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BARTH AS A PHILOSOPHER OF CCMMtJNICATION 
Purpose
Karl Barth's impact upon twentieth-century theology has 
been revolutionary, inspiring a radical redirection of theological 
thought. Martin Marty, theologian at the University of Chicago, 
argues that Barth "helped Christian thought take a 180-degree turn, 
advocating God-centered instead of man-centered theology.Begin­
ning with the revolutionary commentary on The Epistle to the 
Romans (Romerbrief) in 1918, his influence has been international.
Catholic theologian Karl Adam says The Epistle to the Romans fell
2"like a bombshell on the playground of the theologians." Barth's 
description of the disturbance he began to create in the theological 
world compared himself to one groping up the stairs in a dark 
church tower, thinking he held the nandrail for support. Instead,
^Martin E. Marty, Foreword to The Promise of Barth, by Thomas 
C. Oden (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1969), p. 7.
2T. H. L. Parker, Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1970), p. 56.
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he discovered he held the bell rope and to his surprise the great 
bell was ringing above hira.̂
The extent of this revolution and Barth's significance is 
stressed by Thomas Torrance, Professor of Christian Dogmatics at 
the University of Edinburgh: "Karl Barth is incontestably the
greatest figure in modern theology since Schleiermacher, occupying 
an honored position among the great elite of the church— Augustine, 
Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin.Many critics echo Torrance's 
evaluation. Georges Casalis says: "Not since Luther and Calvin
has Protestantism had a single theologian of the stature and impor­
tance of Karl Bar t h . J o h n  Godsey calls him a Church Father, a 
theologian of such creative genius, productivity, and widespread 
influence that his name is appropriately linked with the outstand­
ing figures in the history of Christian thought.® Like many theo­
logians with whom he has been compared, Barth also deserves 
recognition for his philosophical contributions. This study
^John Bowden, Karl Barth (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1971),
p. 38.
a.'Thomas F. Torrance, "Karl Barth," in Ten Makers of Modern 
Protestant Thought, ed. George L. Hunt (New York: Association
Press, 1958), p. 58.
^Georges Casalis, Portrait of Karl Barth (Garden City, N.Y. : 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 34.
^John D. Godsey, Introduction to How I Changed Mv Mind. by 
Karl Barth (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 9.
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particularly concerns his philosophical communicology.
Barth's extensive, international publication underscores his 
importance. His writings possess universal interest, having been 
published in over one hundred major translations including English, 
French, Japanese, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, Danish, Swedish, 
Korean, Italian, Norwegian and Spanish editions.^ He has been one 
of the most prolific theologians in history. His Dogmatics com­
prises thirteen volumes. This work covers more than eight thousand 
pages containing nearly six million words, yet represents only 
half of Barth's output. He wrote many other articles, books, and 
pamphlets. A bibliography compiled in 1956 for his seventieth 
birthday credited him with more than four hundred and six items.^ 
Barth's extensive writings have been an abundant source for modem 
theology; he also appears to offer benefits for the philosophy of 
communication.
Barth's concept of theology is a primary reason for recogniz­
ing him as a philosopher of communication. For Barth theology, 
language, and communication are inseparably related. By nature 
and etymology, "theology is a logia. logic, or language bound to
9the theos, which both makes it possible and also determines it."
^Casalis, Portrait of Karl Barth, p. 122.
^Bowden, Karl Barth, p. 10.
9Karl Barth, Evangelical Theologv: An Introduction, trans.
by Grover Foley (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. 3, 16.
Theology is "responsible reflection on proclamation."^^ Its task 
is critical appraisal of the content of the church's language about 
God, which includes the use and criticism of concepts of human 
communication•
Although Barth never formally articulated a philosophy of
communication, as in the case of Paul Tillich and Soren Kierkegaard,
he wrote extensively and cogently concerning concepts and problems 
in communication. The thesis of this study is that a philosophy 
of communication can be derived from his writings. Thus, the 
clarification and structuring of the philosophy of communication 
implicit in Barth's writings and development is the general pur­
pose of this study.
Several central questions guide this study: (1) What prin­
ciples of communication revealed in Barth's development contribute 
to a philosophy of communication? (2) How did Barth's conceptuali­
zation of existentialism and dialectic impact on his ideas about 
communication? (3) What is Barth's conceptualization of communi­
cation? (4) What principles of communication did Barth believe
were conducive to ecumenicity, or cooperation and unity among groups?
Justification
From consideration of intrinsic factors in Barth's writings
^®Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation, trans. by 
John Riches (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), pp. 8, 20.
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and development, from extrinsic evaluations of his work, and from 
the field of communication numerous reasons emerge to justify an 
analysis of his communicology. Intrinsically, Barth's signifi­
cance as a theologian recommends his importance as a philosopher 
of communication, for his work reflects an inherent and reciprocal 
relation between theology and communication. The ultimate data 
and questions of his work involve issues of communication. The 
particular occasion for his theological work— the problem of pro­
claiming the Word of God— reveals the bearing of communication on 
his thought. Barth's methods, including his use of existential 
communication and dialectic, involve important concepts of communi­
cation. Many problems in his writings interrelate with communica­
tion: problems such as the nature of theology, communication,
man, language, listening, and proclamation.
Criticism of Barth provides important extrinsic reasons for 
deriving a philosophy of communication from his writings. Since 
he is considered the outstanding Protestant theologian of this 
century by many critics, it seems appropriate to study Barth's 
communicative philosophy. His accomplishment of a notable rein­
terpretation of classical. Reformation, and modern theology merits 
investigation of his approach to communication— the philosophy, 
methods, and principles he used in communicating his innovations. 
His broad humanity and distinctive attitudes about theology contain
6
values for communication. His impact as an ecumenical theologian 
suggests the importance of evaluating his communicology for the 
discovery of principles which make dialogue and community possible.
Beyond the theologically intrinsic and extrinsic factors 
which justify elaborating a philosophy of communication from Barth, 
additional justifications for this study derive from the field of 
communication. The issue of human motives in language is a pivotal 
theme in the writings of Kenneth Burke. His Rhetoric of Religion 
provides several theses substantiating the value of rhetorical 
studies of theological systems. Burke observes that "religion 
has often been looked upon as a center from which all other forms 
of human motivation gradually diverged" and addresses itself "in 
statements of the widest and deepest possible scope, concerning 
the authorship of men's motives." Burke classifies religious 
discourse under rhetoric. Specifically, his "book is about some­
thing so essentially rhetorical as religious nomenclature. . .
While Burke's approach is secular, he advocates studying theologi­
cal systems for their communicological value. In the foreword to 
the Rhetoric of Religion he argues: "Thus it is our 'logological'
thesis that, since the theological use of language is thorough, 
the close study of theology and its forms will provide us with good
^^Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley, Calif.; 
University of California Press, 1970), pp. v-vi.
insight into the nature of language itself as a motive.
While recognizing the rhetorical nature of religion, the 
depth of its appeal to human motives, the rhetorical nature of 
its terminology, and the value of studying theological language 
for its insights into language in general, Burke also recognizes 
in the concept of the Logos a "master analogy, the architectonic 
element from which all the other analogies could be deduced." He 
states; "What we say about words, in the empirical realm, will 
bear a notable likeness to what is said about God in theology." 
Finally, Burke underscores the importance of studying theological 
language by stating: "It is necessary to consider all the sym­
bolic dimensions involved in the motives of the symbol-using 
animal. And this text is intended to show why any secular theory 
of language that ignores the hints provided by theology is bound 
to be inadequate, whether or not theology is 'true.'
The primary objective of the National Developmental Project 
on Rhetoric was "to outline and amplify a theory of rhetoric suit­
able to twentieth-century concepts and n e e d s . S o m e  question 
exists whether this objective was accomplished. Marie Nichols 
contends that the outline of such a theory does not emerge from
l̂ ibid.
^^Xbid., pp. 13-14.
^^Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, eds.. The Prospect of 
Rhetoric (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. v.
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the discussion of many topics. She urges that many students of 
communication are finding more profitable insights into the nature 
of communication by reading philosophers and theologians like 
Buber, Kierkegaard (who influenced the early Barth) and Tillich. 
Rhetoric needs fresh questions and approaches offered by philoso­
phers and theologians.
Richard McKeon argues the significance of rhetoric as "an 
architectonic art, an art of structuring all principles and prod­
ucts of knowing, doing, and making."^® Barth's interpreters agree 
that his work is a unique architectonic production. Otto Weber 
notes that the size of Barth's Dogmatics justifies "the common 
expression that it is an evangelical summa of theology.
Geoffrey Bromiley and Thomas Torrance, in the "Editors' Preface" to 
the last volume of the Dogmatics, commended the work as an achieve­
ment in which "the exposition is sustained throughout volume after
18volume with a marvel of architectonic beauty." Therefore, Barth's
^^Roger E. Nebergall and Marie H. Nichols, "Two Windows on 
the Prospect of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (Febru­
ary 1972):88-96.
^^Richard McKeon, "The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological 
Age; Architectonic Productive Arts," Prospect of Rhetoric, p. 45.
^^Otto Weber, Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, trans. Arthur 
Cochrane (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), p. 15.
1AG. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, Editors' Preface to The 
Doctrine of Reconciliation, by Karl Barth in Church Dogmatics. 13 
vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-1962), 4/4:vi.
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experience in evolving a theological "system" (he personally dis­
dained this term although critics and interpreters apply it to his 
work) should offer insights for rhetoric as an art of organizing 
systems of thought.
Barth's architectonic achievement relates well to rhetorical 
communication's search for more adequate concepts of invention.
Lloyd Bitzer urges discovery of concepts of invention which put 
rhetoric in the service of "the great aspirations of the human 
community." He argues; "Rhetoric as a study and practice is made 
vital by its relation to vital subject matter. The question . . . 
becomes, therefore— what steps must we take to effectively engage 
rhetoric with this subject-matter?" Bitzer capsulizes the need 
for this knowledge as follows: "To paraphrase a line in McKeon's
essay, in these times all men need an art of invention, judgment, 
and action enabling them to understand contemporary problems, to 
formulate and evaluate positions, and to engage in intelligent 
dialogue and action.Barth's achievement of an international 
dialogue and enunciation of positions in careful distinction to 
those of others are inventional accomplishments deserving attention. 
A study of Barth's communicology and its development should contrib­
ute to a better understanding of how rhetorical invention in its 
broad, philosophic conception, can contribute to community.
^^Bitzer and Black, Prospect of Rhetoric, p. 202.
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Beyond problems and Issues arising from theologically intrin­
sic and extrinsic considerations of Barth, the follcn̂ ing questions 
from the field of communication guide this s t u d y ; (1) Ifhat does 
Barth's experience in evolving a theological system teach concern­
ing rhetoric as an architectonic art of organizing systems of 
thought? (2) What does Barth's development and philosophy of 
communication contribute to a better conceptualization of invention?
(3) What unifying, architectonic principles of human motivation, 
language, and communication are discernible in Barth? (4) What 
concepts does Barth provide which may broaden and enrich communi­
cation theory?
Survey of Literature
General theological literature strongly urges continued study
of Barth. In "A Critical Analysis of Barth's Principal Works,"
Georges Casalis considered "The Echo" or response to Barth's
works. He expressed the need for further research as follows:
"Actually, the task of understanding, assimilating and utilizing
21the riches in Barth's work has scarcely begun. . . . "  Thomas C. 
Oden, author of The Promise of Barth, draws the same conclusion;
"It is the conviction and thesis of this book . . . that Barth's
20The questions identified here are specific extensions of 
the central questions of the study identified above, p. 4.
21Casalis, Portrait of Karl Barth, p. 123.
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work is important not only for the past, or for the study of the 
history of theology, but also for the future. His life began a 
new epoch which is even yet awaiting fulfillment and full explica­
tion."^^
A complete survey of Masters Abstracts and Dissertation 
Abstracts from their inception (respectively, 1962 and 1861 to 
the present) was undertaken to discover relevant research on 
Barth. The survey attempted to evaluate all related dissertations 
in philosophy, religion, theology, and communication. This survey 
revealed that there has been no explication of a philosophy of 
communication from Barth. Although more than eighty-five disser­
tations have been reported on Barth, these primarily concern spe­
cific issues. Several studies deal with language and proclamation,
but none appear to present a comprehensive view of a philosophy of 
23communication. The common limitation of these studies is their
22Oden, Promise of Barth, p. 22.
23For example: Sydney Earl Allen, Jr., "A Study of the
Idea of Revelation with Special Reference to the Thought of Paul 
Tillich and Karl Barth" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Nebraska, 1964); William Walter Johnson, "Preaching as Ethical 
Action: A Response to the Concentration on Preaching in Barth
and Bultmann from the Viewpoint of Practical Theology" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1969); Morris 
Jerome Niedenthal, "Preaching the Presence of God: Based on
a Critical Study of the Sermons of Paul Tillich, Karl Barth and 
Herbert H. Farmer" (Th.D. dissertation. Union Theological Semi­
nary, New York, 1969); and James Kenneth Wilkerson, "Transcendence 
and Language: A Study of the Theology of Karl Barth" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1967).
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restriction to one or two major concepts. The present study is
broader in its concern for the interrelations of a number of topics
which have bearing on a philosophy of communication.
To illustrate how this study fits in with previous research,
it is useful to consider the general plan of two related disser-
24tations in the field of communication. Gary Keith Rayburn 
explored "Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Communication." He sought 
to contribute to the field of speech relevant areas of Tillich's 
thought. "A comprehensive picture of Tillich's philosophy of 
communication was obtained by utilizing his lectures on communica­
tion, the insights growing from Tillich's own personal efforts to
25communicate, and his underlying methodological assumptions." 
Rayburn evaluated Tillich's assessment of communication, forms 
of relationships in communication, the primary aims and ethical 
imperatives of communication, and considered obstacles to communi­
cation which destroy relationships necessary for community. He
Raymond Eugene Anderson's "Kierkegaard's Theory of Communi­
cation," Dissertation Abstracts 20 (1960):4213, is a kindred study. 
Like the present study, Anderson's discovered a theory of communi­
cation in a broad literature including theological writings. His 
study united ethical, religious, philosophical, psychological, aes­
thetic, and communicological elements, located a number of problems 
of communication in the "coreligious sphere" and related them to 
current issues in the field of communication. This study may be 
of particular interest since Barth acknowledged his early depend­
ence on Kierkegaard.
25Gary Keith Rayburn, "Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Communi­
cation," Dissertation Abstracts 30 (March 1970):4048-A.
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treated conditions under which communication can best be fulfilled, 
including "dialogue situations, correlated messages, and an apolo­
getic outlook.
Carolyn Castleberry Deile also investigated "Paul Tillich's 
Philosophy of Communication." Her study was outlined as follows:
Paul Tillich never dealt systematically with the philoso­
phy of communication or with any of its constituent elements, 
although he referred to them obliquely throughout his writings 
in relation to other major topics. It was the thesis of this 
study that a philosophy of communication could be constructed 
from his writings. The purpose of the study was to provide a 
systematic explication of that philosophy of communication.
The materials used in this study consisted primarily of 
Tillich's writings between 1933 and 1965, plus his posthum­
ously published works to date. The analytical stage of this 
study involved discovering all those elements deemed relevant 
for a philosophy of communication from his works, clarifying 
and interpreting them. The synthetic stage involved organ­
izing them into a meaningful and coherent theoretical frame­
work.
Deile found that the major elements in Tillich's philosophy of 
communication inhere in his theory of language. Her study con­
sidered Tillich's philosophical anthropology with its implications 
for communication. Tillich's philosophical methods, including 
dialectic and dialogue, were examined for their bearing on the 
rational and ethical dimensions of communication. Finally, the 
social-political dimension of communication was considered in 
terras of relationships and community.
ZGlbid.
27Carolyn Castleberry Deile, "Paul Tillich's Philosophy of 
Communication," Dissertation Abstracts 32 (April 1972):5920-A.
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This project compares with the Rayburn and Deile studies as 
follows: it seeks a comprehensive picture of a philosophy of
communication in Barth by deriving insights from his personal 
efforts to communicate and by analyzing communicative implications 
of his methodological assumptions; it endeavors to explain the 
fundamental assumptions which structured his philosophy of communi­
cation, to discern his assessment of communication, the primary 
aims of communication; and it inquires how communication influences 
relationships and community.
Methodologically, this study appears similar to the Deile 
study. It shares a similar thesis but stresses the term 
"derived" rather than "constructed." The reason for this emphasis 
is that Barth's approach to theology and the approach of this study 
is largely inductive. The procedure is one of discerning, discov­
ering— observing an unfolding process— more than constructing.
The selective use of a broad literature, as in the case of the 
Anderson and Rayburn studies, is similar. The analytic and syn­
thetic processes in the Deile study are also involved in the present 
study.
Data for this study divides into four categories: (1) pas­
sages in the Church Dogmatics relevant to Barth’s communicology.
The methodology of the present study is elaborated in the 
following section of this chapter.
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(2) other selected writings by Barth, (3) literature interpreting 
Barth, and (4) literature from communication, philosophy, and the­
ology. The criteria for including these writings is threefold: 
that they contribute to understanding Barth's development and influ­
ence, that they are significant for understanding his philosophy 
of communication, and that they represent Barth's better interpre­
ters and his mature thought.
Plan of Study
For philosophical and procedural reasons, this study pri­
marily concentrates upon the Church Dogmatics. While other works 
are used, the basic data for a philosophy of communication is 
located there. Georges Casalis, summarizing the earlier writings 
in "A Critical Analysis of Barth's Principal Works," stated: "All
the above work . . . prepares for, centers upon and is fulfilled in
29the Church Dogmatics." Geoffrey Bromiley, co-editor of the Dog­
matics with Thomas Torrance, states:
Barth has expressed the desire that he should be judged 
theologically by the Church Dogmatics rather than by earlier 
writings. This does not mean that the latter are unimportant. 
Nor does it mean that many of the earlier themes are not 
present in the Dogmatics. It might be argued that the Dog­
matics can be understood only in the light of Romans. Yet 
there is a difference in assumptions, emphases, and basic 
understanding. Hence one must look to the Dogmatics for a
O Q Casalis, Portrait of Karl Barth, p. 104.
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proper view of Barth's teaching.
The research for this study proceeded as follows: It derived
by an inductive, observational approach, unfolding a philosophy 
of communication implicit in Barth's development and the Dogmatics. 
This involved an analytic process isolating parts of Barth's develop­
ment and writings most relevant to a philosophy of communication 
and examining these to discover their nature, function, and meaning. 
Also involved was an interpretative process based on a critical 
reading of the selected literature which elicited the meaning of 
this philosophy in terras of concepts in the field of communication. 
This interpretative process, as each of the processes, combined 
theoretic concepts from the fields of theology, philosophy, and 
communication. Next was a synthetic process which unified other­
wise disparate elements of a philosophy of communication in Barth. 
This synthesis was achieved by an inductive derivation of topics 
from Barth's teaching. The derivation included a complete survey 
of the Dogmatics to discover concepts related to communication and 
to put them into a framework constituting a philosophy of communi­
cation. The final process was critical evaluation, involving 
appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of Barth's philosophy of 
communication. In summary, these four research procedures
W. Bromiley, "Karl Barth," in Creative Minds in Contemp­
orary Theologv. ed. Philip E. Hughes (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1966), p. 31.
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occurred simultaneously and separately. They were not applied as 
rigid phases, but arose immanently in response to Barth's thought.
Six chapters structure the study's report. The present 
Chapter One, "Barth As a Philosopher of Communication," introduces 
the study's design and indicates Barth's potential as a philosopher 
of communication. Chapter Two, "Principles of Communication in 
Barth's Development," elaborates elements in his development con­
tributing to a philosophy of communication. Chapter Three, "Exis­
tential Communication and Dialectic," examines how Barth's concep­
tualization of existential and dialectical principles provided a 
philosophical basis for his ideas about communication. Chapter 
Four, "Barth's Conceptualization of Communication," clarifies his 
chief objectives for communication. Chapter Five, "Principles of 
Ecumenical Communication," focuses on concepts in Barth relevant 
to the achievement of community. Chapter Six, "Barth's Contribu­
tions to a Philosophy of Communication," sums up and assesses some 
values of Barth's communicology.
CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OP CCMMUNICATION 
IN BARTH'S DEVELOPMENT
This chapter examines origins of a philosophy of communica­
tion in the work of Karl Barth. The central question addressed 
is: What principles of communication revealed in Barth's develop­
ment contribute to a philosophy of communication?^ To answer this 
question the chapter first considers Barth's "rhetorical situation,' 
or factors in his environment which influenced his communicology, 
including his educational development, and, secondly, examines the 
implications of his "scientific-critical" attitude. A central 
theme evolves: the primary architectonic principle governing
Barth's development and thought, and any philosophy of communica­
tion derived therefrom, appears to be a movement toward complete 
fidelity to the object of inquiry as determining the nature of 
scientific activity, rationality, and discourse.
A principle of communication implies here a guiding concept 
or motivating force influencing the production and/or evaluation 
of discourse. Particular emphasis is given to Barth's inventional 





An adequate interpretation of Barth's philosophy of communica­
tion examines his "rhetorical situation"— i.e., specific stimuli 
in his environment which influenced his approach to communication—  
in order to discover implications for a philosophy of communication. 
Such an examination accords with current philosophical and communi­
cological thought. Michael Polanyi, for example, urges recognition 
of a personal participation of the knower in all acts of scientific 
understanding; we inevitably see the universe from a center lying
within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a language condi-
2tioned by the exigencies of our particular situation. The reason 
for examining Barth's educational development, then, is to under­
stand his intellectual and "rhetorical situation.
Barth's educational development conditioned his philosophy 
of communication, for it shaped his intellectual and "rhetorical 
situation." To locate formative influences in this development, 
this section first examines his educational goals and experiences 
as they influenced his thought and were manifested in his concept
2Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958).
^The later Wittgenstein, Oxford philosopher R. G. Colling- 
wood, and communicologists such as Bitzer and Wallace emphasize 
that understanding discourse demands thorough knowledge of source 
and situation. Interpreting philosophic concepts and language 
requires taking into full account the contexts and purposes of 
the "players" of a particular "language-game."
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of theology as "faith seeking understanding;" second, explains how 
Barth's use of educational positions as a communication channel 
redirected his thought and modes of communication; and third, indi­
cates major characteristics of Barth's "scientific-critical" atti­
tude which were developed within his Swiss-German educational 
experience and which are necessary for understanding his principles 
of communication.
"Faith seeking understanding"
Barth viewed learning as a life-long process and vital part 
of his concept of theology as "faith seeking understanding." Even . 
as a youth, he began to manifest this fundamental concept. John 
Bowden explains;
Looking back on his childhood, Karl picked out the time 
of his confirmation as the real beginning of his own voca­
tion to theology. "On the eve of my confirmation day," he 
wrote, "I boldly resolved to become a theologian, perhaps 
not so much with the thought of preaching . . . but rather 
in the hope of realizing in the course of this study some 
substantial understanding of a confession of faith of which 
I had only a vague apprehension."'^
As a student, pastor, professor, and mature theologian, Barth
advanced his education. Throughout his development, he demonstrated
his presupposition that understanding is a necessary and inherent
goal for faith, not in order to prove it but to complete it. Barth
found in his religious experience, in the nature of faith itself.
^Bowden, Karl Barth, p. 30.
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incentive for a lifelong pursuit of theological knowledge.^
Barth developed in a family which emphasized theological 
study. His father, Fritz Barth, was a minister in the Swiss 
Reformed Church at Basel and later Professor of Church History 
and New Testament at Bern. Karl's grandfathers were ministers and 
a younger brother, Peter, was a well-known Calvin scholar. His 
other brother, Heinrich, was professor of philosophy at the Univer­
sity of Basel. Extensive evidence, implicit and explicit, reveals 
that his father and brothers stimulated his intellectual develop­
ment. From his father Barth apparently received incentive for aca­
demic excellence and the essence of his Reformed theology. Barth 
dialogued with his brothers formally, discussing their work in his 
Dogmatics. He drew heavily upon Calvin and upon existential phil­
osophy, major concerns of his brothers. New Testament scholarship 
and church history, specialties of his father, were evident in his 
theology. Barth shared substantially with the theological circle 
of his immediate family, and this personal environment contributed 
to his theological concepts, his existential interests, and the 
broad ideational foundation of his communicology.
^The rationale for this pursuit is detailed in Barth's study, 
Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum (Richmond, Va.: John Knox
Press, 1960), and includes the reasons that such understanding 
results in joy for the believer, that faith in God demands knowl­
edge of Him, and that knowledge completes the vision of faith and 
brings the believer to its limits.
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From his early educational experience, Barth showed indepen­
dence. Although Karl's education began at home and he initially 
studied under his father in Bern, he then, in keeping with the 
European tradition of studying at several institutions, pursued 
studies in Berlin, again at Bern, and at Tuebingen and Marburg in 
Germany. At first he followed his father's wishes in studying 
under conservative theologians. Soon, however, he asserted his 
desire to pursue a more liberal theological education. This balance 
in his education between liberal and conservative elements appar­
ently contributed to the overall tempered emphasis of his theology 
and his philosophic openness to a wide gamut of views. This open­
ness in Barth's thought and desire to thoroughly explore positions 
even antithetical to his own reflects his integrity and fidelity 
to the Anselmian concept of theology as "faith seeking understand­
ing . "
Barth's use of educational positions
A second influence of Barth's experience in Swiss-German 
education was his use of educational positions as a communication 
channel. Barth's communicology was shaped by his academic environ­
ment. While his initial success came as an obscure Swiss pastor, 
throughout his life (he died on December 10, 1968, at the age of 
eighty-two), Barth's work centered in the university. When Romer- 
brief's dramatic success resulted in his call to a university
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post,^ a marked change followed in his communication: Barth shifted
from the role of a Kierkegaardian, existentially-oriented critic 
to a much more systematic approach.^ His new constructive emphasis 
included analysis of his presuppositions and methods with a definite 
sense of responsibility to integrate his teaching, even with its 
sharp criticisms and reinterpretations, into the existing structure 
of theological thought.
The shift from pastor to professor was pivotal, as Barth 
found the university calling for a very different kind of communi­
cation than the pastorate. After World War II, Barth was much in 
demand as a speaker to aid in German reconstruction. Briefly, he 
was torn between the possibility of a popular speaking career and 
the requirements of his academic work and constructive theology, 
then underway for more than a decade. He chose to devote himself 
to the latter, while continuing some public speaking, even if, as 
in later years, this was primarily to inmates at Basel prison.®
Barth taught successively at the universities of Gottingen, 
Munster, and Bonn in Germany, at Basel, Switzerland, again at Bonn, 
and finally at Basel.
^This shift was relative, not complete. Barth always retained 
some existential emphasis in content although his method of exposi­
tion became more systematic.
®Barth lectured occasionally in European conferences through­
out his career but apparently turned down far more speaking invita­
tions there and internationally than he accepted. Late in his 
career, in 1962, Barth traveled briefly as a lecturer and delivered 
a series of addresses at the University of Chicago and Princeton 
Theological Seminary, later published as a synopsis of his basic 
thought. See Barth, Evangelical Theology.
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The Dogmatics, with its great architectonic demands, remained his 
lifetime work. Consequently, Barth's thought was necessarily 
channeled academically to deal directly with problems of episte- 
mology and communication which received only indirect attention in 
his early days as a pastor.
Barth's use of educational positions was important, then, in 
redirecting his thought, changing his mode of communication from a 
primarily existential to a constructive orientation, reshaping his 
style, and directing his attention to similar yet qualitatively 
different issues than he faced as a pastor. As with Luther, the 
great energy Barth invested in his teaching and research became 
the driving force expressed in his lectures, dialogues, articles, 
books, public addresses, and, above all, in the Dogmatics. The 
stimulus of the academic environment of Swiss-German theology, 
with the demands of its thorough scientific-critical scholarship, 
became the nucleus of his communicative efforts.
Barth's "scientific-critical" attitude
A third influence of Barth's education upon his life, work, 
and concepts of theology and communication was the development by 
Swiss-German education of his "scientific-critical" attitude. 
Wilhelm Pauck explains the influence of German education upon the 
scientific-critical attitude of its theologians :
German theology has held a peculiar place in public life.
Unlike the usual American practice the theological faculties
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have always been members of the universities. They have been 
engaged in their research under full loyalty to the scientific 
principles of investigation as these are generally observed in 
the institutions of higher learning. This loyalty and freedom 
accounts for the advances made by German Protestant theol­
ogy. . . .
Generally speaking, German theology is the most academic 
of all. It has become extraordinarily learned, both in its 
critical-historical and constructive-philosophical aspects.
For this reason it has always been most sensitive to the 
changes and movements in the scientific and philosophical 
fields.9
Barth received much of his education in Germany, taught there 
for a considerable period, and developed his "scientific-critical" 
attitude within this intellectual tradition. Characteristics of 
this "scientific-critical" attitude Barth developed were: fidelity
of attention to a specific object of inquiry, pursuit of knowledge 
according to a responsible epistemological path, application of 
scientific canons of thought with accompanying rigor of investiga­
tion, integration of knowledge with previous research, and accuracy 
of reporting. These elements characterized Barth's writing and 
underwrote the claim he made that his theology was scientific.
This conception was succinctly expressed by Barth: "I propose
that by science we understand an attempt at comprehension and 
exposition, at investigation and instruction, which is related to 
a definite object and sphere of activity." Stated somewhat more 
particularly: "...  Christian dogmatics is an attempt— an
^Wilhelm Pauck, Karl Barth: Prophet of a New Christianity?
(New York: Harper & Bros., Publishers, 1931), p. 11-12.
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attempt to understand and an attempt to expound, an attempt to see, 
to hear and to state definite facts, to survey and co-ordinate 
these facts, to present them in the form of a d o c t r i n e . F o r  the 
purpose of considering his "scientific-critical" attitude, then, 
it can be stated that what Barth means by science at least involves 
elements of historical-critical research.
In summary, several factors in Barth's "rhetorical situa­
tion" conditioned his thought, language, and/or contributed to a 
philosophy of communication: (1) his immediate theological environ­
ment, which contributed to the scope, variety, openness, independ­
ence, and balance of his thought, as exemplified in his concept of 
theology as "faith seeking understanding"; (2) the influence of 
his Swiss-German academic environment, including his use of univer­
sity positions as a communication channel, involving redirection 
of his communication as he shifted from a primarily existential to 
a systematic orientation; (3) the stimulus provided by these posi­
tions which enabled Barth to invest his rigorous and energetic 
teaching and research into publishable lectures, dialogues, arti­
cles, books, public addresses, and, above all, the Dogmatics ; and
(4) the development by Barth's Swiss-German education of his 
"scientific-critical" attitude, including elements which influenced
^^Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1959), p. 9.
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his communicological thought.
Implications of Barth's "Scientific-Critical"
Attitude
This section analyzes Barth's "scientific-critical" attitude, 
projecting contributions to a theory of invention, or concepts 
and methods which guide the production and judgment of discourse. 
Four aspects of Barth's "scientific-critical" attitude grounded in 
his situation and development are examined: (1) his concept of
fidelity to the object of thought and language, (2) his experimen­
tal attitude toward language, (3) his self-criticism and critical 
discontent, and (4) his view toward argumentation.
Fidelity to object
The central movement in Barth's theology and a primary ele­
ment in his epistemology and communicology appears to be his con­
cept of fidelity to the object of inquiry. This concept appears 
throughout Barth's thought and, as his arguments suggest, it 
guided his production and evaluation of discourse. This principle 
is examined in its impact upon three areas of his thought: (1) his
ideas regarding the nature of scientific activity, (2) his
The preceding section indicated the influence of Swiss- 
German education in the development of Barth's "scientific- 
critical" attitude and provided a definition of his concept of 
theology as a critical science. The present section elaborates 
particular elements within this attitude as they contribute to 
a philosophy of communication.
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conceptualization of rationality, and (3) his position on the goal 
of language.
Scientific activity
Barth's conceptualization of the nature of scientific activ­
ity was conditioned by his recognition of the importance of strict 
fidelity to the object of inquiry. As he conceived it, the essence 
of science is the investigation of a specific object within a par­
ticular sphere of activity.The unique object or objects of an 
inquiry— its given datum and/or data— provide definiteness, sub­
stantive content, and direction for that inquiry. To attend to 
this special object or these objects with the appropriate attitudes, 
presuppositions, and methods, is to proceed scientifically; to 
deviate therefrom is to proceed unscientifically.
Barth's thought concerning the crucial importance of fidelity 
to the object in scientific inquiry is very similar to Francis 
Bacon's. Bacon held that "our minds are full of 'idols' (false 
notions or erroneous modes of thinking)" and that we must rid our­
selves of these, suspending a priori judgments and opening our
^%arth. Dogmatics in Outline, p. 9. Barth defines an object 
as "something posited in its own being by another." Barth, Doctrine 
of Creation. 3/2:194. In Barth's discussions the objects of dis­
course and inquiry are potentially limitless; they include man,
God (both of whom are also regarded as subjects), documents, as 
the Bible, language, which is a special object of theological 
inquiry, and any other posited existant of the universe.
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thought to the object of inquiry to let it speak to us.^^ Bacon
argued that "all depends on never letting the eyes of our mind
stray from the things themselves, so that it may receive its images 
14plainly." Similarly, Barth held that persistent attention to the 
object of inquiry determines the validity of scientific theology. 
"The place of theology," he wrote, "... will be determined by 
the impetus which it receives from within its own domain and from 
its own object. B a r t h  stressed, as did Bacon, the critical 
importance of attending to and "receiving" from the special object 
of inquiry. Barth challenged the theological world as Bacon did 
the scientific, with a new stress upon the importance of looking 
phenoraenologically at the special object of inquiry. Such an 
emphasis was responsible for an epistemological revolution in 
scientific thought under the stimulus of Bacon and of theological 
thought under Barth.
First, fidelity to the object provides definiteness to 
scientific inquiry. Barth says, "If theology lets itself be 
called and calls itself a 'science,' it thereby declares that . . .
Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969), p. 72, quoting Novum Crganum, I. xxiii 
et seq., xxxix et seq.; II. xv et seq.; De Augmentis Scientarium, 
V. iv; Valerius Terminus. 15f.
^^Ibid., p. 74, quoting Distributio Oparis; Cogitata et Visa 
(Works, iii, 611).
^^Barth, Evangelical Theologv. p. 16.
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like all other so-called sciences, it is a human effort after a 
definite object of knowledge. . . . A science without an actual 
datum or data would be a pseudo-science; such an activity might be 
mythical or poetical, but true science presupposes the existence of 
a given object or objects.Such an object becomes the focal 
point of inquiry within a field of knowledge, ordering thought 
around itself and prescribing the kinds of activity appropriate to 
its nature.
Second, fidelity to the object provides substantive content 
for scientific inquiry. This derives from the phenomenal nature 
of objects: each object presents its own nature, order, stimulus,
and process. To observe, experiment with, or encounter the object 
affords opportunity for substantive discovery. From the observa­
tion and experimental interaction of the theologian and theologi­
cal community with the object, a record of revelation and witness 
to revelation arises. This involves not a single theologian but 
a community of theological inquiry, for science, Barth recognizes, 
requires collective investigation, interaction, and experience
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:7.
^^Barth emphasizes this presupposition of the definiteness 
and existence of the supreme object of theology when he says that 
"the dominant presupposition of its thought and speech is God's 
own proof of his existence and sovereignty" and that "its 
object . . . God Himself— is the law which must be the continual 
starting point of theology." Barth, Evangelical Theology, pp. 8, 
16.
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1Arelated to a special object. The substantive content of theology 
is thus manifested and generated within the theological circle of 
experience and inquiry related to this object.
Third, fidelity to the object provides direction for scien­
tific inquiry. The object is not static; it is manifested progres­
sively and in different forms. For example, the object of theology 
is to be sought in various forms, as in Barth's concept of the
Word of God in its three basic modes: as revealed, as written,
19and as preached. Each form of the object and each special object 
of inquiry requires varied approaches, presuppositions, and 
responses. Barth sees each object which man encounters as a kind 
of "summons" or "claim" which demands a response:
It can be said of every object in the natural and histori­
cal world that it contains and expresses a command to the 
extent that in its existence and essence it demands our atten­
tion, observation, consideration, investigation and understand­
ing— purely for its own sake, because in its special existence 
and mode of existence it is our object, i.e., it confronts us, 
and as such asks us a question— perhaps many questions— which 
await our answer, i.e., our cognition, recognition ̂ gd acknowl­
edgment of it in its special existence and essence.
The object of inquiry, then, by its special demands, calls the
observer to decision, interrogating him, calling for commitment,
action, and ultimately movement in its direction. Fidelity to the
Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 9.
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:98-124, 135. 
^^Barth, Doctrine of God, 2/2:583-585.
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21object, becomes, as Barth says, "a way," that is, the object, by 
the claim of its special characteristics, dictates, in true scien­
tific activity, the unfolding process which will elucidate its 
nature.
This claim exerted by objects provides pivotal direction for 
scientific inquiry. Barth makes this point at the very beginning 
of Evangelical Theologv:
Theology is one among those human undertakings tradition­
ally described as "sciences." Not only the natural sciences 
are "sciences." Humanistic sciences also seek to apprehend 
a specific object and its environment in the manner directed 
by the phenomenon itself; they seek to understand it on its 
own terms and to ggeak of it along with all the implications 
of its existence.
In the case of theology, the direction provided by the special 
object is decisive for its methodology. Barth consequently rejects 
an "arbitrarily chosen basic view" for theology. Although recog­
nizing that presuppositions accompany any inquiry, he insists that 
in genuine scientific investigation such conceptions "must not 
usurp the position of the object. ..." Instead, he contends,
"the choice of dogmatic method can be made only with the intention
of placing human thinking and speaking on the path of total surren-
23der to the controlling power of its object. ..."
21Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/2:856.
22 Barth, Evangelical Theologv, p. 3.
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/2:866-867.
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The implications of this decision are momentous;
. . . this means that from the human point of view the position 
which in a system is occupied by the fundamental principle of 
interpretation can only remain basically open in Church dog­
matics, like the opening in the centre of a wheel. It cannot 
be occupied even hypothetically or provisionally by any a priori 
decisions. It is ready to receive those decisions with which 
the object will urgently confront human thinking and speaking.
It is ready for new insights which no former store of knowl­
edge can really confront on equal terms or finally withstand. 
Essentially dogmatic method consists in this openness to receive 
new truth, and only in this. It consists in unceasing and 
ready vigilance to see that the object is able to speak for 
itself, and that its effect on human thinking and speaking is 
not disturbed. . . . Therefore it presupposes the operation of 
the object itself. . .
This openness in method based upon fidelity to the object of 
inquiry— upon receptivity to its movements and changes— was deter­
minative for the direction of Barth's theology. With such a view, 
the process of invention— the utilization of concepts and methods 
guiding the production and evaluation of discourse— can remain 
open and progressive. With such a view, no central a priori con­
cept is likely to control and perhaps ultimately stultify thought. 
For this reason, Barth's thought, now rendered from the standpoint 
of his own production, must remain open and alive to continual 
interpretation and reinterpretation. Whereas many philosophical 
and theological systems eventually stagnate and become outdated as 
their central, controlling presupposition is exhausted, in Barth's 
case, taking his thought and method on its own terms, an openness
Ibid.
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for new interpretation must always remain. Even Barth himself and 
his thought as an object of inquiry offers ongoing and varied direc­
tion for its observers.
Rationality
A second area of Barth's thought conditioned by his concept 
of fidelity to the object of inquiry was his conceptualization of 
rationality. Barth's concept of theology as a rational activity 
involved the notion that "theology is a logia. logic, or language 
bound to the theos, which both makes it possible and also deter­
mines i t . I t s  rationality derives from its object. This iden­
tification of reason with adherence and appropriate response to 
the object of reflection was a significant part of Barth's concept 
of rationality. In interpreting Anselm's concept of ratio, or 
reason, Barth, who closely identified his thought with Anselm’s,^^
Barth, Evangelical Theology, p. 16.
^^Barth acknowledged Anselm's direct influence upon his 
thought. In the preface to the second edition of Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum. he stated concerning this pivotal commentary of 1931; 
"So far as I was concerned, after finishing this book I went 
straight into my Church Dogmatics and it has kept me occupied ever 
since. . . . "  Barth noted that, at that time, few commentators 
"realized how much it has influenced me or been absorbed into my 
own line of thinking. Most of them have completely failed to see 
that in this book on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not 
the key, to an understanding of that whole process of thought that 
has impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only 
one proper to theology." Barth, Anselm, p. 11. An understanding 
of Barth's interpretation of Anselm, particularly at the crucial 
point of his concept of fidelity to the object of inquiry, is nec­
essary for the comprehension of principles of invention and com­
munication in Barth.
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stated that "the right use of the human ratio is determined pri­
marily by its object. . . . Barth's interpretation strongly 
emphasizes that "ontic rationality precedes n o e t i c , t h a t  is, 
the given object is prior to the event of knowing. Ontology pre­
cedes epistemology. Rationality, therefore, is, at least in sig­
nificant part, conformity to the object of reflection; it is 
appropriate behavior in terms of the particular object of thought.
Barth and Anselm speak of rationality in various senses and 
29contexts. In discussing Anselm's concept of ratio. Barth writes: 
"Among the many possible meanings of ratio in an author who con­
tinually employs the concept subjectively and objectively . . .
27Barth, Anselm, p. 46.
^®Ibid., p. 50.
29For example, Barth sees in Anselm three main uses of ratio: 
"the primary capacity of dealing with experience, of formulating 
conceptions and judgments ;" "the ratio of the words and acts of 
God . . . their necessity and possibility;" and "a third and ulti­
mate ratio . . . that is with the divine Word consubstantial with 
the Father." Barth stresses the objective ratio in Anselm and finds 
"only one passage in Anselm where the human side of ratio is empha­
sized and therefore its contrast to the objective ratio to a certain 
extent made prominent." Barth, Anselm, pp. 44-45. In Evangelical 
Theologv. Barth briefly speaks of "reason" as "the capacity for 
perception, judgment, and language common to believers as well as 
to all men," identifying this as one of the "subordinate presup­
positions with which evangelical theology works." Barth, Evangeli­
cal Theologv. p. 7. In the Dogmatics. Barth refers to rationality 
as "meaningful order" and relates its meaning to recognition, recep­
tivity, action, and encounter with the Logos as the ground of ration­
ality. Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/2:419-426.
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the one that is most highly recommended as a general guide is con- 
30formity to law." Barth's conceptualization of law in the con­
text of rationality seems to involve recognition and proper response 
to the inherent order of phenomena. This is consistent with his 
view of man as a "'rational being' (Vernunftwesen)." Barth uses 
this term comprehensively, identifying it with the Latin ratio 
and Greek logos. In an important anthropological discussion in 
which man is considered as the special object of theological knowl­
edge,^^ he writes:
. . .  we understand by it a "meaningful order," so that when 
we say that man is a rational being, what we mean is that it 
is proper to his nature to be in rational order. . . . That 
man is a rational being we also understand as an event. . . . 
Man lives as man in a meaningful order. He recognises it and 
subjects himself to it. He himself establishes and observes 
it. He is man as it is valid; and he makes use of its valid­
ity in human perception and activity. As this happens^^ i.e., 
as he himself brings it about, he is a rational being.
Rationality, then, is ordered activity according to the law of an 
object’s being.
Barth’s concept of reason provides a solid foundation for 
invention, correlating objectivity and subjectivity in a purpose­
ful order. By emphasizing rationality as conformity to law, i.e..
^^Barth, Anselm, p. 49.
^^Barth identifies man as "the central object of the theo­




as adherence to the order and process of an object's being, a 
scientific orientation may be given to the production and evalua­
tion of discourse. Significant potential thus resides in Barth's 
concept of rationality for a modern theory of invention. His 
scientific concept of reason contributes to a twentieth-century 
theory of rhetoric. This contribution, grounded in Barth's notion 
of fidelity to the object of inquiry, the primary conditioning 
factor in his concept of rationality, contains the following ele­
ments observed in the preceding discussion: (1) that definite­
ness, substantive content, and direction are provided for discourse 
by fidelity to a specific object of inquiry; (2) that scientific 
inventional judgments must be based upon observation of the laws 
and characteristic actions of an object's being; (3) that a priori 
judgments need suspension in order that, as Bacon and Barth agree, 
proper, inductively-formed conclusions may be drawn; (4) that 
collective experience and experimentation with respect to an object 
is required for sound inventional judgments; that individual judg­
ments must contribute within a community of scholarship, research, 
and/or experience; (5) that because of the uniqueness and vitality 
of most objects, a variety of approaches and methods of analysis 
are required; (6) that fidelity to an object requires continual 
openness to its movements; that, consequently, room must always 
remain for changed perceptions and new interpretations of any
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object; (7) that fidelity to the object provides an objective 
starting point and boundaries for rational and scientific thought 
and discourse; and (8) that rationality is a continuing, active 
process and event: a dynamic response of a knower to a thing known.
The goal of language
A third area of Barth's thought conditioned by his concept 
of fidelity to the object of inquiry was his view that such fidel­
ity determines the goal of language. Earth held that "the goal of
thought and language must be determined entirely by the unique 
33object in question." This conclusion follov/s primarily from the 
relation of scientific inquiry and rationality to a special object 
of inquiry, from the demands of the nature of such inquiry and 
from that of its own inherent order. Essentially, the demand is 
phenomenological: the special object of inquiry requires thought
and language which accurately represent its unique characteristics. 
As in modern semantics, language, as Barth conceived it, must 
scientifically and rationally represent the realities to which it 
refers, although its limitation in representing these objects must 
be clearly recognized. Therefore, the goal of language must be to 
adequately apprehend and to speak faithfully of the object of 
thought and inquiry, following its movements and co-responding
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/2:125.
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with it. Fidelity to object provides a crucial orientation for 
language. The special object may be irreplaceable. Particularly 
is this true in Barth's theology: the object is original, unique,
and authoritative. The object is a kind of telos, an ultimate 
end, turning point, and boundary. No substitute will serve in the 
object's place: it must be given its archetypal position as the
central model, foundation, reference point, and goal of thought 
and language.
In summary, the central movement in Barth's theology and in 
his epistemology and communicology, appears to be his concept of 
fidelity to the object of inquiry. This concept was examined in 
its impact upon three areas of his thought: the nature of scientific




A second element of Barth's "scientific-critical" attitude, 
exhibited in his development and contributing to a theory of inven­
tion, was his experimental attitude toward language. This attitude 
was a direct consequence of Barth's concept of fidelity to the 
object. Concerning the theologian’s attitude toward thought and 
language, Barth said: "It is summoned and commissioned by its
object for a sight, thought, and speech that are open and flexible
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on all sides. It is unconditionally bound to its object alone.'' 
Thus, "it must inquire into the logic, dialectic, and rhetoric 
that stem from its object, the divine L o g o s . A  dual "summons" 
is given for language which is faithful and flexible in view of 
its object. Fidelity is required if language represents its 
object; flexibility is required if it responds to the object and 
situation in which it arises.
Barth's experimental attitude toward language contributes 
in three significant ways to a theory of invention. First, Barth 
held that the teaching of any discipline, particularly theology, 
is not to be received or communicated as a static body of theory 
but requires continual testing of ideas within the boundaries of 
the discipline (within the limits of revelation in Christian theol­
ogy) and the adaptation and testing of language. He held that "as 
a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientific test to 
which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about 
God which is peculiar to her. Such testing inheres in theology 
as a "logia, logic, or language bound to the theos. If such 
an obligatory relation to the object of inquiry is accepted, then 
it follows that testing the fidelity of language to this object is
^^Barth, Evangelical Theology, p. 91, 
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:1. 
^^Barth, Evangelical Theology, p. 16.
41
required. Since language is a response to objects, the ontology 
of these objects must precede and exert a controlling influence 
over the language which is evoked by them; language must be tested 
against its objects and thus must remain experimental. Barth 
explains:
According to the rule of Hilary, Non Sermoni res, sed rei 
sermo subiectus est (The thing is not subject to the word, 
but the word is subject to the thing). Or, as the same idea 
is expressed in Anselm's terms, the ratio and the nécessitas 
of theological knowledge must be directed by the ratio and 
the nécessitas of its object.
Thus, "language about God has the proper content, when it conforms 
to the essence of the Church, i.e., to Jesus Christ. This 
involves application of the various forms of revelation: the
Logos as revealed, the written Word of God, and the Word of God 
as preached. But the conformity of language to its object is seen 
indirectly: the language which seeks to interpret the conformity
of given discourse with its object "is itself in need of criticism 
and revision, of repeated and ever closer re-testing."^® The lan­
guage of critical science itself becomes a further "object of, 
fresh human effort."^® Criticism itself needs criticism.
®^Ibid., p. 90.




Consequently, the results of earlier inquiries within a discipline, 
and those of the present as well, are never final. Therefore, the 
task and language of dogmatics as a critical science can never be 
"merely the combination, repetition, and transcription of a num­
ber of already present 'truths of revelation,' once for all
41expressed and authentically defined as to wording and meaning." 
Received concepts and language must be investigated anew; the 
fidelity of contemporary language to original and current meanings 
must be re-explored. Language must be tested and retested to 
validate its fidelity to its objects.
Second, Barth held that language must be regarded as in proc­
ess, as fluid, mobile, tentative, and always subject to revision; 
that language must reflect movement, change, energy, and life.
Barth believed that human language behavior reflects man's state 
of knowledge at a given time. Consequently, language must be re­
garded as experimental and subject to revision. This experimental 
attitude toward language was exhibited as early as September 4, 
1914, when Barth wrote his life-long colleague, Swiss pastor 
Eduard Thurneysen: "Here are two sermons from me. . .  . You will
look at them not as though they were finished products but only as
41lbid.
^^Karl Barth, The Heidelberg Catechism for Today, trans. 
by Shirley C. Guthrie, Jr. (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press,
1964), p. 19.
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experiments. We are really all of us experimenting now, each in 
his own way and every Sunday in a different way, in order to become 
to some degree masters of the limitless problem. . . .
This process and experimental view of language entailed use
of new approaches, emphases, and symbolic variety from week to 
week in Barth's preaching. This experimentation was quite effec­
tive, as Barth's sermons and lectures commanded unusual attention 
from his early career. Barth's language, especially in his early 
sermons and lectures, was marked by sharp images and contrasts, 
by a prophetic tenor and sense of urgency and crisis. It was a
language suited to the mood and aftermath of World War I. As a
professor, Barth's language moved in new directions and, through­
out his career, he experimented with new language. This experi­
mentation is evident, for example, in the great amount of revision 
Barth made of his own work as in Romerbrief's six editions; in the 
Christian Dogmatics of 1927, predecessor to the Church Dogmatics; 
and in his published lectures and sermons. Barth's theology was 
often described as "a bird in flight"; his formulations reflected 
movement, change, energy, and life. Barth regarded the language 
of theology and proclamation as a living response to a living object, 
and as an ongoing response to an ever-new revelation. Part of
Karl Barth and Eduard Thurneysen, Revolutionarv Theology 
in the Making; Barth-Thurnevsen Correspondence. 1914-1925, trans. 
by James D. Smart (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1964), p. 25.
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theology's purpose, as Barth conceived it, is to trace the work-of
God "in the history of his deeds." This impetus does not derive
from its own efforts, but from that of its object. In recounting
this history theology employs "human perceptions, concepts, and
formulations of human language." But it does this properly only
when it "follows" this movement of its object. "Therefore, in its
perception, meditation, and discussion, theology must have the
44character of a living procession."
Barth's process view of language and thought guided his pro­
duction and evaluation of discourse. Barth held that "there can 
be no completed work. All human achievements are no more than 
prolegomena; and this is especially the case in the field of theol­
ogy. Barth's process orientation greatly influenced his sermons,
lectures, and writing ; it meant that he regarded his rhetorical 
productions as ongoing, dynamic, and evolving. Barth confessed 
that he did not fully know the specific direction that each volume 
of the Dogmatics would take, even though its overall plan was laid 
early in his career, by 1932. He wrote for more than thirty years 
on this architectonic work, yet it was never completed; the last
^^Barth, Evangelical Theologv, p. 9.
^^Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans. 6th ed., trans. by 
Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 2-3.
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volume is called a "Fragment. Nowhere in Barth is this process
orientation, with its great impact upon invention and language,
more evident than in his preface to the third edition of Romans:
A time may come when it will be necessary for me once again 
to rewrite the whole. I hardly know whether I ought to fear 
or to desire this. Our modern life is subject to strange and 
rapid changes. Whether this is a symptom of decay, or whether 
it is a sign that we are moving towards momentous spiritual 
decisions, who can say? At all events, the situation alters 
from day to day, conference succeeds conference, men instruct 
and are instructed, a man says something, and then, finding it 
echoed in the mouths of others, fears to say it again lest its 
meaning be altogether lost in the noise of its echo, and yet, 
side by side with all this dangerous applause, fresh, valuable 
criticism makes itself heard, and requires"most careful consid­
eration. "We can never plunge a second time into the same 
river, for now it narrows, now it broadens out, but always it 
flows on and on." How then can such a living and responsible 
undertaking as a commgnt^y on the Epistle to the Romans ever 
remain stationary
It appears, then, that a process orientation to language and
responsiveness to changing situations was evident in Barth and that
this viewpoint was basic to his inventional theory.
Third, Barth held that the theologian is free to use various 
terminologies but is not bound to them; that language is free in its 
concepts and speech so long as it maintains fidelity to its special
“̂^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/4. Perhaps prophet­
ically, several years before his death, Barth wrote: "With every
step that the theologian ventures, he has occasion to comprehend 
once more and unambiguously the fragmentary character of his ques­
tions and answers, his research and speech, his discoveries and 
formulations." Barth, Evangelical Theologv, p. 150.
^^Barth, Epistle to the Romans, pp. 15-16.
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object. The issue here is recognition of the sources of both con­
tent and form. Barth explains that "theological speech is taught 
its content by exegesis and dogmatics, and it is given its form 
through the experiences of whatever psychology, sociology, or 
linguistics may be most trustworthy at a given moment." Thus, the 
theologian simultaneously employs sacred and secular terminologies. 
The reason for this is that theological speech "must point to the 
Word that goes forth from God and goes man." Therefore, both 
kinds of language are indispensable and can be mutually supportive, 
for one cannot be received without the other.
Barth held that all human languages are potentially usable 
and lawful for the theologian; his ultimate criterion, however, 
for their usability must be whether they can be used in ways appro­
priate to the special object of inquiry. Barth claims that "as a 
human science, theology constantly and universally employs the 
viewpoints, concepts, images, and linguistic media that have been 
handed down or have newly arisen in its time and situation." 
Theology shares this utilization of current languages with other 
sciences. But Barth warns that it must not allow itself to be 
bound to the laws of any of them. It must follow the law of its 
own being and object. Thus, theology as a "free science . . . 
preserves its freedom by making use of every human capacity for
Barth, Evangexical Theology, p. 183.
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perception, judgment, and speech, without being bound to any pre­
supposed episteraology.
Barth believed in the renewal of language; that is, that 
terras come into being to meet the needs of a particular situation, 
and when that situation changes so must the language. He thus 
emphasized conceptual and terminological freedom for the theologian. 
He warned against the danger of becoming bound for too long to any 
terminology, of permitting "certain ruts to appear, ruts in which 
our thoughts run and in so doing acquire a dead weight which in 
theology they must never have." Barth noted that some of his stu­
dents complained that "I no longer used the language of the 'Epistle 
to the Romans.'" Barth's response was;
On the contrary, you should be thankful that I no longer 
burden you with "void" (Hohlraum) and "deathline" (Todeslinie) 
That served its day. To-day it would be confusing and weari­
some if I were to continue with it. I profoundly hope that in 
five or ten years I shall be able to speak yet another language 
than I do to-day, and that then also I shall be compelled to 
speak it. . .
Barth stressed he was then "at liberty" to use Kantian-Platonic 
concepts and language but that "if I were to be told to-day that I 
had to use them, I should say with decision. N o . H e  urged that
49lbid., pp. 90-92.
^®Karl Barth, Credo, trans. by J. S. McNab (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 185.
^̂ Ibid.
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terminologies must change with changed situations, that the 
"language-game" of a community must be renewed in its concepts and 
vocabulary in the light of evolving needs and conditions.
In summary, Barth's experimental attitude toward language 
resulted from his concept of fidelity to the object of inquiry.
This experimental attitude contributes at least the following 
elements to a theory of invention: First, the teaching of any
discipline, particularly theology, is not to be received or communi­
cated as a static body of theory but involves continual testing of 
ideas within the boundaries of the discipline and the adaptation 
and testing of language. Second, language must be regarded as 
in process, as fluid, mobile, tentative, and always subject to 
revision; linguistic formulations must be kept open and develop­
ing; language must reflect movement, change, energy, and life. 
Third, the theologian is free to use various terminologies but is 
not bound to them; language is free in its concepts and speech so 
long as it maintains fidelity to its special object.
Barth's self-criticism and 
critical discontent
A third element of Barth's "scientific-critical" attitude 
contributing to a theory of invention was his self-criticism and 
critical discontent. Several manifestations of this orientation 
are observed: (1) his determination to build a comprehensive and
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durable theoretical and architectonic structure for his theology, 
demonstrated in the comprehensiveness and concentration of his 
thought, (2) his willingness to re-examine his assumptions and 
thoroughly recast his communications in the light of criticism, 
and (3) his recognition of the importance of provocative and 
relentless questioning in order to remove subjective hindrances 
to objective reality and to see each object of knowledge from 
different perspectives.
Barth's self-criticism and critical discontent was first 
exhibited in the extraordinary comprehensiveness and concentration 
of his thought, for example, in his determination to pursue 
"renev/ed philosophical and theological studies." He wrote 
Thurneysen:
The monologue with myself and the little bit of dialogue with 
the congregation that I happen to have, and also our common 
discussions— profitable as they are— do not satisfy me in the 
long run. The area must be widened and deepened from which 
I draw resources for inner concentration and strengthening 
and upon w^^ch I would gladly rely in working and speak­
ing . . . .
This critical discontent was exhibited not only in Barth's atti­
tude toward his sermons and writings but in his unwillingness as 
a professor and theologian to content himself with lectures.




courses, or books which lacked completeness. Barth lectured from 
fully written manuscripts sometimes completed scarcely before the 
beginning of a particular class session. He noted that "more than 
once what I presented at 7 a.m. was not ready until between 3 and 
5 a . m . H e  was determined not to offer a course unless he had 
comprehensively investigated the subject. Occasionally he deferred 
to present some courses (as he did some lectures and books) until 
he could meet his own exacting demands for thorough scientific and 
critical analysis. The fruitfulness of Barth's comprehensiveness 
and concentration is evidenced by the international success of his 
teaching, by his great productivity in writing, by the many students 
who flocked to Basel to pursue graduate theological studies under 
his direction, by the many scholarly studies which have analyzed 
his thought, and by the continuing interest of his work.
Barth's self-criticism and critical discontent was further 
manifested in the independence of his thought, which led to his 
determination to build a comprehensive and durable theoretical 
structure for his theology. He wrote: ". . . .1 say to myself 
that such a daring position as we so greatly desire to establish 
must have a solid foundation simply for the sake of order, and 
that is not to be achieved by an occasional bit of metaphysical
"̂̂ Bowden, Karl Barth, p. 48.
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construction sandwiched between administration and teaching.
Barth expressed this determination to build a solid theoretical 
structure as a pastor; he continued the effort as a teacher.
Young professor Barth wrote:
And at the same time, apart from the daily requirements,
I have to build my own scholarly structure, achieve a "thorough 
mastery" as they say, in something. How is one to do that?
Will they ever be able to say that of me?" Or shall I always 
be this wandering gypsy among all the honorable scholars by 
whom I am surrounded, one who has only a couple of leaky kettles 
to call his own and in compensation occasionally sets a house 
on fire? . .
By this time (December 11, 1921), Romans had landed on the Euro­
pean theological scene with its bombshell effect. Barth secured 
his first professorship as a result. His early success, with its 
revolutionary impact, stimulated him to seek broader and deeper 
foundations, a more comprehensive and durable theoretical and archi­
tectonic structure for his theology.
Barth's comprehensive and architectonic efforts were further 
evidenced by a lifelong survey of the literature of his discipline. 
He pursued vast reading through the entire philosophical and theo­
logical heritage at his disposal. He constantly explored sources 
and topic areas: for example, Kant, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard,
Anselm, Aquinas, Augustine, Luther; the scholastics, the
p. 37.
^^Barth and Thurneysen, Révolutionarv Theology in the Making.
^®Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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Reformation, Calvin; Hebrews, Romans; Doestoevsky, Schweitzer—  
entire regions surveyed in breadth and depth. Barth was in the 
process, early in his pastoral and professorial career, of com­
pleting a comprehensive survey of his entire philosophical- 
theological tradition. His survey involved careful analysis of 
the positions of major figures and grappling with questions raised 
by each. The vastness of this undertaking was at times almost 
overwhelming, especially since Barth aimed at great thoroughness 
in his current courses while striving tirelessly to advance his 
overall theoretical structure. An early letter by Barth expresses 
the tension produced by attempting to balance these concerns:
I am not yet by any means as deep in Calvin as Eduard 
imagines, but rather I am still occupied with the scholastics 
whose essential ideas on all essential points, at least of 
dogmatics. I have now gathered together on some hundred cards 
as the one part of the foundation which I need urgently for 
the course on Calvin. The other part is Luther and Zwingli 
with whom for the time being I must make myself acquainted 
in the same way. . . . Ohl If only someone would give me 
time, time, time, to do everything properly, to read every­
thing at mv own tempo, to take it apart and put it together 
again.
Out of this continual survey of the literature of his dis­
cipline, conducted "in order to get some kind of a picture concern­
ing what really is to be d o n e , B a r t h steadily located and 




this literature. For example, he listed several pages of theses 
and antitheses derived from a dialogue with another theologian, 
Hirsch, "after we had talked the day before yesterday from nine 
in the evening until four in the morni n g . B a r t h constantly 
summarized and criticized lectures, sermons, articles, books, and 
discussions. Often he made parallel columns, comparing positions 
of theologians, including his own.®® Barth's approach to this 
wealth of data which he uncovered was penetrating. He wrote 
Thurneysen: ". . .In the letter to the Romans I wrestle just
now with the granite block of 3:20 ff. How much there is that is 
hidden in it I I will hardly discover and gather all Of it in this 
first attempt. To assimilate and conserve this voluminous 
data, Barth made detailed extracts from different sources, for 
example, Kant. These resumes were often an "improved new edition 
of old studies," an exercise Barth found “very refreshing." He 
also noted that "a copy-book with 'comments' is coming into being 
in which I summarize everything in my own language."®^ Later, he 
noted in connection with his study of the Reformation that "a 
voluminous card-index is coming into being in which everything of
®®Ibid., p. 83.




importance finds its place.
Barth's self-criticism and critical discontent was first 
manifested, then, in his determination to build a comprehensive 
and durable theoretical and architectonic structure for his theol­
ogy. Extending from this effort, a second manifestation of this 
attitude was a willingness to re-examine his assumptions and thor­
oughly recast his communications in the light of criticism.
Early evidence of his desire for constructive criticism appears 
in the following request to Thurneysen for evaluation of a segment 
of Romerbrief;
It has cost me ten days of concentrated labor, and I am 
happy that I have this couloir behind me. Look carefully, 
however, to see whether everything is in order, somewhat 
like the car-inspectors at the railway stations who tap 
each wheel with a long hammer to see whether there is not 
a crack in it : I am very happy about your remarks. Only
do not hesitate to tell me if anything is wrong ; it is easy 
in the heat of battle to overlook a crack that has appeared 
somewhere. I often ask myself if it will all have to be 
done again. . .
Barth not only received criticism from his close friend; he 
responded to others' criticism. Striking evidence of this attitude 
appears in the dramatic revisions of some of his major works, 
Romerbrief. the earlier Christian Dogmatics, recast as part of the 
Prolegomena to the Church Dogmatics; and in his articles for
®3ibid., p. 81. 
®^Ibid., p. 57.
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Christian Century, concerning the periods of his development, in 
which he explained "How I Changed My Mind."®^ Much of the interest, 
success, and provocativeness of Earth's theology may be traced to 
this willingness to reexamine and revise. Part of Barth's great­
ness was that he not only articulated telling criticisms of histori­
cal and contemporary theology but that he equally critized his own 
thought, submitted his work for critical judgment, and responded 
to such criticism. Barth learned from friends and protagonists 
alike.
A third manifestation of Barth's self-criticism and criti­
cal discontent was his skillfulness in posing provocative questions. 
Torrance observes that Barth's self-criticism is manifested in 
relentless questioning. Such questioning has an existential basis 
in theology;
This questioning is forced upon us because face to face with 
God's Word we know ourselves to be questioned down to the 
very roots of our being, and therefore in response to the 
impact of the Word we are thrown back upon self-criticism, 
upon a . . . questioning and rethinking of all that we have 
and are and claim to know. Hence questioning is the move­
ment in which we seek to clear away all the unreality with 
which we confront the objective Reality of God in his revela­
tion, in order that we may let God's Truth declare itself to 
us positively and clearly.®®
Barth’s attitude toward questioning has a distinct bearing
®®Barth, How X Changed.
®®Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His
Early Theology. 1910-1931 (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1962), p. 19.
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on his epistemology and conununicology. Barth, like Tillich, 
employed questioning not simply for apologetic or persuasive effec­
tiveness but because of noetic humility in view of the limitations 
of human knowledge. Barth asks thousands of questions in the 
Dogmatics in order to see each object of knowledge from different 
perspectives and to express its reality as objectively as possible. 
Barth's theology, while constituting a great systematic construc­
tion, was not a system in any closed or final sense but was a 
processive, inquiring response to the object, data, and situation 
of theology. Barth held that we not only question the objects, 
data, and situations in our environment, but that they question us. 
Hence, open-ended questioning and response to questioning is a 
necessary element in scientific investigation. Barth's success 
in pursuing significant questions was evidenced as early as 
January 31, 1922, when the young professor wrote; "The courier 
has just brought me the sensational news that I have received the 
D. Theol. from Munster on account of 'essential contributions to 
the deepening of the formulation of religious and theological 
q u e s t i o n s S u c h  an emphasis upon questioning was decidedly 
important in Barth's philosophy of communication and inventional 
theory.
^^Barth and Thurneysen, Revolutionary Theology in the Making.
pp. 60-61.
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Barth's view toward argumentation
The final aspect of Barth's "scientific-critical" attitude 
emerging from his situation and development is his view toward 
argumentation. Casalis, in analyzing the background of Barth's 
life, observes:
From Basel . . . Barth received his critical clarity 
and his feeling for polemics. He illustrates perfectly
the language of the Baselers, which is razor-sharp and
rapid, with a penchant for irony and sharp repartee. The 
innumerable flashes of wit, the whimsy and the jokes that 
enliven his conversation, correspondence and teaching, all 
witness to this. For this reason he is both a remarkable 
teacher and a formidable speaker. The theological debates 
in which he has been involved have given him an opportunity 
to put these natural gifts, which he clearly regards as 
assets, to use. . .
Barth's view toward argumentation was manifested in numerous ways
including; (1) his poignant personal dialogues, (2) his debates
with colleagues, and (3) his arguing of theses in his constructive
theology.
Although noted for his sympathetic listening attitude, Barth 
was straight forward in personal dialogue. His commitment to dia­
lectic, to the clear exchange, clash, and cross-examination of 
ideas, as in debate, is evident throughout his communications. 
Records of his dialogues indicate a poignancy of expression which 
seldom left his position or that of a respondent in doubt. The 
following record illustrates this clash of ideas well:
68,Casalis, Portrait of Karl Barth, pp. 39-40.
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The next question (by an Englishman) claims that the 
address tears God apart into a Creator God and a Redeemer God.
The charge is made that the first is in truth not a good God; 
for he has created man as an evil creature since we are com­
pelled to flee from him. It urges further, that, in the law 
suit between God and man, man ought to be appreciated not 
merely as an object but as a subject. The Bible calls us not 
only servants but also friends of God.
Barth answers:— The objection which we have just heard is 
the exact antithesis of what I said this morning. The speaker 
would have done better not to introduce his objection with a 
word of acknowledgment and gratitude to follow it up with a 
"but." He ought to have said. You are wrong 1 For then he 
would have understood me. We should have squarely faced each 
other. But if a man feels obliged to add to his endorsement 
a small "but" and a tiny "it seems to me," he has understood 
nothing at all. My friends, let me tell you that in the many 
discussions which I have had in nigh unto twenty years, I have 
heard over and over, first a friendly assent and then a "but."
A small back door was opened through which everything that was 
to be eliminated was invited in again. If we are to face each 
other squarely, you must not meet me with such a "Yes, but—  
you must answer with a complete and unequivocal Nol®^
Barth's conviction was that if communication is to serve the ends
of community and understanding an unambiguous exchange of views
must occur. He believed that ideological reconciliation does not
come by a retreat from the full force of divergent views but from
direct confrontation complemented by sympathetic listening. The
effectiveness of Barth's forthright argumentation is evident in
his success in stimulating an international ecumenical dialogue,
particularly between Roman Catholics and Protestants. Significantly,
this dialogue was not achieved by offering insipid theological
®^Karl Barth, God in Action, trans. by E. G. Homrighausen 
and Karl J. Ernst (New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1936),
pp. 120-121.
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compromises but by full and explicit presentation of views, often 
in direct conflict with other partners to the dialogue. Barth was 
convinced that genuine address to and exploration of the root issues 
of disagreement must occur if community among divided groups is 
attained.
Barth was as frank with his faculty colleagues as with public 
inquirers. The Barth-Thurneysen correspondence documents several 
disputes with fellow professors and some versus the entire theo­
logical faculty. Barth was not afraid to "swim against the stream" 
of current opinion. He manifested generally an ability to maintain 
good dialogue and relations with colleagues while engaging in lively 
debate with them on other occasions. Commenting on his interaction 
with an early faculty colleague, he wrote:
Relations with Hirsch are really good. Lively battles alter­
nate with appointments for further meetings but the feeling 
remains intimate and stimulating. It is hard enough for me 
to swallow his eccentricities, his Berlin ways and academic 
airs, his Wingolfisms, and all the other ingredients whatever 
their names, but my varied ingredients are no less difficult 
to him.^®
On several occasions Barth tilted with the entire theologi­
cal faculty when he felt an important principle was at stake. He 
engaged in some spirited debates with former teachers, notably 
church historian Adolf von Harnack and, throughout his career.
^^Barth and Thurneysen, Révolutionarv Theologv in the Making,
pp. 99-100.
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sharply distinguished his positions from relevant discussants in 
the field of his inquiry. He placed himself in clear distinction 
to great philosophical and theological figures of the past (e.g., 
Calvin, Luther, Aquinas) and carefully positioned himself with 
respect to his contemporaries (e.g., Brunner, Tillich, Bultmann). 
Such clear placing of his views— such lively engagement in dialogue, 
argumentation and debate with first-rate theological and philosophi­
cal figures— was an important key to Barth's inventional theory 
and appears to account for much of his great interest and influence.
Regarding Barth's use of argumentation, his systematic or 
constructive theology is strongly asserted and argued carefully.
This is true for many reasons: examples are his bold statement of
theses at the heads of chapters in his Dogmatics, his broad base 
of historical and contemporary documentation out of a vast dialogue 
and literature, his explicit analysis of positions, and his probing 
questions, along with all of the other characteristics of his 
"scientific-critical" attitude.
Summary
This chapter examined origins of a philosophy of communica­
tion in the work of Karl Barth. The central question addressed 
was: What principles of communication revealed in Barth's develop­
ment contribute to a philosophy of communication? To answer this 
question the chapter first considered Barth's "rhetorical
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situation" and, secondly, examined the implications of his 
"scientific-critical" attitude. A central theme emerged: the pri­
mary architectonic principle governing Barth's development, thought, 
and any philosophy of communication derived therefrom, appears to 
be a movement toward complete fidelity to the object of inquiry 
as determining the nature of scientific activity, rationality, 
and discourse.
Several factors in Barth’s "rhetorical situation" contrib­
uted to his inventional theory and philosophy of communication:
(1) his immediate theological environment, which contributed to 
the scope, openness, and independence of his thought, exemplified 
in his concept of "faith seeking understanding"; (2) the influence 
of his Swiss-German academic environment, including his use of 
university positions as a communication channel, involving redirec­
tion of his thought and style; (3) the stimulus of these positions 
which enabled Barth to invest his rigorous teaching and research 
into publications; and (4) the development by Barth's Swiss-German 
education of his "scientific-critical" attitude, including elements 
influencing his communicology.
In analyzing the implications of Barth's "scientific-critical" 
attitude which contribute to a theory of invention, four aspects 
of this attitude were elaborated: his concept of fidelity to the
object of thought and language, his experimental attitude toward
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language, his self-criticism and critical discontent, and his 
view toward argumentation. Barth's concept of fidelity to the 
object of inquiry was examined in three areas: (1) his under­
standing of the nature of scientific activity, (2) his concept of 
rationality, and (3) his position on the goal of language. Exami­
nation of these areas revealed that fidelity to the object can 
contribute to great openness in the process of invention. With 
such a view, no a priori concept is likely to control and perhaps 
stultify thought. This openness derives from the phenomenal nature 
of objects: each object presents its own nature, order, stimulus,
and process. Observation, experimentation, or encounter with an 
object provides opportunity for inquiry, discovery of substantive 
content, and dynamic direction according to the process of the 
object. According to Barth and Anselm's interpretation of reason, 
rationality is primarily ordered activity according to the law of 
an object's being. The scientific element in this interpretation 
of rationality involves recognition and proper response to the 
inherent order of phenomena. Barth's scientific concept of rea­
son may well contribute to a twentieth-century theory of invention. 
Eight elements of such a theory based on Barth's concept of reason 
were outlined. Further, the goal of language must be to ade­
quately apprehend and speak faithfully of the object of inquiry.
Barth's experimental attitude toward language derives from
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his concept of fidelity to the object. This experimental attitude 
contributes at least the following elements to a theory of inven­
tion: (1) that the teaching of any discipline is not to be
received or communicated as a static body of theory but involves 
continual testing of ideas within the discipline and the adapta­
tion and testing of language; (2) that language must be regarded 
as in process, as fluid, mobile, tentative, and always subject to 
revision; that linguistic formulations must be kept open and devel­
oping ; that language must reflect movement, change, energy, and 
life; and (3) that the theologian is free to use various termi­
nologies but is not bound to them; that language is free in its 
concepts and speech so long as it maintains fidelity to its special 
object. Barth thus believed in the renewal of language ; i.e., 
that terms come into being to meet the needs of a particular situa­
tion but when that situation changes so must the language.
Barth's self-criticism and critical discontent contributed 
to a theory of invention in several ways: (1) his determination
to build a comprehensive and durable theoretical and architectonic 
structure for his theology, demonstrated in the comprehensiveness 
and concentration of his thought, (2) his willingness to re­
examine his assumptions and thoroughly recast his communications 
in the light of criticism, and (3) his recognition of the impor­
tance of provocative and relentless questioning in order to
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remove subjective hindrances to objective reality and to see each 
object of knowledge from different perspectives.
Barth's view toward argumentation also contributed to a 
theory of invention in distinct ways: (1) the value of direct,
dialectical confrontation of views in dialogue and debate, (2) 
the importance of clear placing and contradistinction of views 
with respect to first-rate historical and contemporary figures 
in a discipline, and (3) the value of a broad base of historical 
and contemporary documentation, the explicit analysis of positions, 
and the use of probing questions. If communication is to serve 
the ends of community and understanding, Barth believed, an 
unambiguous exchange of views must occur. Direct but sympathetic 
confrontation of ideas was a significant part of his inventional 
thought and contribution.
CHAPTER III 
EXISTENTIAL COMMUNICATION AND DIALECTIC
This chapter examines some philosophical bases of Barth's 
communicology. The central question addressed is: How did Barth's
conceptualization of existentialism and dialectic impact on his 
ideas about communication? Barth's ideas about communication 
derive from his theory of existence and find their motivation and 
necessity in the nature of reality and knowledge. Consequently, 
his view of existentialism and dialectic contributes to communica­
tion. Three philosophical bases for communication are examined: 
Barth's concepts of (1) existence, (2) knowledge, and (3) experi­
ence . ̂
Barth was strongly influenced by developments in existen­
tialism and dialectic. Like Plato, who sharply criticized but 
constructively contributed to rhetoric, Barth criticized, used, 
and theorized about existentialism and dialectic. His attitudes 
toward existentialism and dialectic were themselves dialectical in
^These concepts are not examined exhaustively as philosophi­




that he asserted and denied the value of these "movements" and 
alternated his positions toward both.  ̂ For example, the early 
Barth was existentially oriented; in fact, he is acknowledged as 
a founder of modern dialectical theology. Beginning with the 
Dogmatics of 1932, however, Barth renounced existentialism as a 
basis for theology, although he did not reject its important instru­
mental use, and he criticized dialectics.̂  Despite these criti­
cisms, the later Barth, after 1932, integrated a balanced conception 
of existential and dialectical notions, maintaining an equilib­
rium between objectivity and subjectivity while holding that the 
former ultimately determines the latter.*̂  Barth drev/ from Kierke­
gaard, Hegel, and others in formulating his existential and dia­
lectical views but established his own unique position. This 
chapter examines some implications of Barth's conceptualization of 
existential communication and dialectic.
^Cf., for example, Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God,
1/1:ix, 21-22, 379, 387, 399, 429, 431, 462; Doctrine of Creation. 
3/3:305; Ibid., 3/4:xii-xiii; Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:644, 
741, 755, 757; Ibid., 4/2:8; Barth, Word of God and Man, pp. 206- 
212; Barth, Evangelical Theology, p. 91-
^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:ix; Doctrine of 
Creation. 3/4:xii-xiii.
^Cf., for example, Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 
1/1:141-142, 226.
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Barth's Concept of Existence 
Barth's view of existence is grounded in the object-subject 
relation.^ This relation provides an inner motive and necessity 
for communication, grounding it in the structure of reality and 
knowledge. Reality in both its objective (phenomenal) and subjec­
tive (existential) aspects inherently communicates and summons 
communication. The phenomenal universe presents myriads of objects 
which confront us, claim our attention, energy, time, and demand 
interpretation, assimilation, ordering, and decision.® The ontic 
world provides stimuli demanding response. Being, therefore, is 
inherently interactional; existence is actualized in encounter 
with our phenomenal environment.^ This order provides an objec­
tive framework for subjective response and conditions it. The 
recurrent meeting of object (thing known) and subject (knower) 
provides a basic ontological structure for interaction and thus for 
communication.
As a consequence of the object-subject relation, the struc­
ture of knowledge based on this relation necessitates a process of
^Barth's position concerning this relation is stated gener­
ally here and is detailed in the following sections. Concerning 
man's determination by objects, cf. Barth, Doctrine of the Word of 
God. 1/1:214-216, 226; Doctrine of God. 2/2:583-584.
®Barth, Doctrine of God. 2/2:583-585.
^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:226.
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cojtununication. The object requires kno\,vledge of the subject it 
confronts and this knowing in turn requires communication to other 
subjects. Barth says that' "the world has its distinctive being.
It belongs to this distinctiveness, however, that it is not merely 
in re but also in intellectu . . .  it is being which is known and 
knows, is seen and sees, is apprehended and apprehends."®
Essence— the nature of the universe— communicates through existence, 
the nature of individual being. World being is unitary. Universal 
being communicates through individual being: objective ontology
expresses itself through subjective epistemology. Ontological 
reality "is being which is knoivn, contemplated and apprehended by 
man, and therefore knows, contemplates and apprehends in man.”®
This relationship— the communication of essence through existence—  
is an ontological and epistemological foundation for communication. 
Since existence is grounded in and shaped by essence— i.e., in the 
phenomenological structure of the universe— it partakes of that 
structure. Barth says that it is as man "comes in contact with a 
definite external thing in a definite manner, he is what he is, he 
exists as a man, and not otherwise."^® These interdependent struc­
tures of reality, the objective and subjective, with their
®Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:140. 
®Ibid., p. 141.
^®Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:226.
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interpenetrating movements, provide a dynamic structure for communi­
cation.
Three implications emerging from the object-subject relation 
merit further consideration: (1) the order of the object universe
manifests itself even in defective human communication; (2) norma­
tiveness and individuality unite when communication combines the 
phenomenal and existential; and (3) a "rhythm of existence" or 
dialectic provides ontological movement for communication. These 




First, an important implication of the object-subject rela­
tion is that the order of the object universe manifests itself 
even in defective human communication. Barth says of the "words" 
or communication of the phenomenal to and through the existential 
world that "the fact that they do not cease to be spoken and heard 
means that it can never be altogether without voice or reason, that 
even the worst communication does not completely fail to be communi­
cation and may perhaps become b e t t e r . S i n c e  humanity partici­
pates in the order of the phenomenal environment, its regularity 
and rationality are necessarily, if partially, manifested in human
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:141.
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communication. The connection between the ontic and existential 
orders defender man against the chaos and entropy which might pre­
vail if nature's order did not impel him toward rational and coher­
ent existence. As a product of and element in this phenomenological
12order, humanity cannot altogether fail to reflect its regularity. 
Barth says that the "intelligible cosmos" expresses itself through 
the "intelligent cosmos" in the form of "continuities," "constants," 
"models," and "orientations."^^ He says: "Declaring these, crea­
ture ly being displays its steadfastness; receiving them, it 
strengthens i t s e l f . B a r t h  thus grounds communication in the 
structure of reality and provides it with a cogent orientation and 
future in an ongoing world process.
^^Social sciences are based upon presuppositions like Barth's: 
that similarities exist between regularities of nature and those of 
human behavior, that the natural and humane processes of the uni­
verse share a common orderliness. -Ifhat is perhaps unique about 
Barth is that he grounds elements of an existential philosophy of 
communication in this ontological regularity. He founds scientific 
and rational coherence in the unity of being, establishing communi­
cation in a singular, dynamic ontology.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:142. Communicolo- 
gists have located models for speech and other forms of symbolic 
behavior in the spectrum of the phenomenal world, as in biological 
and physical processes, in operations of physics, and in communica­
tion systems of lower orders. Barth's communicology strengthens 
these efforts at their ontological base, recognizing the world of 





Second, another implication of the object-subject relation 
is the normativeness and individuality derived when communication 
combines the phenomenological and existential. As the "intelligi­
ble cosmos" speaks through the "intelligent cosmos" a blend of 
objectivity and subjectivity occurs, uniting normative patterns 
and individual variations. Subjectivity is preserved within the 
framework of objective regularity. "The one order at stake is not 
just uniform but multiform. It does not exclude the many, the par­
ticular, the change, the alteration, the diversity.Unlike 
Kierkegaard, Barth saw no ultimate disjunction between objective 
and subjective reality.Kierkegaard seemed to elevate existence, 
or the experience of the knower, over essence, or the world of 
objective processes, fearing loss of individuality to philosophic 
or scientific norms. Conversely, Hegel, whom Kierkegaard persist­
ently criticized, seemed to elevate essence over existence, absorb­
ing individual experience in a total world process. Barth 
reconciles both positions. His emphasis in the object-subject 
relation was neither existence over essence (Kierkegaard) or 
essence over existence (Hegel) but essence through existence.
l^ibid.
^^Cf. Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:438; 1/2:238-239. 
^^Cf. Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:142.
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Hegel and Kierkegaard worked from subjective epistemological cen­
ters, one ethical, the other rational. Unlike these thinkers, 
Barth's focus is not upon self-contained ethical or logical pro­
cesses independently considered, but upon these processes as 
united in objectivity. Unlike Hegel and Kierkegaard, Barth does 
not attempt to encompass reality within human cognition or within 
ethical decision-making; he rather sees the subject within a 
rational phenomenological order. Subjectivity is oriented by 
encounter with the object world. This encounter exerts normative 
influence within and through the individual. All participate in 
the lav;s, rhythms, and constants of the phenomenal world and hence 
blend normativeness and individuality in their speech and existence.
Grounding individual existence in the rational, phenomeno­
logical order does not suppress but strengthens subjectivity. 
Individuality develops within the objective-subjective encounter.
The individual receives normativeness from the phenomenal order 
and his individuality contributes to this order. Man exists as he 
accepts the summons of the cosmos as "his cosmos and therefore a 
task set for his own life, not merely for his contemplation and 
apprehension, but for his choice and volition, his decisions and 
actions. . . The intelligible cosmos requires ordering by the
intelligent cosmos. "To put it dramatically," Barth says, "it
^®Ibid., pp. 147-148.
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yearns and cries out to be humanised."^® For Barth, the line 
between the natural and humanistic is thin; these elements in 
existence interfuse each other. Human freedom thus "counts as 
a cosmic element" and manifests itself in the unity of being.
The possibilities of the natural universe and those of the human­
istic are mutually identified and actualized in their persistent 
encounter. The blend of these elements grounds communication in 
the very fabric of the universe. Thus, a communicator's subjective 
inputs are not elements alien to empirical reality, but unite with 
it, particularly when based upon awareness and responsiveness to 
objective regularity. Communication, in blending normativeness 
and individuality, gains dynamic ontological status. In Barth's 
view, genuine communication can never be mere rhetoric in a pejora­
tive sense. Speech can never lie at the surface of reality. On 
the contrary, speech becomes a profound means of expression for 
the innate order and processes of the universe and in so becoming, 
it blends the normative and individual.Existential, essential, 
and empirical realities unite in genuine communication. No one 
element is elevated above another ; all converge in expressing
l^Ibid., p. 148. 
^°Ibid.
^^Ibid., pp. 140-148. 
^^Ibid., pp. 141-142.
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ontological power and movement through speech.
The "rhythm of existence"
Third, a final implication emerging from the object-subject 
relation is "a rhythm of existence" or dialectic which provides 
ontological movement for communication. Barth says that the "being 
for one another of the intelligible and the intelligent is not 
static but dynamic, yet dynamic in an orderly and not a disorderly 
w a y . A  distinct, manifold rhythm pervades the object-subject 
encounter. Existence manifests a repetition or cadence. Forms of 
existence emerge, characterized by recurrent cycles, processes, 
and patterns. "There is always speech and hearing, question and 
answer. There is always beginning, cessation and new beginning. 
There is constant discovery, concealment and rediscovery. There 
is continual coming and going. There is no becoming without per­
ishing, but no perishing without new becoming. " Existence is 
characterized by reciprocal responses in rhythmic patterns and 
communication participates in this dialectic. Communication occurs 
as a life process and, like other organic functions, exhibits alter­
nating rhythms. Barth says "no swing of the pendulum does not 
evoke and is not actually followed by its opposite.
2^Ibid., p. 144.
2'̂ Ibid.
^^Ibid.; cf. Barth, Doctrine of Creation, 3/1:368, 378-379.
75
Applied to discourse, this rhythm of existence implies dia­
lectic, a setting forth of ideas followed by counterbalancing, 
confrontation, and criticism of these in an ongoing process. Barth 
says that "no over-emphasis is not immediately emulated and cor- 
rected." This counterpointing implies that in communication 
processes, as in other life processes, there are built-in correc­
tives. Criticism in and of discourse is an inherent dialectical 
corrective. Barth regarded his early theology, as Kierkegaard did 
his, as corrective. He conceived of theology as a critical science 
and utilized dialectical confrontation in evolving his systematic 
views. As in nature the fittest survive through dialectical 
encounter of opposites: so communication, sharing ontological
roots with other forms of existence, is purified and strengthened
27through confrontation and criticism. The "rhythm of existence" 
in both its phenomenological and existential aspects provides onto­
logical movement for communication. Barth thus recognizes critical 
process in the structure of reality and establishes communication 
in that process. If communication survives, it participates in 
this critical dialectic which tests its fitness.
^%arthi. Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:144.
^■^Ibid.
^®Hegel influenced Barth's concept of dialectic or the "rhythm 
of existence." For Barth and Hegel, dialectic was more than criti­
cal methodology; it was ontology, an underlying movement in knowing 
and communication. Ontological regularity finds a crucial form in
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Barth's Concepts of Knowledge and Experience 
Barth's concepts of knowledge and experience correlate with 
his concept of existence, providing an important triad of bases 
for communication. In examining this correlation, this section 
defines and characterizes Barth's concepts of knowledge and experi­
ence. The following elements influencing communication emerge:
(1) knowledge and experience are based on existence; (2) knowledge 
and experience require active personal participation; (3) knowledge 
and experience are processive; and (4) knowledge and experience 
are dialectical.
The objective basis of 
knowledge and experience
First, knowledge and experience are based on existence. 
Knowledge consists in acknowledging reality, or what is communi­
cated by objects to subjects.Knowledge results from a communi­
cation between essence and existence. Knowledge begins with 
recognition of objective existence.Barth says that "man exists
dialectic. Barth says concerning this dialectical ontology in Hegel: 
" . . .  what makes this system a system . . . gives the order and 
regularity . . .  is nothing but the rhythm of life itself, recognized 
as running through the fulness of history. This rhythm . . . is the 
regularity inherent in the system, its heart-beat, as it were. It 
is the famous dialectical method of thesis, antithesis and syn­
thesis. . . . "  Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to 
Ritschl (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 284.
^%arth. Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:213-214.
^°Ibid., p. 226.
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not abstractly but concretely, i.e., in experiences, in determina­
tions of his existence by objects, by something external distinct 
from himself.Because of his basic empirical orientation, Barth 
rejects Cartesianism, or the "I-experience," as a primary basis for 
knowing reality.Valid knowledge requires definite objects 
(things known) and subjects (knowers) interacting in definite situa­
tions. While according primacy to ontology— to the object-centered 
aspect of experience— Barth recognized the interdependency of the 
objective and subjective. He says that "the ontic or objective 
element implies as its consequence the noetic or subjective estab­
lished by it. Conversely, the noetic or subjective element implies 
as its presupposition the ontic or objective which establishes 
it."^'^
Barth recognized a "dialectic of object-subject," i.e., that 
objective forms require subjective apprehension.^^ He correlated
^^Ibid. Italics are mine.
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:222-223. Italics 
are mine.
^^Ibid., 1/2:238-239.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:215. Barth's objec­
tive emphasis was at least partly due to his desire to center the­
ology primarily upon God as an entity, recognized as both object 
and subject, rather than focusing religious knowledge and experi­
ence primarily upon man. Cf. Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 
1/1:20, 438.
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:270; Doctrine of 
Reconciliation, 4/2:302.
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essence (objectivity) and existence (subjectivity).^^ His thinking
was dialectical enough that he conceded that theology could be
constructed from a subjective rather than objective orientation.
While arguing that objectivity is fundamentally determinative, he
recognized that "the human determinateness, the experience and
attitude of the knowing subject might well be exalted into the
37criterion of theological knowledge." While Barth chose not to 
do this, and while he strongly criticized some subjective orienta­
tions in theology, he blended the objective and subjective in 
mutual relatedness. This synthesis recognizes a dynamic ontologi­
cal movement in communication, linking invention and discourse with 
the structures of existence, knowledge, and experience, and making 
communication responsible to these.
Personal participation
Second, knowledge and experience require active personal par­
ticipation. Knowledge must become experiential, i.e., what is 
communicated by an object to a subject must become subjective 
reality, a property of the knower's existence, as well as an
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:215-216.
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:20. Here, as 
often in this study, we are borrowing from Barth philosophical con­
cepts which he grounded in a theological setting. In this proce­
dure we are in agreement with both Barth and Kenneth Burke. Burke 
says that "words" have a purely "naturalistic, empirical reference" 
but have been adapted for theological use. Since theological lan­
guage is borrowed, as Barth also emphasizes (for example, cf. Barth,
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objective or phenomenological reality. Barth defined knowledge as 
follows: "By the knowledge of an object by men we understand the
proof of their acquaintance with its reality in respect of its 
being there (or its existence) and in respect of its being thus 
and thus (or its nature).Several elements in this proof of 
personal participation emerge: (1) subjective proof of acquaintance
with an object's existence and nature; (2) subjective determination 
by objective existence; (3) subjective coexistence with the object 
of knowledge; and (4) subjective witness to its content. The 
demand that knowledge must become experiential first means that 
subjective proof of a<iquaintance with an object's existence and 
nature is required. Barth says that "‘proof of their acquaintance' 
implies that the reality of the object in question, its existence 
and its nature, now becomes, while true in itself, somehow and
39with some degree of clarity and definition also true for them." 
Proof of acquaintance with an object involves assimilating meaning
Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:735), one can legitimately reclaim 
terms and concepts developed theologically and re-employ them in 
their secular sense. As Burke says, "once a terminology has been 
developed for special theological purposes the order can become 
reversed. We can borrow back the terms from the borrower, again 
secularizing to varying degrees the originally secular terms. . . . 
Burke, Rhetoric of Religion, p. 7.




frcsn an object beyond acknowledgment of its external existence. A 
communication occurs; subjective reality incorporates objective 
reality. The subject receives mediation from an object and affirms 
this mediation. Barth also defines "knowledge . . .  as self- 
authenticating acquaintance in its subject with the reality of an 
object. . . Existential proof of acquaintance provides sub­
sidiary confirmation of empirical reality. Barth insists on the 
primacy of ontology, arguing that objective reality transcends our 
"merely verbal and mental" assertions. Simultaneously, he asserts 
that in terms of the human significance of knowledge, "everything 
depends upon the fact that we are involved in the matter as speakers 
and listeners. Subjective proof of acquaintance with an object's
existence and nature is thus an important step in the communication 
of reality.
A second element in subjective participation in knowledge 
involves determination by objective existence. Barth says: "We
defined knowledge as that confirmation of human acquaintance with 
an object whereby its trueness becomes a determining factor in the 
existence of the man who knows. It is precisely this factor deter­
mining the existence of the man who knows that we call experience.




Experience occurs when an individual becomes subjectively deter­
mined by the nature and reality of an object. Experience occurs 
as object confronts subject and again as subject confronts object, 
i.e., relates to this object. The knower's subjective response to 
an objective stimulus becomes a determining factor in his exist­
ence. This determination occurs in two processes:
. . . /man exist^ as the object of experience, i.e. deter­
mined by this external thing which so far has come in contact 
with him, and in the way in which it has made contact, and as 
the subject of experience, i.e. as one who now a second time 
comes in contact with a definite external thing in a definite 
manner, he is what he is, he exists as a man, and not other­
wise.^^
Our determination by objects is not impersonal and passive; we 
participate with and act upon objects. As "the object of experi­
ence" man is only partially determined ; he must again confront the 
objects he encounters and -become "the subject of experience," i.e., 
actively and purposefully relate to objects in his experience, inter­
acting with them, shaping and being shaped by them.
Barth's concept of subjective determination by objective 
existence contributes to an epistemology for rational discourse. 
Experience corresponds to the rational structure of b e i n g I n  
correlating objective and subjective elements in ontology and epis­
temology Barth serves communication. He offers a counterpoint to
“̂^Ibid. Italics are mine.
Barth, Doctrine of Creation, 3/2:419.
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those who would separate existence, experience, and discourse from 
rationality and knowledge. He sees these elements in their archi­
tectonic unity. He conjoins objectivity and subjectivity in an 
active process of existence, experience, and knowledge, providing 
a rational model for communication.
A third element in personal participation is subjective 
coexistence with the object of knowledge. A consequence of knowl­
edge of and experience with objects is that the subject, having 
attained a measure of acquaintance with an object, thereafter begins 
his thinking with an awareness of the existence and reality of that 
object. Knovi'ledge entails thinking with and existing with an 
object. Subjective coexistence constitutes a "knowledge-relation," 
i.e., the truth of an object, its reality and nature, becomes a 
necessary element in thought. Barth says:
Whatever else and however else they may think of it, they must 
begin by thinking of the actual trueness of its reality. When 
faced with this trueness they can no longer withdraw into them­
selves in order from there to affirm, question, or deny it. Its 
trueness has come home directly to them personally, has become 
their property. And at the same time they themselves have 
become the property of its trueness.
Knowledge is a relationship in which a knower has been so affected
by an object that its reality accompanies his thought, influences
it, and makes him aware of and a part of its trueness. Such objects
posited in their reality stimulate expression. In the absence of
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:214.
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such stimulus— if no object can be posited in its reality— motiva­
tion for communication wanes and invention occurs in a vacuous 
monologue: thought is then developed in subjective terms alone.
Conversely, when a knower is aware of the reality of an object, 
invention occurs dialogically, in a "knowledge-relation."^®
Knowledge then has existential and objective validity. Subjective 
coexistence with an object of knowledge thus provides incentive for 
invention and communication.
A fourth element in personal participation in knowledge is 
subjective witness to its content. Knowledge requires communica- 
■ tion. Its existential vitality— its determining influence upon 
and coexistence with the thought of a knower— requires expression. 
Knowledge which has existential life summons utterance; its ontologi­
cal dynamic calls for affirmation. Barth distinguishes between 
"mere knowings" or perceptions and knowledge which becomes subjec­
tively determining."^^ Genuine knowledge involves an individual, 
brings him into relation with reality, truth, and specific proper­
ties of existence. Such a relation, because of its animation, 
cannot easily be suppressed. Existence— and knowledge is an exis­
tential relation between a knower and a thing known— gravitates 
toward utterance. Thus Barth says "knowing becomes knowledge when
46,'Cf. Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/2:302.
"̂ B̂arth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:214.
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the man becomes a responsible witness to its content. A knower, 
participating in the existential reality of an object, becomes a 
spokesman providing evidence of the reality of that object as 
testified in his relation to it. Barth thereby brings a strong 
existential realism into the process of communication. Content is 
an active relationship between object and subject and thus the 
knower is in a position to bear witness to this content which has 
determined his existence.
Knowledge and experience 
are processive
Third, knowledge and experience are processive, i.e., in 
continual movement, development, and change. This movement pro­
ceeds from the structure of existence. If knowledge, experience, 
and existence are correlated in object-subject relations, then these 
relations are variable. Objects and subjects are limitless and 
changing. Consequently, the subject-object correlation, what is 
mediated through it, how it is perceived, and what it communicates, 
varies. Knowledge cannot be static since reality is fluid.
Knowledge— if it acknowledges reality— must be revised constantly.*^®
The process nature of knowledge and experience entails
^®Ibid., p. 226.
^^Cf. Barth, Epistle to the Romans, pp. 2-3, 15-15; Barth, 
Evangelical Theology, p. 9, 150.
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progression from one partial insight to another. Our perception of 
reality is fragmentary, never complete. We are part of the process; 
the whole is imperceptible to us. Our thoughts and expressions are 
relative to our limited encounters with reality. Thus Barth regarded 
human thought and disciplines as "an inquiry." Human perceptions 
never assure perfect apprehension of reality. We know in a "prism"; 
our knowledge is refracted through the senses and our subjective 
processes of interpretation, and thus we know by "a laborious 
advance from one partial insight to another intending but by no 
means guaranteeing an 'advance 1 ' This process character of 
reality, knowledge, and experience involves important consequences 
for communication. Several implications of this refractive nature 
of knowledge and experience— its oblique, indirect, and fractional 
character— emerge: (1) knowledge, invention, and discourse must
retain the character of an investigation; (2) the process charac­
ter of knowledge and experience entails that human thoughts and 
expressions are provisional and require supplementation; and (3) 
human thought and discourse, including theory and criticism, is 
part of a history, i.e., knowledge and speech are in a process of 
becoming
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, p. 14.




Due to the process nature of reality, knowledge, invention, 
and discourse must retain the character of an investigation. 
Constantly changing object-subject relations require continuous 
inquiry. Knowledge, thought, and speech follow objective reality, 
searching after it; their efforts at conceptualization and expres­
sion trail original movements or events. Knowledge and speech are 
subsequent to and derived from the ontological events they seek to 
represent. They recollect previous perceptual events.Expres­
sion follows perception. Communication attempts to transfer a 
perception of reality from one medium to another— from an original 
perception through a perceiver, to a receiver- Subjective expres­
sions of reality only indirectly speak of the objective, even 
though the objective interpenetrates the subjective.^^ Human 
thought and speech is relative, conditioned by the limits of human 
perceptions and interpretations of reality, by differences between 
subjects and objects, by weaknesses in our ability to transmit our 
perceptions, and by the varying nature of object-subject relations.
Barth, Word of God and Man, p. 133; Barth, Doctrine of the 
Word of God, 1/1:226.
^^Cf. Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:188, 198; Doc­
trine of God, 2/1:57, 59; Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:376.
^^Cf. Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:150, 188-191; 
Ibid., 1/2:368; Doctrine of God. 2/1:57, 59; Doctrine of Creation, 
3/4:559; and the Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:110-111.
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Because of the refracted, partial nature of knowledge and experi­
ence, invention and discourse must maintain the character of.an 
investigation— an attempt to understand and express.
Provisional nature of inven­
tion, theory, and criticism
The process character of knowledge and experience also 
entails that human thoughts and expressions are provisional and 
require supplementation. For Barth, a definite system of knowledge 
is impossible because reality eludes i t . S p e e c h  is incomplete 
because our knowledge is partial. Our utterances are provisional; 
they require updating, amplification, and correction. There can 
be no definitive inventional system, only guiding concepts, for 
the reality which any conceptual apparatus or methodology seeks 
to encompass is processive. Theory and criticism must remain 
temporary; they can only serve present needs. Barth says concern­
ing theology as a critical science that as a critical retrospection 
"it can only work through examples, and not comprehensively or 
exhaustively." Due to the process nature of reality and communica­
tion, theoretical and critical formulations are fractional, dealing 
with only part of reality, and tentative, "pending better instruc­
tion," and not conclusive in any final sense. A lesson is to be 
learned, Barth says, but in critical science it "can really only be
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/2:866-867; Barth, 
Evangelical Theology, p. 89.
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the lesson for the needs of next day." What such a science pro­
vides is educational, since "the instruction can in no wise antici­
pate the reality of life, but can only give the most immediate and 
most needed guidance for meeting this reality." Thought and 
speech is relative, partial, and in need of completion in ongoing 
investigations, criticisms, and supplementary communications.
Intellectual and 
rhetorical evolution
Human thought and discourse, including theory and criticism, 
is part of a history, i.e., knowledge and speech are in a process 
of becoming. Speech is emerging meaning. A "word," a message or 
messages, must develop from the many words spoken. Meaning— the 
content of communication which influences and determines— must 
evolve. Barth says that "to 'exist' is to 'step out.'" Applied 
to persons, this means that we must emerge from being "one natural 
phenomenon among others" into a sphere of reflection, decision, 
and action where we become existentially aware, independent 
subjects.The same is true of discourse: meaning must find a
characteristic form, an independent existence, so that it stands 
out or becomes a recognizable entity, a subject matter, from among 
many linguistic or behavioral phenomena. Discourse must give birth
^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:87-88.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Creation, 3/2:92.
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to meaning— physical stimuli must become ethical and intellectual 
phenomena capable of achieving existence in the subjective experi­
ence of receivers. Discourse must attain meaningful existence so 
that it can coexist with and condition the thought and action of 
receivers.
Barth says that the subject matter of theology as critical 
science "is the series of expressions which constitute the mate­
rial of all Christian proclamation. . . ."58 This subject matter 
concerns the "expressions which, more or less constantly and 
emphatically . . . "  comprise the total configuration of the speech 
of the Christian community. Barth says that "here, as everywhere, 
these expressions acquire their meaning from the associations and 
contexts in which they are used." This "series of expressions" 
thus has "varying meaning" and "becomes from time to time a defi­
nite, characteristic language.Criticism asks how effectively 
this "series of expressions," given its variable meaning in differ­
ent contexts, serves its particular purposes, as related, for 
example, to the requirements of particular communities, speakers, 
situations, and subjects as these are seen from the perspective of 
a total history or intellectual and rhetorical evolution.
Methodologically, critical science considers the total
Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:87. 
^^Ibid., p. 86. Italics are mine.
90
historical proclamation of a community, "the sum-total of the 
attempts at . . . proclamation that have occurred up to date, as 
variously determined by the meaning attached to the expressions 
in question."^® Barth takes a meaning-centered view of the history 
and criticism of discourse. History and criticism, while dealing 
with the total evolution of the speech of a community, culture, etc., 
necessarily focus upon centers of meaning within that total config­
uration of discourse. Criticism deals not only with the variable 
meaning a series of expressions has acquired through use in differ­
ent contexts and times, but also with the variable meaning which 
has been attached to these expressions through previous critical 
analysis. In recognizing discourse as a history, criticism not 
only evaluates its meaning as acquired in practice but also as 
interpreted through earlier criticism. Criticism, however, must 
not be obscured by criticism but must return to original discourse. 
Still, criticism partially builds upon earlier criticism which 
illuminates centers of meaning in discourse.®^ Criticism's influ­
ence in correcting and revising earlier discourse must be considered 
as shaping the total configuration of discourse. Not all criticism 
is direct, then, but is partially mediated through earlier criti­
cism. We see much of the history of speech through criticism.
®*̂ Ibid., p. 87. Italics are mine. 
^^Ibid.
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Criticism necessarily concerns itself with "a very small 
fraction" of the total "series of expressions." Only a fragment 
of the total evolution "can be made the object of investigation." 
Further, "even within this known fraction there can be . . . only 
some few elements, which stand out representatively from the rest 
in the series, and with which this work can busy itself. Addi­
tionally, earlier criticism must be consulted for its contribution 
of standards by which discourse has been and may be judged.
These are not binding, however, as the objects of critical science 
must be re-examined in each new situation. On the basis of histori­
cal and contemporary investigation, guidance may be provided as to 
how the "series of expressions" which comprises the subject matter 
of the discourse of a particular community can "be used in altered 
connections and contexts and therefore in a new and, we hope, a 
better s e n s e . T h e  history and criticism of discourse evolves.
Its scientific and educational (advisory) character, as well as 
its processive nature, prohibits its crystallization in any kind 
of system. The "whole of a corrected . . . proclamation" can never 
be put "finally before the public." Only tentative and perhaps 





"a definite section of the entire world of past and future . . . 
proclamation .. . "  can be offered.
Knowledge and experience 
are dialectical
This section briefly considers the need for dialectic, and 
then defines and characterizes Barth's dialectic. For Barth dia­
lectic was primarily an ontological and epistemological necessity 
and secondarily a critical methodology.For Barth "existence is 
existence in movement. " Objects and subjects constantly inter­
act. Subjects progressively acquire knowledge— i.e., acknowledge 
reality as they perceive its movements— and their experience is 
based upon determining encounters with meaningful elements in these 
movements.^® Meaningful events and emerging centers of meaning 
require correlation, analysis, interpretation, and communication.
The dynamic movement of existence, knowledge, and experience requires 
forms suitable to its vitality, forms capable of expressing, organ­
izing, unifying, and critically evaluating these movements.
®®Ibid., p. 88.
®®The existential basis for Barth's dialectic is discussed as 
part of his concept of existence, cf. pp. 74-75, supra, the "rhythm 
of existence." The present section analyzes more particular impli­
cations of this dialectic.
®^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:939.
®®Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:14-16, 213-214, 226.
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Dialectic is such a fonti.®̂
Barth's dialectic is so much a part of his thought that no 
single definition encompasses its meaning. Dialectic must be dealt 
with in at least a partially dialectical manner; i.e., a variety 
of statements must be made to elucidate the concept. The following 
defining characteristics of Barth's dialectic emphasize implica­
tions for communication; (1) dialectic is a conceptual evolution 
or "history" of thought marked by determining events and encoun­
ters, (2) dialectic involves critical correlation of opposites, and 
(3) dialectic implies an elasticity, portability, and adaptability 
of concepts.
Dialectic as conceptual 
evolution or "history"
Dialectic is a conceptual evolution or "history" of thought 
marked by determining events and encounters. Dialectic involves 
the movement of reason within existence, seen in its various rela­
tions, manifestations, and sequences.Barth was apparently 
indebted to Hegel for much of this view of dialectic or "history" 
which views concepts in their relation to events and as events 
possessing full ontological status as much as any occurrence in
^^Barth, Word of God and Man, pp. 198-212.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/2:47; Doctrine of Reconcilia­
tion, 4/1:360; ibid., 4/3:144-147, 195, 469-470.
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the physical world.^^ Ideas are an organic part of history, an 
integral part of "world process," the integrated functions and 
movements of the cosmos. Knowledge, as acknoifledgment of reality, 
must evolve with it. Knowledge cannot viably exist solely in a 
subjectively-conceived or self-contained state; it demands outward 
movement and communication. Apart from dynamic ontology— a follow­
ing, apprehension, and representation of objects— knowledge is 
sterile. Knowledge is an ontological movement with full historical 
status. A fundamental correspondence exists in "world process" 
between sequences of historical or empirical, object-related 
events; sequences of conceptual or cognitive and rational events; 
sequences of behavioral or experiential, subject-related events; 
and between these sequences and speech or symbolic and interactional 
events. Existence, knowledge, experience, and speech are mutually 
aligned in the total, evolutionary process of history.
Since Barth virtually equates dialectic and "history," using 
them interchangeably at times, it is appropriate to consider his 
contrast of the concept of history with that of a state:
^^Hegel contributed to Barth a comprehensive picture of the 
"life of reason . . .  in the full movement of life." While Barth 
rejected Hegel's absolute self-confidence in knowing, he adopted 
from him the crucial dialectical and historical insight that con­
cepts are events, transactions in a dynamic process of life. Barth, 
Protestant Thought, p. 283, ff.
^^Although Barth once recommended abandoning the term dia­
lectic in favor of "history," cf. Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 
4/3:195, he never did so in practice. He continued to use
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There are states that are very much in movement, developing 
through many changes and varied modes of behaviour. The con­
ception of a stiff and motionless uniformity need not be linked 
with that of a state. But the idea of a state does involve the 
idea of something completely insulated within the state . . . 
the idea of a limitation of its possibilities and therefore of 
its possible changes and modes of behaviour. It is never capa­
ble of more than these particular movements. Even the concept 
of the most mobile state is not therefore equivalent to that of 
history.
Movements within a state or system— "fixed circles of changes and 
modes of behavior," their "sequence, continuity and causal connec­
tion," or "the sum total of . . . possible and actual changes and 
modes of behavior" in a system— only tell part of what we need to 
know about a system. A system or state needs to be seen within 
the context of an overall historical and dialectical process.
We learn much about a system when we see it affected from outside 
itself in dialectical encounter with something opposite its nature.
"dialectic," which was very prominent in his earlier writing, in 
many important contexts in his later writing. The identification 
Barth made of these terms is evident, for example, in his state­
ment concerning the necessity of "understanding in its dialectic 
the history of the Christian community. ..." Barth, Doctrine of 
Reconciliation. 4/3:880. He understood "history" as a dialectic 
and dialectic as a "history."
^%arth. Doctrine of Creation, 3/2:157-158.
^^This viewpoint should challenge students of communication 
to further unify historical, critical, and experimental studies 
because of its reminder that controlled, limited systems analysis 
needs historical perspective. Process includes but cannot be 
reduced to a finite number of systems. Systems need analysis not 
only for their isolated variables and patterns but also in their 
broader development as related to many systems and to a total evo­
lution .
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Barth says that "the concept of history in its true sense as dis­
tinct from that of a state is introduced and achieved when some­
thing happens to a being in a certain state, i.e., when something
new and other than its own nature befalls i t . D i a l e c t i c  or 
"history" involves critical awareness of relations between 
systems; it interprets the movements of systems in total world 
process. Dialectic or "history" thus occurs at the level of analy­
sis and of events. Theory, criticism, behavior, and events, while 
distinguishable, are seen in their ontological unity within the 
total evolution of existence.
Barthian dialectic or "history" views events and encounters 
within a total movement as determining the meaning of systems. 
Knowledge and meaning are not static but evolutionary and specifi­
cally transactional, i.e., involving actions upon a subject or
state by something outside it. Barth says:
History, therefore, does not occur when the being is involved 
in changes or different modes of behaviour intrinsic to itself, 
but when something takes place upon and to the being as it is. 
The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when 
something other than itself and transcending its own nature 
encounters it, approaches it and determines its being in the 
nature proper to it, so that it is compelled and enabled to 
transcend itself in response and in relation to this new fac- 
tor.
Evolutionary progress is made as systems encounter new systems.
^%arth. Doctrine of Creation. 3/2:158. 
^^Ibid. Italics are mine.
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elements, objects, or subjects. Encounters permit introduction of 
new elements into a system, criticism and revision of old elements, 
cuid the integration and evolution of new forms and relations. 
Encounter leads to the outward transcendence of a system— to its 
moving beyond itself to a new form or level in total evolution. 
Barth says; "The history of a being occurs when it is caught up 
in this movement, change and relation, v/hen its circular movement 
is broken from without by a movement towards it and the correspond­
ing movement from it, when it is transcended from without so that 
it must and can transcend itself outwards.Dialectical 
encounter opens entire new sets of possibilities for a system.
Dialectic as critical 
correlation of opposites
Because of its evolutionary nature based upon the integra­
tion of new elements through encounter, dialectic is a way of 
critical correlation. Since reality is seen as part of a total 
evolution, the dialectical thinker recognizes the interdependence 
of all thought. Different knowers possess varied, partial pictures 
abstracted from the total mosaic of existence. Criticism, compari­
son, and correlation of these pictures is necessary for understand­
ing and enhancing conceptual and behavioral evolution. Thus,
Barth says, interpreting Hegel, that "history here has entered so
7?Ibid.
98
thoroughly into reason . .. " that reason "is in a position to 
recognize itself at once in all history in some stage of its life- 
process, and also in its entirety, so far as the study permits us 
to divine the w h o l e . T h e  dialectician recognizes meaning in 
its evolution, not so much in oppositions, but at different levels 
of development. Since earlier stages of knowledge and experience 
are transcended, the dialectician may not so much reject opposing 
views but reconcile them, not renouncing a weaker level of inter­
pretation of reality— but pointing the way to a higher synthesis. 
The dialectician recognizes contributions through the inputs of 
diverse views of reality— that through cross-fertilization of 
ideas, interaction, mutual criticism, and synthesis, conceptual 
and behavioral evolution is advanced. In keeping with the Hegelian 
pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, concepts and rela­
tions are criticized and assimilated in new combinations.^^ This 
entails a process "which consists in something distinguishing its 
parts, separating them, and absorbing them into itself again. 
Dialectic, then, is a process of critical incorporation. Thus, 
amusingly, perhaps, but constructively, the later Barth observed
^^Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 284. Italics are mine. 
^^Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/3:306, 354, 418-419. 
®*̂ Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:3-4, 195. 
®^Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 297.
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that his eldest son. New Testament scholar Markus Barth, largely 
demolished an early work by Barth on the meaning of baptism. He 
wrote: "When my son was studying the literature available at the
time, he had to tell me kindly but firmly that 'not one stone was 
left upon another' of my 1943 work." Barth admitted that "this 
has been more or less my own finding too." Undaunted, however, 
the dialectically-minded elder Barth observed in his later revised 
book on the subject (it was his last book, a final fragment of the 
Dogmatics). that "I have had to accept in the main his predomi­
nately negative thesis and incorporate it into my own predomi­
nately positive thesis."®^ Barth saw his earlier work as a par­
ticular stage of his own conceptual evolution, accepted criticism 
of it, even from within his family, and incorporated this criti­
cism in a new level of interpretation.
Barth saw dialectic as a critical correlation of opposites. 
He wrote that "the unity of truth . . .  is the unity of contra­
dictions, more, the reconciliation which is effected between them. 
It is their reconciliation, but also the establishment of their 
basis, their necessity, and their adjustment and dissolving."®^ 
Dialectic examines the common ground of varying propositions, 
attempting to see their unity and mutual implications. Further,
®^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/4:x. Italics are mine. 
®®Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 297.
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it seeks to recognize the necessity of these opposites, the con­
tributions of each element, how these elements can be harmonized 
and disagreements eliminated. Thus, "the contradictions of being 
and thinking, object and idea, nature and spirit, object and sub­
ject . . . "  and other existential and what Perelman calls "philo­
sophical pairs," are seen in "the relationship they have both 
among themselves and with their higher unity. . . . "  Dialectic 
does not set aside contradictions but makes them relative and con­
tributory to a total, progressive evolution.
Dialectic implies elasticity, 
portability, and adaptability 
of concepts
Finally, as a consequence of dialectic's nature as a concep­
tual evolution involving critical correlation of opposites, dia­
lectic implies an elasticity, portability, and adaptability of 
concepts. Dialectic encompasses diverse lines of thought and 
interrelates different systems and processes.®^ The dialectical
84Ibid., p. 298. Much of Perelman's philosophy of rhetoric, 
such as his "arguments based on the structure of reality," "the 
relations establishing the structure of reality," “the role of 
philosophical pairs," etc., is similar in concern, if different 
in content, to Barth's communicology. Cf. Ch. Perelman and 
L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The Hev/ Rhetoric, trans. John Wilkinson and 
Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 
pp. ix-x. Kindred concerns appear in the work of communicologists 
such as Richard Weaver and Kenneth Burke.
®^Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/3:306.
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thinker, while keenly observing the various elements of any system, 
shows great elasticity of thought in interrelating these systems. 
James Robinson, in introducing a series of essays on Barth's dia­
lectic, cites the theologian's expressed preference to speak 
"'dialectically,' to exegete in 'a dialectic movement as inexorable 
as it is elastic.' to attain 'the inner dialectic of the subject 
matter.' Barth believed that wrestling with the inner dynamic 
of ideas, their tensions, comparisons, contrasts, and movements, 
is necessary. Mere formal analysis of technical meanings bound to 
concrete historical situations, while important, was for him insuf­
ficient. While careful analysis is important, categorical rigidity 
is a hindrance, particularly in view of the evolutionary nature of 
concepts, systems, and processes. Technical analysis is but the 
foundation for experience with a subject matter. A thinker and 
speaker must interact with his subject matter, immerse himself in 
it, experience its pressures and tendencies, and then release this 
experience with a subject matter in a dynamic, flexible manner.
The internal and external unity and direction of a subject 
matter— not only or primarily its closed, circular movement— but 
its outward tendency, needs expression. The boundaries of systems
James M. Robinson, ed.. The Beginnings of Dialectical The­
ology, trans. Keith R. Crim and Louis De Grazia, vol. 1 (Richmond, 
Va.: John Knox Press, 1968), p. 24, quoting Barth's second German
edition of The Epistle to the Romans, p. 113. Italics are mine.
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need to be recognized for what they are in reality— elastic, move- 
able, and permeable. The dialectical and scientific thinker recog­
nizes a chemistry in thought as in physical reality. While correct 
emalysis of the composition and properties of various substances is 
important, the interaction of different sets of elements in order 
to generate new substances, organic or conceptual, is also neces­
sary. Thus, conceptualizations need to be portable— the thinker 
should be open and ready to mix systems or at least elements from 
different systems, as Barth blended many diverse philosophical and 
theological views in his thinking, adapting these views and creat­
ing new combinations.®^ Such a scientific, creative, and investi­
gative mode of thinking, based on ongoing, dynamic interaction 
with evolving reality, seems to insure a progressive sense of 
discovery and development for the processes of invention and com­
munication.
Summary
This chapter explored Barth's conceptualization of existen­
tialism and dialectic as it impacted on his ideas about communica­
tion. Three philosophical bases of Barth's communicology were 
examined: his concepts of existence, knowledge, and experience.
Barth's communicology derives from his theory of existence and
®^Barth, Evangelical Theology, pp. 89-92.
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finds its motivation and necessity in the nature of reality. Three 
implications of Barth's view of existence were examined: (1) the
order of the object universe manifests itself even in defective 
human communication; (2) normativeness and individuality unite 
when communication combines the phenomenal and existential; and 
(3) there is a "rhythm of existence" or dialectic which provides 
ontological movement for communication. Barth's philosophy of 
existence is grounded in the object-subject relation, which struc­
tures reality and knowledge. Interaction is built into the uni­
verse in the object-subject relation, and communication is 
grounded in this ontology. The "intelligible cosmos" expresses 
itself through the "intelligent cosmos," manifesting its regularity 
in subjective existence and providing communication with a cogent 
orientation in a world process. Barth thus reconciles essentialism 
(Hegel) and existentialism (Kierkegaard). Subjectivity is oriented 
by encounter with the object world, enabling the individual to 
participate in its laws, rhythms, and constants.
Barth's concepts of knowledge and experience correlate with 
his concept of existence, providing a triad of bases for communica­
tion. The following elements influencing communication emerged:
(1) knowledge and experience are based on existence; (2) knowledge 
and experience require active personal participation; (3) knowledge 
and experience are processive; and (4) kncAfledge and experience are
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dialectical. First, knowledge consists in acknowledging reality.
By recognizing communication as an ontological movement, Barth 
linked invention and discourse with dynamics of existence, knowl­
edge, and experience.
Second, knowledge and experience require active personal 
participation. This involves: (1) subjective proof of acquaint­
ance with an object's existence and nature; (2) subjective deter­
mination by objective existence; (3) subjective coexistence with 
the object of knowledge ; and (4) subjective witness to its con­
tent. Knowledge and experience must correspond to the structure 
of being. Content is an active relationship between object and 
subject; thus, the knower is able to witness to this content which 
has determined his existence, bringing existential realism into 
the process of communication.
Third, knowledge and experience are processive. Knowledge 
must be revised because reality changes. Several consequences 
follow: (1) knowledge, invention, and discourse must retain the
character of an investigation; (2) the process character of knowl­
edge and experience entails that human thoughts and expressions are 
provisional and require supplementation; and (3) thought and dis­
course, including theory and criticism, are part of a history, 
i.e., in a process of becoming. Speech is emerging meaning. Dis­
course must give birth to meaning— physical stimuli must become
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ethical and intellectual phenomena existing in the experience of 
receivers. Criticism analyzes evolving meaning within a "series 
of expression" in a community. Barth thus takes a meaning-centered 
and evolutionary view of the history and criticism of discourse.
fourth, knowledge and experience are dialectical. Three 
characteristics of Barth's dialectic were observed: (1) dialectic
is a conceptual evolution or "history" of thought marked by deter­
mining events and encounters; (2) dialectic involves critical 
correlation of opposites ; and (3) dialectic implies an elasticity, 
portability, and adaptability of concepts. Dialectic involves the 
movement of reason within existence in its various relations, 
manifestations, and sequences. Barth held that ideas are an organic 
part of history. A basic correspondence exists in world process 
between sequences of historical, conceptual, behavioral, and speech 
events. Events and encounters within a total movement determine 
the meaning of systems. Evolutionary progress is made as systems 
encounter new systems, elements, objects, or subjects. Evolution 
through encounter is a fundamental ontological and communicological 
principle. Dialectic is a way of critical correlation. The dia­
lectical thinker views reason at different stages in its "life- 
process." The dialectician may not so much reject opposing views 
but reconcile them, not renouncing a weaker level of interpreta­
tion of reality— but pointing the way to a higher synthesis.
CHAPTER IV
BARTH’S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF COMMUNICATION
Barth explored "the important sphere of speech" or "this 
field of speech"^ in developing his anthropology or doctrine of 
man. This chapter investigates a central question related to his 
anthropology: What is Barth's conceptualization of communication?
To answer this question, five functions of communication developed 
by Barth are analyzed: (1) to make reference, (2) to participate
in a common event of perception which includes the equally impor­
tant related functions of obtaining understanding and achieving an 
interpretation, (3) to establish our humanity through being in 
encounter and reciprocal interactions, (4) to act, and (5) to 
experience human fellowship in reality, which includes the impor­
tant related function of receiving, creating, comparing, and criti­
cizing images, or pictures of reality.
Barth's development of these functions of communication con­
tributes to a philosophy of communication in at least three areas:
^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:738-739. Barth refers 




first, toward a better conceptualization of interpersonal communi­
cation; second, toward an axiology, or general value theory of 
communication; and, third, toward a teleology or goal conceptuali­
zation of communication. These contributions are elaborated in the 
following sections.
To Make Reference 
A foundational presupposition and master key to Barth's 
thought is his assertion that "the goal of thought and language 
must be determined entirely by the unique object in question. 
Thought, language, and communication are fundamentally concerned 
with making reference to objects. This axial principle has impor­
tant consequences, providing elements of necessity and objectivity, 
variety, control, seriousness and substance for communication.
Barth says that the goal of speech must be determined 
entirely by the unique object in view. This does not mean that 
making reference is the only goal of speech; it means that to be 
rational speech necessarily refers to objects. Barth says that a 
genuine human word says "something specific . . . points away 
from itself . . . points toward a fact, an object."3 This
^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/2:125.
3Ibid., p. 454. Barth defined an object as "something posited 
in its own being by another." Barth, Doctrine of Creation, 3/2:194. 
Cf. n. 12, p. 28, supra.
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pointing is logically necessary for speech and helps establish its 
objectivity and factuality. If no object is in view, thought, and 
hence language and speech, is vacuous. Simply pointing to per­
sonal states of the speaker or situational factors misses the 
reality of objective reference. Symbols, personal states, and 
contextual factors, though important, must not become ends in them­
selves, obscuring reference to objective realities. Process must 
not obscure substance. Barth disdains non-referential symbolism—  
speech which loses sight of posited objects. He says, "we do not 
speak for the sake of speaking, but for the sake of the indication 
which is to be made by our speaking. We speak for the sake of what 
we denote or intend by our speaking. Symbols must stand for 
something. Speech presupposes a definite datum or data. If it 
deviates from this object or objects it devolves into myth, fantasy, 
or sheer expressionism. In such a case genuine communication, 
speech or hearing has not occurred. Barth says "we can speak mean­
ing fully of hearing a human utterance only when it is clear to us 
in its function of indicating something that is described or 
intended by the word. . . ."  ̂ The referential or descriptive func­
tion thus supplies an indispensable foundation and goal for communi­
cation.
“̂Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/2:464. 
^Ibid.
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Second, the referential principle provides inexhaustible 
variety for speech. If thought and language is determined by its 
objects, then the meanings and purposes of speech a-i?e as varied 
and unlimited as those objects. Indeed, language must continually 
be in process to keep pace with the object world it seeks to repre­
sent, a world including objects who are also knowing subjects or 
persons, as well as an organic universe. Speech, therefore, is as 
open-ended as the object world.
Third, the referential principle provides control for communi­
cation. Barth says that the particular object in view not only 
provides a goal for discourse but also a limit. He states that 
"the same object in its uniqueness must also signify for us the 
boundary beyond which we are not to think or s p e a k . T h e  unique 
object exerts a governing influence over realistic discourse, 
focusing thought and speech toward itself and calling forth cogni­
tive and linguistic patterns apposite to its nature. The refer­
ential principle acts as a kind of cybernetic, or helmsman, 
directing discourse, giving it a channel, motivation, and impetus.
To depart from this referential function is to wander aimlessly in 
thought and speech. To maintain the referential bearing is to think 
and speak rationally, meaningfully, and with purpose.
Fourth, the referential principle provides seriousness and
^Ibid., p. 125.
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substance for communication. This results from the objectivity it 
supplies. Substance is also a function of a receiver's attitude. 
Barth urges taking seriously "the human speech uttered by specific 
men at specific times in a specific situation, in a specific lan­
guage and with a specific intention.If substance in discourse 
is discerned, a communication must be understood in its referential 
aspects— those related to the speaker and his specific purpose, 
those related to his specific frame of reference, his language, 
and those related to the specific objects to which his language 
refers. Serious attention must be given to these factors if serious 
regard is given to the speaker. Each of these factors contributes 
to the substance of discourse. If genuine communication occurs 
receivers must take these elements seriously. What is the attitude 
with which a receiver attends to a speaker, his situation, his 
language, and his objects of reference? If these are regarded 
lightly, little or no substance will be communicated. Is the 
receiver willing to cooperate in the process of making reference?
The process of making reference is mutual, requiring efforts of 
both receivers and sources. When serious reference-making to a 
mutual object of inquiry is undertaken on both sides, then realis­
tic reference occurs and discourse is invested with substance.
Barth thus contributes to the rationale of communication
^Ibid., p. 464.
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by stressing its objectivity, emphasizing the referential function 
of speech with its consequences of logical necessity, objectivity, 
variety, control, seriousness, and substance in communication; and 
he contributes to an axiology and teleology of communication by 
arguing for integrity of reference in speech, for objective ref­
erence provides speech with motivation, impetus, and purpose. To 
speak seriously, honestly, and with purpose, is to speak with 
objective reference.
To Participate in a Common Event of Perception 
A second function of communication is to participate in a 
common event of perception which includes the equally important 
related functions of obtaining understanding and achieving an 
interpretation. These functions are components or phases of the 
same process. Barth stresses that interpersonal encounter must 
become an event— first, an event of perception and then a fully 
reciprocal speech event. The event of perception goes beyond the 
initial referential function of communication and prepares for the 
yet more comprehensive event of speech. Barth indicates the pro­
gression from reference-making to the event of perception as follows;
We can speak meaningfully of hearing a human utterance only 
when it is clear to us in its function of indicating something 
that is described or intended by the word, and also when this 
function has become an event confronting us, when therefore by 
means of the human word we ourselves in some degree perceive
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the thing described or intended.®
The referential function is primary but preliminary; it must 
become an event in which percipients not only cognize a symbol, 
a speaker, and a context, but in which the word spoken mediates 
something to them and confronts them as an object for reflection 
and decision. This mediation is not a passive cognition of an 
object of reference; it is an active encounter through symbols 
which transmit and evoke a perception of an object which in turn 
exerts a claim upon both percipients, speaker and hearer. The 
confrontation is mutual; both parties relate together to the objec­
tive referent. Communication occurs when speaker and listener 
share in some degree a common perception of an object of mutual 
reference through symbolic encounter with that object and when it 
in turn mediates something specific to them and confronts them so 
that they have to take a position with respect to it. Communica­
tion, in this perspective, is mutual participation in a common 
perceptual event.®
®Ibid., pp. 464-465. Italics are mine.
®Barth's stress upon participation in the event of percep­
tion may be compared with Tillich's concept of participation in 
symbols. The accent of these writers is different. Barth empha­
sizes the objective reality of what is referred to by symbols 
(referents), whereas Tillich appears to use symbols more abstractly, 
and, while using them carefully, generally shows less concern for 
their concrete referents. For Barth, it is not so much the symbol 
but the perception of the object mediated through the symbol, which 
grasps the percipient and binds communicators together in a
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The response called for by participation in a common percep­
tual event includes the related functions of obtaining understand­
ing and achieving an interpretation. These functions are further 
phases of the event of perception. Barth develops in these func­
tions a process view of understanding and interpreting discourse.
For him, understanding discourse is more than cognizing symbols, 
contextual factors, interpreting speakers, or simply recognizing 
meaning. These occurrences, while important, are preliminary.^®
Barth warns that "if I were to confuse this preparation with the 
listening, understanding and expounding, and concern myself only 
with the word as such and the one who speaks it, how I should 
deceive myself I As far as I am concerned, he would have spoken in 
vain."H Understanding does require inquiry into these factors; 
in fact, Barth conceptualizes understanding in part as a process 
of inquiry. He says that "understanding is . . .  a return to the 
word, an inquiry into the word itself: the word with all its lin­
guistic and factual presuppositions; an inquiry in which . . .  I 
turn afresh to the word and speaker. ..." Understanding requires
perceptual event. This does not mean that Barth devalues symbols 
but rather that he views them instrumentally, not as ends in them­
selves but as having their end in mediating a perception of objec­
tive realities.




more than inquiry; it demands taking a position with respect to 
what has been mediated in discourse. This positioning recurs; 
initially, in the event of perception, in an original communicative 
encounter, and, retrospectively, as a post-communication analysis 
and criticism. Barth advocates returning to the speaker, to the 
perception of an object, and the word "even when it has been 
spoken.Understanding thus transcends the original perceptual 
event as an ongoing and retrospective response to this event.
Understanding and interpreting discourse requires a repeti­
tion, renewal, or re-creation of the original encounter. This 
involves not only continued objectivity in taking seriously the 
referential function of speech as it occurred in an initial trans­
action but a further retrospective assumption of a position with 
regard to the communicative event. In this retrospection the focus 
is upon the object of perception. Barth says "as I turn afresh to 
the word and speaker, I take up a standpoint outside the word and 
speaker, that is in that perception of the thing described or 
intended in the word which is mediated to me by my hearing of the 
word. " In taking such a retrospective position, the interpreter 
of discourse looks for a viewpoint from which he can appraise what 




a “locus." a perspective or point of reference.^^
Barth stresses that understanding discourse requires seeing
the speaker in his concrete relation to an object of perception.
The result of my inquiry in this form will be my interpreta­
tion of this human word. My exposition cannot possibly con­
sist in an interpretation of the speaker. Did he say something 
to me only to display himself? I should be guilty of a shame­
less violence against him, if the only result of my encounter 
with him were that I now knew him or knew him better than 
before. . . . Did he not say anything to me at all? Did he 
not therefore desire that I should see him not in abstracto 
but in his specific and concrete relationship to the thing 
described or intended in his word, that I should see him from 
the standpoint and in the light of this thing?^®
Neither the object or the speaker is to be seen in abstraction but
in their specific interrelation, so that interpretation consists
in significant measure in a percipient seeing himself in relation
both to a speaker and an object and the speaker in relation to the
object. To fail to discern this relation of the speaker to the
object is to do disservice to him. Barth says;
How much wrong is being continually perpetrated, how much 
intolerable obstruction of human relationships, how much iso­
lation and impoverishment forced upon individuals has its only 
basis in the fact that we do not take seriously a claim which 
in itself is as clear as the day, the claim which arises when­
ever one person addresses a word to another.
Objects cast light on speakers and speakers on objects. Encounters




are realistic and meaningful when they take into account the
speaker-object-percipient relationship; when this relationship is
ignored encounters are fragmented, darkened, and perhaps dishonest.
When this relationship is fully recognized and investigated, then
understanding occurs, communicative potential is realized, and a
proper and particularly humane interpretation can be made. Barth
sees great potential for understanding and interpretation in the
unfolding of the speaker-object-percipient relationship:
When their word is heard, and in the hearing attention is paid 
to what is signified and intended in this word, and there is an 
understanding of the full meaning and scope of their humanity 
in the light of this object of their word, then a proper exposi­
tion of their work can take account of their humanity in all its 
scope and meaning— not, however, in abstracto but in its con­
nexion with the object revealed in their word as it is heard 
and understood.
A final element in understanding and interpretation is the 
demand for further penetration into the meaning of the object: the
subject-matter of the discourse must be encountered in depth.
Barth warns against preconceiving an interpretation of discourse; 
he says that we often hear "as though we know already, and can 
partly tell ourselves what we are to hear." He cautions against 
subjectivism by the interpreter: "Our supposed listening is in fact
a strange mixture of hearing and our own speaking, and . . .  it is 
most likely that our own speaking will be the really decisive
ISjbid., p. 467.
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e v e n t . I f  genuine understanding occurs, the interpreter must 
be "gripped by the subject-matter";^^ i.e., he must encounter it 
in its independent reality without absorbing it into his own sub­
jective interpretation so much that its distinctive meaning and 
existence is lost. This grasping must happen "so that we can no 
longer confuse it with the word or the humanity of those who speak, 
and even less with ourselves. But more than independent recog­
nition is required: in interpretation as in the original event of
perception, the claim of the object must be allowed if understand­
ing is to occur; it must, by confronting us with its meaning, 
"become to us a subject-matter." Understanding is not simply 
recognition of meaning; it is a penetration to meaning and encoun­
ter with a subject-matter. Barth asks:
Is it not the case that whatever is said to us by men obviously 
wants— and it is with this claim that it confronts us with 
something said to us— to make itself said and heard? It wants 
in this way to become to us a subject-matter. It wants us for 
our part to bring it a true objectivity, i.e., interest for its 
own sake. Therefore the human word, by means of which it is 
told us, wants to be heard openly and not with that mixture of 
hearing and our own speaking and interrupting. In order to be 
understood by us, it wants not to be mastered by us, but to lay 
hold of us. It wants to be evaluated in its relation to what 
is said in it, when this has been spoken to us and made itself 
intelligible to u s . 22
^%bid., p. 470. 
2°Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 471. 
^^Ibid.
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Understanding, then, finally requires objectivity in an ongoing 
encounter in which the full claim of an object, seen in relation 
to a speaker in a total context, exerts its influence upon a 
percipient-interpreter.
Barth's interpretation of communication as participation in 
a common event of perception thus contributes to a rationale of 
interpersonal communication by the emphasis upon a comprehensive 
understanding of the speaker-object-percipient/interpreter relation­
ship, and by recognizing the potential in the unfolding of this 
triadic relationship for communication. Barth's interpretation 
contributes to an axiology of communication by stressing this 
relationship as a key to understanding our full humanity.
To Establish Our Humanity 
A third function of communication, establishing our humanity, 
occurs through being in encounter and reciprocal interactions which 
become the event of speech. This encounter transcends the inher­
ently important but preliminary functions of making reference and 
participating in a common perceptual event. These prior functions 
prepare for and by their objectivity safeguard being in encounter 
and the event of speech, but they emphasize encounter with a 
subject-matter whereas being in encounter stresses self-actualiza­
tion through communication. For all his objectivity, Barth does 
not neglect individual fulfillment through speech encounter.
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Percipients are not only enlightened by referring to a unique 
object in an event of perception; they also actualize their human­
ity by interpersonal encounter. Self-declaration is important as 
well as objective reference and meaning. Barth argues that human 
existence is constituted and manifested in encounter, that man in 
communication is in the process of establishing, expressing, extend­
ing, and confirming his own personhood and is rendering, at the 
same time, this service to others.
Barth's concept of being in encounter is examined in three 
phases: (1) as mutual transparency, (2) as "mutual speech and
hearing," and (3) as "mutual assistance in the act of being."
As part of the second phase, Barth develops his concept that 
"humanity as encounter must become the event of speech," detailing 
the meaning of speech as constituted in four primary elements: 
"reciprocal expression and its reciprocal reception, reciprocal 
address and its reciprocal reception. Following a more general 
discussion, these phases and elements are examined in their impli­
cations for the functions of communication.
Being in encounter is basic to Barth's anthropology. He 
presents "the broad definition that humanity . . . consists in the 
determination of man's being as a being with others. . . . It is 
not as he is for himself but with others, not in loneliness but in
^^Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/2:253.
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fellowship, that he is genuinely human. . . . " Man for himself 
betrays genuine humanity; his humanity is established as he includes 
others with himself. This inclusion is implied in the self­
declaration "1," which assumes a "Thou" as a correlate. The declara­
tion 1, on this premise, cannot be monological; it presupposes the 
existence of another, thereby proclaiming not only self-existence 
but the being of another. This declaration recognizes the other 
within the sphere in which it is made and summons the other to say 
Thou in response. Barth says that "the word 'I' with which I think 
and declare my humanity implies as such humanity with and not with­
out the fellowman. I cannot say 'I,' even to myself, without also 
saying 'Thou,' without making that distinction and connexion in 
relation to a n o t h e r . T h i s  immanent symbol "I" bridges man's 
self-expression in speech and his link with fellow-humanity. Our 
mutual existence declares and confirms itself in speech.
The I-Thou relation, which is basic to being in encounter, 
invites communication. Through encounter we posit, project, and 
position ourselves with respect to our interpersonal environment as 
in making reference and sharing in a perceptual event we position 
ourselves with respect to our object environment. Through encoun­




Barth thus says "I am as I am in a relation,i.e., we identify 
and establish ourselves, the boundaries of our existence, its prob­
lems, questions, potentials, and answers, as we express ourselves 
with respect to others.
Mutual transparency
The first phase of Barth's concept of being in encounter 
involves mutual transparency. Barth expresses this as "a being 
in which one man looks the other in the eye, " by which he seems 
to say that interpersonal visibility, openness, and mutual percep­
tion is integral to genuine being in encounter. Such perceptive 
encounter leads to duality, a mutual awareness of shared humanity. 
This phase of being in encounter makes interpersonal knowledge, 
communication, and relationship possible. Barth says "as I and 
Thou art we are open to one another. I know thee as a man, as 
something like myself, and I make it possible for thee to know me 
in the same way."^® Dodges, deceit, and concealment are set aside 
and a mutuality takes their place in which common humanity and 
involvement is recognized. Barth says:
This two-sided openness is the first element of humanity.





does not occur. To the extent that we withhold and conceal 
ourselves, and therefore we do not move . . . out of ourselves 
to know others and to let ourselves be known by them, our exist­
ence is inhuman, even though in all other respects we exist at 
the highest level of humanity.
Mutual transparency involves an openness which prepares for self­
disclosure, movement out of self, and interpersonal participation. 
The significance of these movements made possible by mutual trans­
parency is that "these are the first and indispensable steps in 
humanity, without which the later ones cannot be taken. . .
Mutual speech and hearing
A second phase of Barth's concept of being in encounter 
"consists . . .  in the fact that there is mutual speech and hear­
ing. As part of this phase, Barth develops his concept of the
event of speech as reciprocity, which involves reciprocal expres­
sion and address and their reception. Mutual speech and hearing, 
where interaction is fully reciprocal, "is the human significance 
of speech."32 Reciprocity transcends openness. Transparency, 
"seeing and being seen," is receptive but does not provide, adequate 
opportunity for self-declaration and self-interpretation. At the
3^Ibid., p. 251. 
3°Ibid.
33-ibid., p. 252. 
3^Ibid.
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level of transparency alone much of the image of another must be 
constructed from the standpoint of a percipient. Inadequate infor­
mation may result in a distorted image; one may be at the mercy of 
another's construction of himself. Independently formed images 
may obstruct communication. More than transparency and mutual 
observation is required. Barth says that "if in the encounter of 
I and Thou there is to be not merely mutual consideration but a 
mutual contact and intersection of being and activity," then 
dialogue is necessary. He says: "What is needed at this point is
speech— the human use of the mouth and ears. Humanity as encounter 
must become the event of speech. And speech means comprehensively 
reciprocal expression and its reciprocal reception, reciprocal 
address and its reciprocal reception. All these four elements are 
vital.
Self-expression is the first reciprocal element in "humanity 
as encounter" becoming the event of speech. The I must declare 
and interpret itself to the Thou if "spontaneous crossing of the 
necessary frontier of mere visibility in relation to the other 
occurs. Self-expression warrants that the I is not leaving the 
interpretation of himself to the Thou, but intends to assist him
^^Ibid., p. 253.
^^Ibid. Italics are mine. 
^^Ibid., p. 254.
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by supplying his self-interpretation. As the I speaks the Thou is
provided with an opportunity to compare his image or picture of
the I with that given by the Although self-expression may
acquire the meaning of self-protection by safeguarding the image
of oneself as known to others, its primary motivation is that this
assistance in interpretation is owed the other. Genuine self-
expression does not arise out of fear of being misunderstood or
from an apologetic purpose. Words are not true self-expression if
they present a mask, an unrealistic image, or a defense. Self-
expression is confirmed in honest intention to disclose and to
assist the other. Barth concludes:
To take the Thou seriously is to be concerned for the Thou in 
self-expression and self-declaration; to have regard in my 
self-representation for this other who necessarily has to do 
with me for good or ill; to do my best not to leave him to his 
own devices in the unavoidable task of making something of me. 
Only on this presupposition will my self-expression in relation 
to him be true and not false.
Reception of expression is the corresponding and second 
reciprocal element in "humanity as encounter" becoming the event 
of speech. This requires acceptance of the other's motives and 
purposes as directed toward self-disclosure. Barth says that "what
^^The concept that speech is an opportunity to receive, 
create, compare, and criticize images is developed by Barth in 
various contexts and is more fully examined in this chapter as 
part of the last function of speech, to experience human fellow­
ship in reality. See pp. 133-137, infra.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/2:254-255.
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matters now is the humanity of my hearing, and this is conditioned 
negatively by the fact that at least I do not hear this other with 
suspicion, and positively by the fact that I presuppose that he is 
trying to come to my help with his self-expression and self-declara­
tion."^® If hearing is humane, the receiver must recognize a need 
for the word of the other, welcoming it as an event contributing to 
interpersonal interpretation and relationships. Reception is move­
ment toward a source. Whatever its consequences, the movement and 
disclosure is a mutual benefit and need. The significance of "the 
event of self-expression" is that it contributes to interpersonal 
sharing and self-giving. Barth calls this sharing a "supreme favor" 
and concludes that "hearing on this presupposition is human hearing 
of the self-expression of the fellow-man.
Reciprocal address is the third element in which "humanity as 
encounter" becomes the event of speech. Self-expression and its 
reception are incomplete reasons for “crossing that frontier of 
mere visibility."^® Something objective needs communication. Why 
is address necessary? Barth first answers that it is necessary so 
the receiver can complete his interpretation of the source; secondly, 





subject but which is in the first instance unattainable, being con­
cealed in me."^^ Interpersonal address thus involves self-giving, 
self-disclosure, and mutual appropriation. Through this appropria­
tion the mosaic of our mutual humanity may be constructed.
Interpersonal address further requires elements of penetra­
tion, directness, disturbance, and decisiveness. Thus, "the word 
of address is necessary as a kind of penetration from the sphere of 
the one into the sphere of another being. . . . Address is coming 
to another with one's being, and knocking and asking to be 
admitted.Address involves an interpenetration of spheres of 
existence, an intersection of being, activity, and mutual under­
standing. It invites shared existence, experience, and purpose. 
Since such an invitation to share is often unwelcome, part of the 
purpose of this knocking is to disturb, to make the other aware 
of a need for "the objective thing which I can offer and 
impart. . . . Awareness of need cannot be taken for granted 
and interpersonal responsibility requires disclosure to meet needs.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. Barth's concept that interpersonal address requires 
penetration into another's sphere of being complements the aspect 
of his concept of understanding discourse which emphasizes pene­
tration into the meaning of a subject-matter, cf. pp. 116-117, supra. 
In complete communication both elements— objective and intersubjec­
tive penetration to meaning— are required.
"̂ Îbid., p. 257.
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Barth says:
Why I cannot be silent but am required to speak is that I 
necessarily abandon him and leave him to his own devices if 
I spare myself what is perhaps the thankless venture, and him 
the unwelcome penetration of his sphere, and withhold from him 
that which he definitely ought to know, but cannot know until 
I tell him. I cannot withhold it, because he encounters me as 
a man, and I should not take him seriously as a man if I did 
not seriously try to find the way from me to him. ̂ 4
Interpersonal address is grounded in the vital human need for
interpersonal concern and shared knowledge. Such address involves
comprehensive and incisive efforts to reach the being of another;
it requires decisive and persistent appeals so that humanity is
encountered and in order that speech itself may be truly humane.
Barth concludes: "The humanity of the encounter between I and Thou
demands that I should not merely make a few tentative efforts in
this direction, but do my utmost. Speaking on this presupposition,
not for one's own sake but for that of the needy other, is human
speaking."45
The fourth element in which "humanity as encounter" becomes 
the event of speech is the reception of address. This requires 
acceptance of the one who addresses as a subject, not an object.
This subject, in addressing a Thou, seeks to build a bridge between 




responsiveness to his objective impartation. Being cannot be in 
genuine encounter as long as the speaker and the message he seeks 
to impart is resisted. The receiver must not withstand the address 
of the Thou but invite it, grasping "that it is not just a matter 
of the other but of m y s e l f . T h e  sense of threat and ego- 
defensiveness need to be put aside if real encounter occurs. The 
risk of communication and encounter needs to be undertaken. To 
avoid this encounter is to deprive both the I and Thou. The essence 
of receptiveness to address is that "human hearing of the other 
takes place on the presupposition that I am affected myself if I 
do not hear him, and do so in all seriousness.
"Humanity as encounter," then, becomes the event of speech 
through four processes: reciprocal expression and address and their
respective reception. Reciprocity, therefore, is one of Barth's 
central concepts of the meaning and function of speech.
Mutual assistance in 
the act of being
The third phase of Barth's concept of being in encounter
"consists . . .  in mutual assistance in the act of being.





with its important entailment of reciprocity, as means to a higher 
end. This higher purpose involves a summons to action and putting 
ourselves at the disposal of another. This is action in fellowship—  
mutual responsiveness to the claim of another. Barth says that 
"action in encounter is action in correspondence with the summons 
which the Thou issues to the I when it encounters it. . . ."
More than behavioral response to a persuasive appeal or to informa­
tion requiring decision is involved: interpersonal encounter and
response, a being with and for being— being's response to being—  
is at issue. Being in encounter involves the summons of a person 
as well as that of an objective message. Barth says "as we see 
one another and speak and listen to one another, we call to one 
another for assistance."^® The summons involved in much of our 
communication requests sharing in the task of being. Barth explains 
that "assistance is actively standing by the other. It is standing 
so close by him that one's own action means help or support for 
his. It thus means not to leave him to his own being and action, 
but in and with one's own to take part in the question and anxiety 
and burden of his, accepting concern for his life. . . This





is the higher thing which is decisive beyond mere reciprocal sight 
and speech and hearing. . . . " Responsiveness to assist in the 
act of being "leads the encounter of I and Thou to its goal and 
makes human being human.
A third function of communication, to establish our humanity, 
has been examined. This function is achieved through being in 
encounter and in reciprocal relations which constitute the signifi­
cance of speech. Three phases in the concept of being in encounter 
were analyzed; mutual transparency, “mutual speech and hearing," 
and "mutual assistance in the act of being." Four elements in the 
concept of reciprocity were examined as an aspect of mutual speech 
and hearing: reciprocal expression, address, and their reception.
In these three phases of being in encounter and in the concept of 
reciprocity, in which encounter becomes the event of speech, we 
seem to have the heart of Barth's interpersonal communicology and 
a crucial, actualizing element in humanistic anthropology.
To Act
A fourth function of communication is to act. This section 
observes some of Barth's views concerning the relationship of 




as speech occurs in the context of his consideration of "The Minis­
try of the Community.Barth sees the active life of man as 
"differentiated, though not divided, into speech which is also 
action on the one side, and action which is also speech on the 
o t h e r . S p e e c h  and action are an organic unity, though each 
element is distinctive. Generally, speech is prior. Barth says 
that "for the most part the Word precedes and the act follows.
But neither is lacking even where one or the other alone is men­
tioned or receives prominence. Why should speech ordinarily 
precede action? Barth answers that "the burden of both the speech 
and action of the community is that men are called to knowledge, 
yet not to empty but to active knowledge. Because it is a matter 
of knowledge, speech must come first. But because it is a matter 
of active knowledge, the element of action must not be lacking. 
Barth says that "speech is to be linked at once and directly with a 
distinct human action, becoming an active life in unity with it."^® 
If speech is not united with action, either speech or action may be 
lifeless. He says: "If all is well, the speech of the community
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:830-901. 
^^Ibid., p. 862.
^®Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 863. Italics are mine.
^®Ibid., p. 862.
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in all its forms must also be action. Similarly, action will also 
necessarily be both implicitly and indeed explicitly speech.
Speech is an inception of action and contains potential for action. 
This potential needs actualization in event or behavior. Speech 
and action, therefore, share a common source, the active life of 
man, a common unity, concretely manifested behavior, and a common 
goal, active knowledge.
As an organic unity, speech and action require "equal serious­
ness and emphasis."®® To be concerned with one is to be concerned 
with the other. Barth says of the ministry of the community: "it 
is not as though it were concerned with something different in the 
two, but wholly with the same thing though in different ways in 
both. For its speech is also action and its action speech."
Action is not an "incidental" or "optional" element. One need not 
wonder whether action should accompany speech or simply "do so per­
haps in a very rudimentary and imperfect f o r m . S p e e c h  and action 
are different forms of the same message. Speech is incipient 
action— it contains the seed, nucleus, or motive for action, as 
action does for it— while action is the concrete actualization of 





Barth asks: "Who can say . . . that the community may not often
speak and therefore call to knowledge more clearly and forcefully 
with its action than with the verbal speech which must necessar­
ily . . . precede and indicate the meaning of the action?
While stressing the necessary sequential pricarity of verbal speech 
because of its interpretative function, Barth regards action—  
non-verbal speech— as equally requisite to effective communication. 
A primary function of communication is thus to act by speech, i.e., 
to initiate and interpret an act in speech and then to complete 
and actualize it in deed.
To Experience Human Fellm\fshio in Realitv 
The fifth function of communication is to experience human 
fellowship in reality. This is Barth's final purpose for speech 
and a synoptic statement of the preceding functions. The state­
ment is seen in the context of Barth's discussion of man's struggle 
with a false image or picture of reality. In overcoming this 
broken and distorted image Barth thinks that speech has a final 
function.Consequently, an important function associated with 
the final function of speech is the opportunity provided in speech
°2ibid., p. 864.
®^An interesting analogue to Barth's discussion is Floyd 
Matson's The Broken Image (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., 1964; Anchor Books, 1966).
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to receive, create, compare, and criticize images, or world views. 
With these related concepts Barth climaxes his view of the func­
tions of communication and contributes his concept of shared 
responsibility in the interpretation of world views. If this 
responsibility is undertaken, he believes, communication can assist 
humanity toward a more meaningful and truthful understanding of 
existence.
Barth believed man generally exists in a "lost and false 
situation" in which his "whole being is given an aspect which 
deforms, distorts and corrupts its true reality." Although man 
and the world were inherently created in goodness by God, this 
goodness and reality has been falsified by man, who tends to resist 
truth. A new human situation is needed in which man's representa­
tion of reality will correspond to truth. As it is, "reality dis­
closes itself to him in an image which is defaced, distorted, and 
corrupted.This false image has no power to change truth or 
reality, only to obscure it. Even in the broken image, truth is 
present and inescapable. But man is bound to his image of reality; 
"it controls, determines, limits and characterises his existence." 
He finds that "he is forced to have and to experience the world 
and himself in the defaced, distorted and corrupted form in which
®‘̂Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:468.
®^Ibid.
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they represent themselves to him in this image. He exists in a 
subjective reality alien to and contradicting his objective 
reality.
Barth says that "the painfulness of the situation is concen­
trated, and finds its most striking co-efficient and exponent, in 
the problematical nature of human s p e e c h . H e  sees speaking and 
hearing as a tremendous possibility by which the human situation 
can become truly humane, although this is often not the case.
"tfhat should take place in human speaking and hearing," he says,
"is the utterance, declaration and revelation of human reality with 
a view to its indication, impartation and communication to others 
and with the final purpose of the communion or fellowship of the 
one with the others."®® This statement capsulizes much of the 
thrust of the preceding functions of communication— with their 
emphasis upon reference-making, participation, encounter, speaking, 
and acting in order to convey and share human reality. Barth 
observes that reality cannot be communicated so long as truth is 
resisted or if speakers "lack this determination.All speech, 
he says, suffers from this lack. Consequently, one of the
®®Ibid., p. 469. 
®7lbid., p. 472. 
®®Ibid., p. 472-473. 
®®Ibid., p. 473.
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important functions of speech is to discern and compare images, 
i.e., the pictures of reality or world views which communicators 
presuppose, imply, or declare. Speech is thus an opportunity to 
receive, create, compare, and criticize images. Barth states that 
"in any . . . cognitive act, we are definitely active as the 
receivers of images and creators of counter-images."^® Although 
perceptual mediation is involved in this process, Barth's greater 
concern is not with psychophysical processes, which are funda­
mentally important, but with the actual content of the world views 
of those in encounter. Despite a positive capacity to receive and 
create images, humanity tends toward the creation of false images. 
Consequently, comparing and criticizing images or pictures of reality 
is a vital, ongoing function in communication. Barth says;
This is why it is so tremendous a task, constantly to be 
resumed . . . not only to say, even in our own thoughts to 
ourselves, let alone to others, that which we really intend to 
say in the way intended, but also to hear that which others 
both say and intend to say, i.e., to interpret or even to 
discern the dream with which they are occupied when they say 
it.'̂ l
Both speakers and listeners, Barth holds, share responsibility to 
assist each other in the task of understanding their shared expe­
rience. One should not be concerned with his own vision of reality 
alone but also with that of the other; one should not interpret his
^®Barth, Doctrine of God. 2/1:182.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:473.
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image only but assist the other in mutual interpretation. Unfor­
tunately, this responsibility is often neglected or rejected.
Barth says "this is why human speech especially is the arena of 
such ceaseless misconceptions and errors, and also of so many more 
or less intentional great or small concealments and distortions, 
and also of so many tragic and comic misunderstandings for which 
both speakers and hearers must usually share the responsibility." 
Conversely, if this shared responsibility is undertaken, then speech 
with its great possibilities for referring, perceiving, and partici­
pating in reality, will serve its final function of declaring and 
creating fellowship in reality.
Summary
Barth explored "the important sphere of speech" or the "field 
of speech" in developing his anthropology or doctrine of man.
This chapter investigated a central question related to his anthro­
pology: What is Barth's conceptualization of communication? To
answer this question, five functions of communication were ana­
lyzed : (1) to make reference, (2) to participate in a common
event of perception, including the equally important related func­
tions of obtaining understanding and achieving an interpretation,
(3) to establish our humanity through being in encounter and
72ibid.
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reciprocity, (4) to act, and (5) to experience human fellowship in 
reality, including the important function of receiving, creating, 
comparing, and criticizing images, or pictures of reality.
First, communication concerns making reference to objects. 
This function has important consequences, providing elements of 
necessity, objectivity, variety, control, seriousness, and sub­
stance for communication. Second, comm.unication involves partici­
pation in a common event of perception, including the related 
functions of understanding and interpretation. Communication 
occurs when speaker and listener share a perception of an object 
through symbolic encounter with that object and when it in turn 
mediates something specific to them and confronts them so that they 
have to take a position with respect to it. Third, communication 
establishes our humanity. This occurs through being in encounter 
and reciprocity. Being in encounter was examined in three phases: 
as mutual transparency, "mutual speech and hearing," and "mutual 
assistance in the act of being." The concept that "humanity as 
encounter must become the event of speech"— in which Barth details 
the meaning of speech as reciprocity— was also examined in its 
four processes: reciprocal expression and address and their
respective reception. Fourth, communication involves action.
Speech and action are organically related. These elements share 
a common source, the active life of man, a common unity.
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concretely manifested behavior, and a common goal, active knowledge. 
As an organic unity, speech and action require "equal seriousness 
and emphasis." Fifth, Barth's final function for communication is 
to experience human fellowship in reality. This includes the 
related function of receiving, creating, comparing, and criti­
cizing images, or pictures of reality. With these concepts Barth 
climaxes his view of the functions of communication and contributes 
his concept of shared responsibility in the interpretation of 
world views.
Barth's thought related to the functions of communication 
contributes to a philosophy of communication in at least three 
areas; first, toward a better conceptualization of interpersonal 
communication; second, to%vard an axiology, or general value theory 
of communication; and third, toward a teleology or goal conceptuali­
zation of communication. Barth's contributions to interpersonal 
communication include: his stress upon objectivity in communica­
tion; his interpretation of communication as participation in a 
common perceptual event, emphasizing a comprehensive understanding 
of the speaker-object-percipient/interpreter relationship; his con­
cept of being in encounter and reciprocity, contributing to the 
communicology-anthropology relationship; his concept of speech as 
action; his concept of speech as experiencing fellowship in 
reality; and his concept of speech as an opportunity to receive.
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create, compare, and criticize images or world views. These con­
cepts, because of their humane goal orientation, also contribute 
to an axiology and teleology of communication. Contributions to 
these areas include: grounding interpersonal interaction in con­
cepts of what ought to occur in communication; providing concepts 
of the desirable and beneficial which give interactions an ethical 
basis, motive, and direction; arguments for integrity of reference- 
making in speech; being in encounter as a key to actualizing human­
ity; and an emphasis upon human fellowship through communication 
based upon realism achieved through ongoing encounter, sharing, 
and criticism of world views.
CHAPTER V
PRINCIPLES OF ECUMENICAL COMMUNICATION
This chapter considers how community or intergroup unity 
may be achieved. The central question addressed is; What prin­
ciples of communication did Barth believe were conducive to ecu­
menicity or cooperation and unity among groups? To answer this 
question the chapter first considers the significance of a theory 
of community for contemporary rhetoric, and, second, examines 
some foundational presuppositions in Barth's theory of community.^ 
A theory of community is seen herein as in the mainstream
of contemporary rhetorical theory and needs. To this Barth con-
2tributes a theory of how community may be achieved. Barth's 
perspective includes an inductive, scientific approach to commu­
nity, and his "principle of the common center," which orders com­
munity around a common object of interest, emerges as the axial
This chapter does not analyze Barth's total theory of com­
munity but outlines concepts significant for intergroup relation­
ships and communication.
2For a discussion of the importance of studying how community 




concept in his theory of community.
The Significance of Community for Rhetoric 
This section considers the significance of a theory of com­
munity for contemporary rhetoric. A theory of community contrib­
utes to rhetoric in at least three ways; (1) as part of a concep­
tion of the task of rhetoric; (2) as part of a conception of 
modern inventional theory; and (3) as part of a conception of how 
the "universal audience" or audiences are produced.
The ecumenical task of rhetoric
The National Developmental Project on Rhetoric urged the 
development of a rhetoric of ecumenical significance. Lloyd 
Bitzer suggested "that we view rhetoric as a discipline and art 
whose practical mission is realization of the great aspirations of 
the human community.In this perspective, rhetoric includes 
approaches to problem-solving applicable to contemporary issues- 
Rhetoric enables one to address "vital subject-matter," "to formu­
late and evaluate positions, and to engage in intelligent dia­
logue and action.Accordingly, a shift of emphasis was urged 
for rhetorical studies in which attention would be given to con­




Specifically, scholars at the Wingspread Conference advocated 
"investigations of the ways in which communication can help develop 
world community."  ̂ The final report of the National Developmental 
Project called for a "reconstituted" rhetoric, conceived of as "an 
art of inquiry and communication, seeking to generate agreements 
among people. . . ."  ̂ The conferees considered the ecumenical 
task of rhetoric so central to contemporary rhetoric that in their 
"Suggestions for Future Projects" they proposed "that the National 
Endowment for the Humanities support a project designed to examine 
the arts of communication for their service to and impairment of 
community. . . ."  ̂ Thus, an approach to rhetoric emphasizing con­
tributions to contemporary problem-solving, competent dialogue, 
and the generation of agreements among people, is part of a funda­
mental conception of the task of rhetoric.
Community and inventional theory
A theory of community also contributes to rhetoric as part 
of a conception of modern inventional theory: (1) as part of its
basis, through the concept that rhetoric studies how cooperation 
is achieved; (2) as part of its evaluative function, which involves
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 240. Italics are mine. 
^Ibid., p. 242.
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making judgments among competing world views; and (3) as part of 
its goal, which involves generating frameworks which put group 
relations into meaningful perspectives. First, a theory of com­
munity basically contributes to inventional theory by conceptual­
izing rhetoric as a study of how cooperation is achieved, which 
entails a view of invention as a means of analyzing and correlating 
relationships between people. The "Committee on the Nature of 
Rhetorical Invention" of the National Developmental Project regarded 
the connection between rhetoric's ecumenical task and inventional 
theory as basic. They began their report "with the assumption 
that a vital aspect of man's experience is rhetorical," i.e.,
"that every man will find himself in circumstances in which he 
cannot act alone, in which he must seek to act cooperatively with 
others. . . . Rhetorical invention not only analyzes subjects 
but also "problems" and "situations" including "the discovery 
of . . . grounds of agreement. . . . A theory of invention ade­
quate to contemporary needs includes a theory of how community is 
achieved. Inventional theory concerns not only the origination 
and management of discourse— the cohesion of ideas— but also the 
origination and cohesion of groups. It contains a logic of inter­
group relations, of how diverse groups can be brought into




Second, a theory of community contributes to the evaluative 
function of inventional theory, which involves making judgments 
among competing world views, particularly as to the means of their 
presentation. The final report of the National Developmental Proj­
ect concluded that rhetoric "examines and criticizes communication 
practices for their quality— ultimately in terms of their contribu­
tions to . . . community" and that "the methods of rhetoric allow 
us to judge and order competing conceptions of 'the aspirations of 
the human community.’ Rhetoric criticizes world views because 
argumentative and persuasive strategies relate to such positions. 
Understanding an argument requires understanding the world view 
from which it originates and which it supports. Robert L. Scott
^^Lloyd Bitzer addressed the need for a modern theory of 
invention based on a theory of community as follov/s: "It was one
thing to devise a theory of invention for ancient Athens, where 
the public was very small— a city-state, a community having stabil­
ity of beliefs and values. Today there are multiple communities 
marked by swiftly changing populations, conventions, beliefs, and 
values, but trying to talk with one another and needing desperately 
to join in wider and more fulfilling communities. Amid such diver­
sity and change, can a theory of invention be devised? Can legiti­
mate grounds of judgment and action be discovered or generated?
Can community be formed? Is it true that a workable theory of 
invention depends on the existence of community?" Ibid., p. 204.
^^Ibid., p. 240. Cf. Barth's concept that speech compares 
and criticizes world views, i.e., the pictures of reality which 
communicators presuppose. This notion of the purpose of speech 
correlates with its ecumenical task and with the evaluative func­
tion of invention. Cf., "Barth's Conceptualization of Communica­
tion," pp. 133-137, supra.
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and other conferees of the "Committee on the Nature of Rhetorical 
Invention” argued that "galaxies" of arguments and persuasive 
strategies "have centers, which may be called world-views or stances 
or originating positions." In this view, "inventional resources 
may vary radically from one galaxy to another.Commonalities 
also exist. Rhetorical efforts function to maintain world views. 
World views become frames for rhetorical efforts. Such "frames 
become instruments for rhetorical invention." Questions concern­
ing the correlation of world views arise: ". . . . how do galaxies
shift? How do new centers of commitment come into being? S u c h  
questions impact upon the ecumenical task of rhetoric and inven­
tion, which asks how groups with varied world views and rhetorical 
resources can generate agreement.
Third, a theory of community contributes to inventional 
theory as part of its goal, which involves generating frameworks 
which put group relations into meaningful perspectives. If world 
views frame rhetorical efforts, then ways of relating different 
world views, groups, and their rhetorics, become necessary. The 
conceptual mobility of modern society— the fact that many persons 
move in and out of different frames of reference during their
l^Ibid., p. 233,
^^Ibid., p. 234. Italics are mine.
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lives— increases this need.^^ Ways of bridging differing struc­
tures of experience are needed. A "generative theory of rhetoric" 
brings diverse groups, ideas, situations, products, events, and 
experiences into meaningful perspectives. Such a theory recognizes 
that "the constituents of invention" include "social conditions and 
resources" and "perspectives on facts, persons" as well as methods 
of presentation. Generative rhetorics may establish bases for 
communication between groups, provide means for evaluating inter­
group relations, and contribute to community among groups. From 
such generative theories, new world views and rhetorical frames 
may emerge, new rhetorical resources may surface, and communicative 
efforts may improve. Invention, then, will not be addressed so 
much to the recovery and reinforcement of predetermined arguments, 
but to the discovery and generation of new relationships between 
ideas and people.
Communitv and the 
"universal audience"
A theory of community also contributes to rhetoric as part 
of a conception of how the "universal audience" or audiences are 
produced. The "Committee on the Nature of Rhetorical Invention" 




rather than 'discovering' the universal audience or audiences." 
Reference was made to Perelman's "concept of a universal audience" 
as "obviouslv important in the search for rapport or at least 
operational agreement among diverse groups. T h u s ,  the issue of 
community was linked with the concept of a universal audience.
Lloyd Bitzer, for example, linked the issue of community with that 
of the universal audience by asking: "Are we witnessing the break­
down of traditional communities and the transition to something 
very new— perhaps a universal public, a universal audience?"
It was argued that "audiences are made, not given.Accordingly, 
a generative theory of rhetoric must involve the invention or gen­
eration of audiences. Broader conceptions of audiences from 
receiver and intergroup perspectives are needed. The "Committee 
on the Nature of Rhetorical Invention" noted that in a process 
view of invention "the rigidity of the distinction between speaker 
and audience loses its sacredness" and that "the interplay of vari­
ous points of view is often more generative than a single person's 
e f f o r t s . T h e  following section examines some principles which 
Barth believed could help interrelate diverse views of different
^^Ibid., p. 235. Italics are mine. 





Barth's Theory of Community 
This section examines some factors in Barth's theory of com­
munity. Three areas are analyzed: (1) Barth's concept of commu­
nity with related terms; (2) intragroup factors ; and (3) intergroup 
factors.
Barth's concept of community
Barth's theory of community involves defining and charac­
terizing his concept of community with the related terms ecumeni­
cal and catholic. Since the latter terms represent the framework 
of Barth's concept of community, they are examined first. The 
terms "catholic," ecumenical, and community, respectively, are 
examined as they structure Barth's theory of community.
Barth's universal framework
Barth's concept of the term "catholic," which he regarded as
the comprehensive basis for the related concepts ecumenical and
20community, frames his theory of community. Barth defined the 
term as follows: "The adjective 'catholic' means general, compre­
hensive. It speaks of an identity, a continuity, a universality.
20While employing the term ecumenical, Barth preferred the 
term "catholic." This was because he considered that the term 
"catholic" refers to the "being of the community" and "has an even 
wider temporal dimension" or historical connotation than the term 
ecumenical. Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:701-704.
150
which is maintained in all the differences."^^ Three elements in 
this definition urge discussion as aspects of Barth's theory of 
community: the elements of (1) "comprehensiveness" or "univer­
sality," (2) "identity," and (3) "continuity.
First, Barth's theory is "comprehensive" in scope; it includes 
all humanity. Barth employs the term "catholic" to refer to the 
universal church and he applies it, through the church, to all 
persons. The universal church is a "provisional" human fellowship
or audience which "points beyond itself to the fellowship of all
23men in face of which it is a witness and herald." This "provi­
sional," temporary audience points to an even larger universal 
audience. The church does not exist for itself but "for the 
world. Barth saw the church as the "inner circle" of an all- 
encompassing election by God of all humanity.Barth's theory of 
community was inclusive. He saw the church, a universal community.
^^Ibid., p. 701. Italics are mine.
^^The terms "comprehensive," "identity," and "continuity" are 
discussed respectively. Concepts related to the term "universality" 
are subsumed under the term "comprehensive."
^%arth. Doctrine of God. 2/2:196.
^^arth. Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:830.
^^arth. Doctrine of God, 2/2:196. Of. Barth's description 
of the community as "the provisional representation of the whole 
world of humanity justified in Him." Barth, Doctrine of Reconcilia­
tion. 4/1:643.
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an opening to an even more comprehensive frame of reference, the 
universal body of all humanity, and as part of a comprehensive world 
process. He saw that the church exists in "world-occurrence.
This comprehensive viewpoint enabled Barth to include all persons 
in his theory of community and in his communications. Because of 
his universal framework, Barth did not exclude any; he was able to 
reconcile, not to divide. His was a rhetoric of "yes," not of 
"no." In contrast to sectarian, nationalistic, provincial, or 
otherwise exclusive views, Barth adopted an architectonic approach 
to community which, instead of isolating any segment of humanity, 
addressed all.
Second, Barth's concept of the term "catholic" contributes 
the element of an "identity," a "sameness" and "solidarity" to a 
theory of community. Barth wrote that "the term 'catholic' 
speaks explicitly of the true Church activating and confirming its 
identical being in all its forms." Barth saw the church as an 
ultimate unity. He said "Credo catholicam ecclesiam . . means 
that . . .  I believe in the existence of a community which in the
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:581-761.
Cf. Barth's statement concerning the Christian community 
that "in the long run it can only be pro, i.e., for men, since God 
in Jesus Christ is and has decided for them." Barth, Doctrine of 
Reconciliation. 4/3:717-718.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:701-702; ibid..
4/3:773.
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essence which makes it a Christian community is unalterable in
29spite of all its changes of form. ..." By taking this position, 
Barth was able to address members of different churches as consub- 
stantial, as one in nature. This aspect of his "catholic" view­
point provided him with a universal principle of identification, 
i.e., a conviction concerning the intrinsic unity of all humanity. 
This principle of "identity" presupposes a shared "common life" 
for the church and for all humanity. This principle of "identity" 
brought all communication within a framework of community between 
persons. On this premise, Barth approached any auditor with the 
expectation of finding a "neighbor" or "brother." On this premise, 
no listener or audience is to be approached as "a stranger" or 
strangers.
Barth held that "the community does not perform its task 
properly if it does not perform it in this manner /i.e., by per­
sonally addressing a subject— speaking implicitly or explicitly 
in the second p e r s o n . B a r t h  says that the "manner in which the 
community comes to them /its fellow humanity/, acts toward them, 
thinks of them and speaks to and concerning them . . . necessarily
29lbid., p. 702.
*̂̂ Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/2:441.
^^Barth, Doctrine of God. 2/2:324; Doctrine of Reconciliation,
4/3:772.
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emerges in the being and activity of the community. . . ." This 
means of address and relation "necessarily impresses itself upon 
them, causing them to consider that in the community it has to do 
with a society of men who are . . . attempting to see and under­
stand them in their o\\m place and manner. . .."  The principle of 
"identity" requires addressing others as familiar, "as those who 
are well acquainted. It requires a relationship and address 
characterized by "solidarity." "Solidarity with the world means 
full commitment to it, unreserved participation in its situa­
tion. .. . "  Although the principle of "identity" or of "solidar­
ity" does not remove the occasional necessity of contradiction, of 
saying "no" as well as or as part of saying "yes," it does mean 
proceeding "from the profoundest commitment to the whole of human­
ity and each individual man. . .
Third, Barth's concept of the term "catholic" contributes 
the element of a "continuity" to a theory of community. Barth 
says that the term catholic has a "temporal dimension," i.e., 
"exists in history," "is history," "makes history," and "exists
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:772.
33lbid.
34lbid., p. 773.
^%arth. Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:701, 704.
154
only in c h a n g e . T h e  concept of community involves a dynamic 
historical evolution. Neither a particular community nor a uni­
versal community exists statically. The community "is on a way 
which is surrounded by a continually changing landscape and in 
which it is itself continually subject to change. ..." While 
"summoned always to be the same" it does so "in forms which are 
always new." While preserving some constant features, commu­
nities are transformed in the process of time with changing con­
ditions. Communities, like their language and ideas, must be 
renewed to meet evolving needs. This dynamic approach to commu­
nity provides for restructuring groups and interpersonal relations. 
This principle of "continuity" attempts to correlate communities 
by pointing out to them that they are not states, i.e., self- 
contained entities, but evolving aspects of a total historical 
process.
The meaning of ecumenical
Several features of the term ecumenical deserve recognition 
as contributing to Barth's theory of community: (1) Barth gener­
ally equated the terms ecumenical and "catholic," seeking to enrich 
and expand the term ecumenical by investing it with the meanings 




to develop intercommunity relationships and concerns principles 
which promote unity in these relations; and (3) Barth's theory of 
ecumenics views "a people" or community as a "fluid concept," a 
"historical construct," and a matter of "attitude" which recognizes 
the relativity of all communities and is hence open to changes in 
them.
First, Barth generally equated the terms ecumenical and 
"catholic." He held that "every . . . Christian community is as 
such an ecumenical (catholic) fellowship, that is, at one with the 
Christian communities in all other places, regions, and lands." 
While he preferred the term "catholic," Barth often employed the 
term ecumenical synonymously with it. He urged, for example, that 
instead of emphasizing "local, national, continental," "social 
and racial traditions" or other situational factors which influence 
the speech of the Christian community, "theology will have to stand 
guard over the purity of the Christian message and insist on the 
ecumenical, catholic, and universal sense and character of this 
m e s s a g e . W h i l e  regarding "catholic" as the initially broader 
term, Barth observed that "as progress is made" in ecumenical 
efforts, "there are signs that . . . the wider term 'catholic'
^®Karl Barth, Community, State, and Church (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1960), p. 150.
39Barth, Evangelical Theologv, p. 193.
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will fill out or burst through the narrower term 'ecumenical.'"'^® 
The concepts associated with the term "catholic"— its comprehen­
siveness ("universality"), principles of "identity" and 
"continuity"— attach to the term ecumenical. Barth thus contrib­
utes to a theory of community by expanding the term ecumenical 
with concepts related to the term "catholic."
Second, in keeping with its etymology, Barth says that the 
term "catholic" contains "the narrower sense of 'ecumenical,' i.e., 
identical in the whole inhabited world, in all parts of the globe 
where men live. . . He adds that the term "has been chosen
to describe the modern attempts at reunion and u n i t y . E c u ­
menism concerns principles of unification, concepts which help 
bring the world's communities into unity. This concern for unifi­
cation accentuates one of the most important ideas which Barth's 
use of the term ecumenical adds to a theory of community; namely, 
that ecumenics concerns intercommunity relationships. Barth notes 
that "from the geographical meaning" of ecumenical "there has 
derived . . . the wider sense in which the reference is to the 
relationship of the Christian communitv to the other natural and




historical human societies. E c u m e n i c s ,  then, concerns relation­
ships between communities and principles which coordinate and pro­
mote unity in these relations.
Third, an important contribution emerging from Barth's view 
of ecumenics is his idea of "a people" or community as "not a fixed 
but a fluid c o n c e p t . T h e  concept of a people is "a historical 
construct," a matter of an "attitude" based on a particular concep­
tualization of a history of persons in a geographical area.^^
Common "experiences," "certain historical foundations and facts, 
events and formations" plus "economic, social, cultural, political 
and religious factors" constitute "the historical realities which 
underlie the existence and distinction of peoples. Differing 
attitudes, "assumptions, questions, anxieties, needs and tasks" 
related to these factors become "the root of . . . serious division" 
between pe o p l e s . I n  discussing the problem of "Near and Distant
Neighbours," Barth states that he is "concerned with relationships
4Rin which it is essential for every man to exist as man." " While
^^Ibid. Italics are mine.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Creation, 3/4:291, 300-301., 
45Ibid., p. 295.
'̂ ®Ibid., p. 294.
'̂ Îbid., p. 295.
^^Ibid., p. 285. Italics are mine.
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taking seriously "historical realities" such as the above charac­
teristics of intercommunity relationships, Barth points out the 
flexibility of such factors. The concept of community must be 
taken dynamically, not statically. Boundaries between peoples 
are permeable and expandable. The speech, geography, and history 
of any people is subject to change. Assimilations of peoples 
through language, geography, and historical events occur. As a 
matter of ecumenical attitude, recognizing the relativity of com­
munities is important. Ecumenics concerns relationships and these 
are not fixed or final but subject to change.Such an ecumenical 
attitude is important to Barth's theory of community.
The meaning of community
The term community focuses the meanings attached to "catho­
lic" and ecumenical. The specific elements associated with these 
terms— those of "universality," "identity," "continuity," the con­
cern for principles of unification, for intercommunity relation­
ships, and the fluidity of the concept of "a people"— all converge 
with the term community. Several additional concepts which Barth 





upbuilding of community proceeds from a particular human fellow­
ship to a universal fellowship; (2) the community exists in its 
task; and (3) the community exists as an event.
First, the upbuilding of community proceeds from a particu­
lar human fellowship to a universal fellowship. This is a key and 
scientific, inductive element in Barth's approach to the emergence' 
of community. Barth holds that the universal without the particu­
lar is insubstantial. He grounds his theory of community in dis­
tinctly visible groups. He says, for example, that "the Christian
community is a phenomenon which all men may perceive and assert
52like all others in the sphere of history. ..." Barth says 
that "the place where the . . . Catholic Church is believed in is 
the particular church which has its own history and its own out­
look. Ecumenism must be based on "the concrete actuality of 
unitedness," upon an actually existing fellowship.Ecumenism 
begins with a "particular community" which "must itself become 
the "ecumenical company," i.e., the aspirations of the universal 
community must be actualized first within a local group.While
^%arth. Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:722.
^^Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man. trans. by 
Douglas Horton (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 228.
^^Karl Barth, Theologv and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-




the universal community has its abstract aspects, existing partly 
as a symbolic construct and matter of belief and attitude, these 
aspects are manifested visibly by a local community. The uni­
versal is disclosed in the particular and therein becomes "an 
empirical and rationally comprehensible" phenomenon.The Chris­
tian community "exists essentially in the sphere of visibility" 
and hence "within world-occurrence.
Accordingly, Barth's approach to the building of community 
proceeds inductively— from definite groups with specific histories, 
characteristics, and situations— to more inclusive intercommunity 
relationships. The particular "points" tmvard the universal.^® 
Thus, universal community is built up inductively. Barth’s ■ 
position contrasts with a deductive approach to community.
He places community "not behind or above" but "within world- 
occurrence." The Christian community does not exist in world 
process "like an embedded foreign body, like a meteorite which has 
fallen from a distant sphere. . .." Community emerges from within 
the particular.Barth's inductive orientation to building com­
munity sees the Christian community as one particular (although
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:722-724. 
^^Ibid., p. 723.
^®Barth, Doctrine of God, 2/2:196.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:723.
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distinctive) communal element among others;
The Christian community does not merely resemble the other 
elements, magnitudes and factors in world-occurrence; for all 
the particularity of its structure and situation it is of like 
manner with them. It does not hover over them; it exists on 
the same level. It can thus be seen together with them, and 
critically and constructively compared with them.®®
Because the Christian community stands as an element in world 
process, although it points beyond it, it has something to offer 
a general theory of community. Barth says "there can be no exclud­
ing the attempts made to understand it in the categories of general 
sociology as a union or society . . . and therefore historically 
as a link in . . . the history of the development of.such 
unions. . . ."®^ In his inductive approach to the development of 
community, then, Barth proceeds from the particular to the uni­
versal, holding that the universal is manifested through the par­
ticular. As particulars, communities— and the larger community 
to which they point— may be studied as empirical, rational entities. 
Critical study of the elements of communities and in community 
may contribute to ecumenical unity.
Second, the community exists in its task. Barth stresses
®°Ibid.
®̂ Ib_id. Cf._Barth's question: "Should the clarifications
which it /theology/ has helped achieve in the community also have 
significance . . . for the general cultural life of mankind (for 
instance, for the sense and procedure of other human sciences)?" 
Barth, Evangelical Theologv. p. 194.
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that the community is a fellowship of persons cooperating in the 
fulfillment of common goals. In the concept of community, Barth 
says, "we are concerned not merely and not primarily with institu­
tions and offices but with human beings gathered together in cor­
porate bodies in the service of common t a s k s . A s  the community 
exists in its task, a specific purpose sustains its being and 
action. Because the community's task precedes its existence, the 
existence of a specific need and purpose serves as a summons for 
the formation of community: "It does not exist before its task
and later acquire it. . . . Its task constitutes and fashions it 
from the very o u t s e t . T h e  community "is measured" by its task 
throughout its history. Its speech, actions, or abstentions from 
action are evaluated "in relation" to its task.^^ The community 
is defined by its task.
The content of the community's task— its specific origin, 
nature, and goal— characterizes the community. The task "is . . . 
addressed to specific p e o p l e . T h e s e  persons are "awakened and 
assembled . . . for the fulfillment of a specific t a s k . T h e
®^Barth, Communitv. State, and Church, p. 149. 
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:795-796. 
®"̂ Ibid., p. 796.
®5lbid.
®®Barth, Doctrine of Creation. 3/4:488.
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task and its specific content calls the community into being, 
shapes it, and gives it direction. The Christian community, for 
example, has the task of witnessing to Jesus Christ and in so doing 
"points beyond itself to the fellowship of all men. . . ."G7 it 
has a specific task of communication with respect to a specific 
message and with respect to a specific movement which, in this 
instance, carries it toward the achievement of universal commu­
nity. The community is united by a central task, "by its common 
cause . . .  in relationship to its individual members. . . ."68 
The norms and roles of the community, its order and the "particu­
lar functions" committed to its members, relate to its central 
t a s k . T h e  task orientation of the community motivates its mem­
bers, occupies its attention, and energizes its inquiry and 
activity:
This task is so profoundly stimulating, so radically impelling, 
so important, urgent and comprehensive. . . .  It demands its 
undivided attention and devotion because with every new gath­
ering of the community and in every new situation in its his­
tory it must be taken up with full readiness and concentration, 
and enquiry must be made into its meaning . . . and the proper 
way to discharge it.^8
^^Barth, Doctrine of God. 2/2:196.
Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/2:678; cf. ibid..
4/3:800.
69Ibid., 4/2:678.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:800.
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The common task of the community does not imply suppression of 
individually "varied questions and concerns and cares and aspira­
tions." These differences should not be concealed or denied. 
Different situational factors necessarily entail, to some degree, 
different concepts, approaches, and activities in the service of 
similar causes. Consequently, the activity of the community "can­
not possibly become the uniform and monotonous function of a collec­
tive."^^ Nevertheless, the community, despite any differences,
73attests to the unity of its task. The fulfillment of this task
74provides a "constancy" and purpose for the community.
The task of the community also entails an inner and outer 
movement: The community's "outward service has necessarily an
inner dimension." The content of the community’s task— its mes­
sage or "witness"— must "be addressed to its own members and con­
tinually made perceptible to them."^^ The community must be 
"enlightened" and "awakened afresh . . .  to participation" in its 
task. The community must be strengthened and renewed from within 
before it can attest its message from without. On this basis of
"̂ Îbid., pp. 800-801. 
72ibid., p. 801.
73Ibid.
74lbid., pp. 813, 818. 
■̂ îbid., p. 832.
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an inner to an outer movement Barth speaks of the need of ecumenics 
within Christian communities: "The centripetal forces which it
/the Church/ needs are still weak enough to make even the unity of 
Christian communities among themselves extremely doubtful in many 
places and a special 'ecumenical' movement both desirable arid 
urgently necessary." The task of the community proceeds from 
the inner to the outer. Barth says that if the necessary inner 
witness of the community failed "its outer witness might be com­
pared to the empty bed of a stream which has been sealed at its 
source. . . ."^^ Barth says that the inner-outer direction of 
the community's task and the proclaiming of its message "is not 
to be reversed."^® At the same time, care must be taken that the 
community's work not become a "sterile inbreeding" or "an end in 
itself" but a service extending from within to and for those 
without.
Third, the community exists as an event. Barth argues that
^^Barth, Communitv. State, and Church, pp. 152-153.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/3:832.
’̂®Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 833. Barth further compares the "relationship of 
outward and inward action" in and from the community as follows:
"In this respect we may think of the circular motion of the heart 
which in order to pump blood through the whole organism not only 
goes out in the diastole but also has to return in the systole, yet 
only to go out again in the renewed diastole." Ibid.
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the community has its being "in the particular relationship" of 
those who share "a common response" to its message-®® This 
response and relationship occurs and the existence of the community 
is fulfilled in interaction. "The Church," for example, "is a 
community which hastens towards and comes together in a public 
convocation."®^ Community is "not the being of a state or insti­
tution, but the being of an event, in which the assembled and 
self-assenibling community is actively at work. . . ."®̂  Community 
is an occurrence. The community "is when it takes place, and it 
takes place in the form of a sequence and nexus of definite human 
activities."®® The community exists in its history and behavior. 
"In these human activities as such it can be studied. . . .  It is 
a phenomenon of world history which can be grasped in historical 
and psychological and sociological terms. . . ."®^ Some observable 
elements in the being of the community as an event include: "a
gathering and separation of certain men to this fellowship"; evi­
dence of "an . . . organization and constitution and order"; 
activities such as its "cultus, teaching, preaching, instruction.






theology," etc., "all in definite relationships to the political 
and economic and social conditions and movements, to the scholar­
ship and art and morality, of the surrounding world." 85 The com­
munity thus exists and may be studied, along with its "laws," 
"tradition," and "purpose," in its "connexions and similarities 
and reciprocal actions in relation to other human phenomena and 
their history."®^ Barth holds, then, that the community exists 
"in the event or occurrence or act of its upbuilding as a commu­
nity."®^ The community sustains its existence in its active gath­
ering, interaction, and communication.®®
Intragroup factors
Since Barth's concept of community stresses a particular to 
a universal, and an inner to an outer movement, it is appropriate 
to consider factors within groups which may contribute to community 
before proceeding to factors in relations between groups. Factors 
here refer to conditions and particularly attitudinal elements 
which may contribute to the achievement of community. In addition 
to his explanation of ecumenical concepts, Barth discussed other
®®Ibid.
®®Ibid.
®^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/2:641. 
88Ibid., 4/3:832-833.
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specific factors extending from these concepts which contribute 
to intergroup cooperation. He stressed that ecumenics begins 
within a particular group and extends from there to other groups.
The following factors synthesize some of Barth's answers to two 
interrelated questions with which he was concerned: What does it
mean to confess unity or community in the face of disunity? and 
What does it mean to do this from a particular place, i.e., beginning 
with one's own group? Barth's answers to these questions from 
the intragroup perspective gather around three factors: the
importance of each group (1) taking its separate existence seri­
ously; (2) facing questions, including the question of its individ­
ual existence; and (3) agreeing to listen.
Taking separate existence seriously
A number of factors relate to this foundational issue. Tak­
ing the separate existence of a group seriously includes at least 
the following factors: (1) taking the local situation seriously;
(2) seeing unity in disunity; and (3) pursuing the intentions of
a particular community "to their origins and actual meaning,"
90developing and implementing them.
First, moving toward unity from a particular place with one's
®^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:677, 680.
^°Ibid., p. 680.
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own group means taking the local situation seriously. Barth 
explains this point initially by stating what such a movement does 
not mean. This progression cannot mean an escape from "the par­
ticular in our life situation . . . into the general and 
absolute. . . . We cannot escape from concrete disunity into 
abstract unity. It is necessary "to accept, to understand, or at 
least to be aware of the particularity of one's historical rela­
tions. . . We do not progress toward unity by overtly or
covertly rebelling against "the particular in our life situation, 
against those elements which are the results of chance and 
history. . . . We must begin where we are. An individual's 
escape from his particular history and community— a withdrawal 
"in disgust or superiority" from one's community into "some hermit's 
retreat or ivory tower" where one represents only one's "own per­
son"— "is to abandon not only the distress but the hope of the 
community and indeed oneself."®^ Barth says that "a will to unite 
cannot be developed by people who have not yet taken themselves, 
to say nothing of others, seriously. . . As with an individual.
^^Barth, Word of God and Man, p. 227; cf. Barth, Doctrine of 
Reconciliation. 4/1:677-678,
^̂ Barth... Word of God and Man, p. 227.
®3ibid.
^^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/1:678.
^^Barth, Word of God and Man. p. 228.
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when communities "try to bring unity nearer by ceasing to take 
themselves seriously, by letting slip the special responsibility 
which they have, by denying and renouncing their special charac­
ter for the sake of internal or external peace, . . . genuine 
unity cannot be achieved. Such an escape does not lead to unity 
but is "the way to a new separation.Unity must be the product 
of critical thought, including self-examination. Hasty alliances 
based upon mixed motives and without careful prior thought, do not 
contribute to responsible unity. Barth says that we must be will­
ing to go "the straight and rigorous way that leads from thought 
to action— and no other."Unity"  cannot be served by under­
standings that lack content.Communities, like individuals, 
must know themselves, take their particular histories and character
^®Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:578.
^^Ibid.
®®Barth, Word of God and Man. pp. 225, 229. Barth says:
"And thought means recollecting the meaning of what we say and do. 
When thought enters in, perhaps this or that will cease to be said 
and done or begin to be said and done otherwise than hertofore. 
Perhaps the same thing will need to be said and done with another 
meaning than it has had. Thought means fundamentally neither 
affirmation nor negation. . . . Thought, in any case, need not 
separate us from each other, even if its theoretical and practical 
results are not the same with all of us. I hold therefore that it 
must be fundamentally possible in the long last to come to an 




seriously, and proceed from the place of self-understanding, if 
they are to be integrated meaningfully into larger unions. Criti­
cal self-awareness is a key to progress toward unity. No external 
attempt at unity which fails to take seriously the separate exist­
ence and character of particular groups can contribute to genuine 
community.
Second, moving toward unity from a particular place with 
one’s own group means seeing unity in disunity. This movement 
and perspective is basically a progressive dialectic involving 
the critical correlation of o p p o s i t e s . I n  this view, opposing 
communities represent contrasting viewpoints which, while they may 
contradict each other, are necessary, complementary elements in a 
total process. Opposing communities represent important parts 
which deserve synthesis into a subsequently richer whole. On this 
Barthian and Hegelian view, "the unity of truth" is seen as "the 
unity of contradictions. A starting point in the movement
toward unity is to see the unity of the whole in the various parts 
in which it can or does consist. Since the parts are necessary to
®̂*̂ Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation, 4/1:678-679.
^®^For a discussion of Barth's view of dialectic as a criti­
cal correlation of opposites, see "Existential Communication and 
Dialectic," pp. 97-100, supra. The above statements extend from 
this discussion.
^^^Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 297.
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the whole, opposing communities and individuals cannot evade the 
fact of disunity. Because of the interdependence of the divided 
parts or groups, "concretely the gathering to the community means 
for each of us the gathering to one of these divided commun­
ions."^®^ Movement toward unity requires facing the fact of dis­
unity. The divided parts must be taken seriously "in their dis­
tinctness" if the whole is taken seriously. Thus, Barth asks how 
one community can know the unity of the whole "or be zealous and 
active in relation to it?" if it fails to recognize its own unique­
ness even in disunity.Divided communities need to learn about 
unity from their fragmented and isolated situation. A universal 
community and particular divided communities are correlates; "the 
one depends on the o t h e r . D i s u n i t y  must exist for reconcilia­
tion to occur; the parts must be accepted in their disunity before 
the whole in its unity can be formed. At this point the scientific, 
inductive character of Barth's approach to community can be seen: 
he recognizes that community begins with an inductive, critical 
examination of each part— of each community in its distinctive 
being— and that community is built up as these parts are examined, 
extended, and correlated. A totality is discovered or generated




by understanding, energizing, and combining particular elements. 
Third, moving toward unity from a particular place with 
one's own group means pursuing the intentions of a particular 
community "to their origins and actual meaning," developing and 
implementing them. To achieve unity it is necessary that individ­
ual groups attempt to live up to their om\ claims. If individual 
communities are inert, if intragroup movement is lacking, inter­
group unity would lack momentum. Consequently, movement toward 
unity does not imply a lessening but an intensification of intra­
group efforts, provided these reach out to intergroup unity. If 
this reaching out for unity does not occur at the intragroup level, 
it is likely not to occur at all.^^^ A community needs to under­
stand its origins to envision its destiny as related to others. 
Barth says that "appreciation of the last things cannot be won by 
hurriedly passing over the things that come b e f o r e . E a c h  com­
munity has a preliminary history which merits careful examination 
and criticism.Each community has its reason for being. Each 
community has its historical roots; it was born out of some need 
and choice, having "its relative necessity and right as the com­
plement to some omission or error on the other side." This
lOGlbid.
^^^Barth, Word of God and Man. p. 228.
lO^Ibid.
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"relative necessity and right may still give at least a relative 
justification for its continuing." Consequently, a community may 
have, "for the time being, no cause to renounce . . . Z^ts/ par­
ticular existence and doctrine and form of life. . .."  On the 
contrary, it may feel compelled "to cherish and renew and develop 
it. "109 result of a community pursuing its origin and meaning
may be that "unity . . .  is proclaimed in all its . . . plural­
ity."^^® Since a community may have its relative necessity, the 
claims of each may contribute to wider community. If each commu­
nity follows out its presuppositions and implements them, commu­
nities may draw together as they realize their relative need for 
each other, their shared interests, and their converging interests.
Questioning individual existence
A second intragroup factor in moving toward unity involves 
a group's willingness to face questions and to question itself.
This issue includes: (1) facing the causes of disunity and ques­
tioning their necessity; (2) facing the question of tradition; and 
(3) facing the question of a community's being.
First, moving toward unity means facing the causes of dis­
unity and questioning their necessity. In the process of pursuing
^®^Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:680.
ll°Ibid., p. 681.
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its origins, intentions, and claims, a community has opportunity 
to face the causes of its separation from other communities. It 
has opportunity to consider whether the reasons for its separate 
existence are justified, or, whether the causes of division are 
sufficiently relative and, hence, removeable or reconcilable. Is 
the community certain that the reasons for its particular separa­
tion from other communities are justified?There are possible 
"grounds for the emergence of the spearation in question: national
peculiarities, particular historical and social groupings, the 
existence of leading personalities . . . traditions . . . the 
usage and customs of the land, the instinct of self-preservation, 
the requirements of prestige natural to every human soci­
ety. ..." A community needs to ask itself if these or other
grounds for separation are tenable. It needs to ask itself if these
differences are such that they "really cannot be surrendered in
inrelation to others?" It needs to ask itself if it really
believes in these issues or if it is only holding to them out of
supposed necessity. Does the community have different options in 
confronting these issues? Must a community accept the continued 





totally b r o k e n ? M o v e m e n t  toward unity can be made at the intra­
group level if a community candidly confronts and responds to such 
questions related to the causes of its disunity.
Second, moving toward unity means facing 'the problem of tra­
dition. In facing causes of division and asking whether existing 
walls of separation must remain, a possibility is that "they have 
been broken long since, or exist only as an external factor and in 
the interpretative historical phantasy of a relative minor­
ity. . . ."115 Barth argued for the importance of taking each 
community's history seriously. He warned, however, against cling­
ing to "the interest of the antiquarian," i.e., adhering to tra­
ditional ways for their own sake, either because they are familiar 
or convenient, but not because they are based on critical under­
standing. Speaking of his own Swiss Reformed background, Barth 
wrote:
To our fathers the historical past was something which called 
not for loving and devoted admiration but for careful and 
critical scrutiny. They cherished the conservative principle, 
it is true, but with them it was so often crossed and broken 
by the opposite one that their beginnings at best show only a 
fragmentary loyalty tovrard the past, and for the most part 
represent a clean and merciless break with it.^^^
^̂ '̂ Ibid.
^^^Xbid.
^^^Barth, Word of God and Man, pp. 228-229. 
^^^Ibid.
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Barth refused to accord "a finality and sacredness" to a particu­
lar tradition. While deeply respecting the values of particular 
traditions, he refused to see them statically. Since his view of 
history was evolutionary, he believed that the received teaching 
of a community must be— and usually was intended to be— left "open 
to being improved upon in the future." Tradition is a prelimi­
nary history, not a final one. Tradition can be constructive and 
powerful when we learn from it, build upon its better parts, adjust 
its teaching, and face its issues "in our way amidst our surround­
ings" as our predecessors "did in their way amidst their surround­
ings."^^® Moving toward unity, then, involves facing the problem 
of tradition.
Third, moving toward unity means that each community must 
face the question of its being. In facing the causes of disunity 
and questioning their necessity and in facing the question of tra­
dition, a community has cause to reconsider its own necessity, to 
reopen the question of its individual existence. A community 
may be more radically confronted by internal self-questioning than 
by competing communities. If a community questions its individual 
existence in "good conscience," it may contribute to unity by
^^®Ibid., p. 229. 
^^®Ibid., p. 271.
^^®Barth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:682, 684.
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breaking walls of division from within. Self-questioning may 
diminish intergroup conflict. Barth says that under the impact of 
such questioning "all would then find themselves drawn up in their 
own place, and doubt, scepticism, indifference and the like would 
be everywhere impossible. Opening the question of the exist­
ence of individual communities does not mean their "dissolution" 
but "fulfillment.Traditions should not be swept aside hastily; 
each may contribute to a larger, more enduring unity. As a result 
of facing the question of its individual existence, a community is 
likely to become more open to the traditions of other communities.
As a community confronts this question, it may ask "whether and 
to what extent there ought not to be on this side a willingness 
to learn from them instead of simply opposing t h e m . A l o n g  with 
the possibility of fulfillment, of new combinations of traditions 
and communities, a question of sacrificing less durable elements 
remains. In facing "the practical question what is to become of 
its individual existence" a community may find "that it will be 
necessary to scrap, or at least to revise or modify, its particu­
lar constitution. It may be that at many points it will need to
^21ibid., p. 682. 
^2^Ibid., p. 683. 
^^^Ibid.
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be liberated or renewed in its separate e x i s t e n c e . S o m e  ele­
ments may be preserved, others destroyed, while others are per­
petuated in new combinations. Barth offers this encouragement: 
"And even if the form is not exactly one and the same, .will not 
that which remains in the one place be so near and similar to that 
which remains in the other that on both sides we will actually 
find that we are positively on the way to unity. . . . Much 
is to be gained, then, in the movement toward unity if communities 
will face the question of their separate existence.
Agreeing to listen
A third intragroup factor in moving toward unity involves a 
willingness to listen. This issue includes: (1) recognizing that
community is based upon "common hearing and receiving" and that 
participation in a community depends upon this; (2) deciding to 
hear; and (3) recognizing that listening is preparatory and.inte­
gral to common debate and discussion.
First, moving toward unity means recognizing that a commu­
nity "is constituted . . . by a common hearing and receiv­
ing. . . . This aspect of a community's existence is a
^̂ "̂ Ibid., p. 684.
^^^Ibid., p. 685.
^^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/2:588.
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"common action" which is "partly contemporary" and "to a much 
greater extent . . . non-contemporary. . . ."^27 since community 
is not a state but a sequence of events and actions affecting 
interpersonal relationships, contemporary participation is required 
if one genuinely relates to a community. The community lives in 
its members, their relationships, and their communication. Where 
individuals "attempt to break loose from the community of hearing 
and receiving" community is denied.Hearing in community is 
hearing and receiving in participation. This involves ongoing 
"contemporary" interaction, i.e., that which "takes place among 
those who belong to the same age and period" of a community.
It also involves "non-contemporary" hearing, i.e., that which 
"takes place . . . between the present age and those which pre­
ceded it." Community is based upon both kinds of conversations. 
As it progresses from its origins to its goal, a community finds 
itself initiated, sustained, and fulfilled in the active listening 
relationships of its members. Without such listening relationships, 
individuals exist in relative isolation, not in community. Listen­
ing provides a concrete basis for much of the community's being 





on listening. "Confession," Barth says, "is the accounting and 
responding which in the Church we owe one another and have to 
receive from one another in relation to the hearing and receiving 
of the Word of God. Confessing is the confirmation of that com­
mon a c t i o n . W h a t  a community proclaims is what it hears.
What it proclaims attests to what it has heard as a community 
either in its "contemporary" interaction or in its dialogue with 
its "non-contemporary" predecessors. Careful listening needs to 
precede proclamation. If a community proclaims a unified message, 
mutual listening within the group must have o c c u r r e d . I f  we 
speak with a group, we must hear with it. Thus, "a single voice" 
in isolation is not the voice of community. We can hear the voice 
of community "only where it is spoken out of a community of hear­
ing and receiving . . . and therefore in fellowship.
Second, moving toward unity means deciding to hear. Barth 
says that "the decisive step" in uniting divided communities is 
that they "should honestly and seriously try to hear . . . the
130ibid.
^^^Ibid., p. 591. Probably much more research needs to be 
done into the listening habits of groups, not simply as individual­
istic auditory processes, but also from the philosophical stand­
point of how listening shapes the common attitudes, behavior, 
values, and speech of a community. Perhaps coramunicologists need 
to study listening as a movement as they have speaking movements.
^^^Ibid.
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voice of the o t h e r s . B a r t h  says that when a community does 
this "in its own place" but "without leaving it," the community 
is on the way to u n i t y . I n  making this decision and effort, 
it abandons its claim to exclusiveness or superiority. If it 
refuses to make this decision and effort, it cannot be on the way 
to one community. If it is open to "the question of its individ­
ual existence," then "it will be willing and ready to let them 
say something to it. . . . Agreeing to listen is a decisive 
step toward unity, for in it a community is "thus renouncing, in 
fact, its isolation . . . its exclusion. ..."
Third, moving toward unity means recognizing that listening 
is preparatory and integral to common debate and discussion.
Barth sees the teaching of a community as open-ended. Since no 
community's doctrine is final, at least from the standpoint of its 
interpretation, listening is necessary to common debate and dis­
cussion. Barth says that "I cannot thrust myself into . . . 
debate . . . without first having l i s t e n e d . I f  one’s
^^%arth. Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:684.
^^^Ibid. 
^^^Ibid.
^^®Ibid. For a further, brief discussion of Barth's views 
about listening in the context of an ecumenical discussion, see 
his lecture "Roman Catholicism: A Question to the Protestant
Church." Barth, Theology and Church, pp. 307-333.
^^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/2:589.
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discussion is to be heard in a community it must be based upon hav­
ing heard that community.The ability to address and influence 
a community depends upon prior listening. If one identifies with 
a community, one must hear its views. Effective speech is built 
upon effective listening. Speech— particularly that addressed to 
a community— is a kind of feedback. Barth emphasizes that proc­
lamation "is an accounting and responding in relation to . . . 
hearing and receiving. . . . He believed that if community is 
achieved there must be an agreement to listen and this involves 
recognition that listening is vital to communication which attempts 
to lead to unity.
Interqroup factors
Barth's theory of community follows an inner to an outer 
movement, beginning within a group and reaching out to others. 
Consequently, what is said here under the intergroup heading is 
an extension of the intragroup factors. Three final aspects of 
Barth's theory of community are examined; (1) the value of common 
debate and discussion as an activity leading to unification; (2) 
the importance of a comprehensive basis for agreement; and (3) the 
"principle of the common center."
^^®Ibid. Italics are mine. 
^^®Ibid.
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Common debate and discussion
A first intergroup factor in moving toward unity involves 
appreciating the ecumenical value of common debate and discussion. 
The adjective common is an important prefix to these terms. It 
refers to equal participation by all members of a community. For 
Barth, these activities are the responsibility of an entire commu­
nity and an important factor in achieving unity between groups.
Two aspects of this idea include: (1) debate and discussion as
corporate action ; and (2) the ecumenical goal and attitude of 
debate and discussion.
First, moving toward unity means participating in debate and 
discussion as corporate action. These activities are vital links 
between listening and proclamation in communities. Listening 
should precede responsible proclamation, for responsible proclama­
tion is an accounting of serious hearing. But this proclamation 
needs debate and discussion if it genuinely represents community. 
Debate and discussion bridges listening and proclamation, helping 
to criticize, shape, and interpret each. Prom the standpoint of 
community, neither listening nor the proclamation it shapes is a 
private action. Hearing is not isolated and for self; it is in, 




on this kind of hearing, is in, with, and for the community. In 
thus speaking to a community, i.e., on the basis of first having 
seriously listened to it, the speaker acknowledges his solidarity 
with the community by putting his ideas before it. Barth says 
that this presentation is not undertaken "to force" the message on 
the community "in the peculiar form in which I necessarily hold 
it. . . . "  Instead, the speaker puts his message before the com­
munity "to enter into debate" with it; "a debate in which I may 
have to be guided, or even opposed and certainly corrected, i.e., 
an open debate. . . . " Such proclamation is not set forth with 
finality; the speaker should "regard it as a question for general 
consideration. ..." Such a speaker presents his views with a 
sense of individual responsibility to the community. Regardless 
of the acceptance or non-acceptance of his message by the commu­
nity, the speaker fulfills his responsibility to share with it. 
Accordingly, the community, recognizing that its vitality depends 
upon the fresh contributions of individuals, knowing its depend­
ency upon encounter, likewise determines to "take account" of a 
speaker's message and "to enter into a debate which is open on its 
side as well."
'̂̂ îbid., pp. 588-589. 
'̂̂ ^Ibid., p. 589.
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Second, the "aim" of such debate is community or "fellow­
ship. Such debate and discussion has an ecumenical goal: it
leads to unification. Consequently, it is undertaken not in a 
competitive but in a cooperative spirit, in an attitude of mutual 
trust and r e s p e c t . T h e  life of the community, Barth believes, 
is manifested "as a debate which comes into being because the 
members . . . owe and pay one another and must receive from one 
another a mutual accounting. . . . " Such debate "has a common 
end," the "common proclamation" of the community.This debate 
is not an end in itself. The community’s "debate stands under a 
binding purpose and this purpose is that of union or 
unions. . . Thus, "the immediate goal" of the debate "can­
not be that of remaining apart, but of coming together and stand­
ing together in view of the actual coming together in proclama­
tion. "^49 This "immediate goal" of the debate and discussion is 
that those who participate in it, for example, those engaged in an 
ecumenical conference, should make a "common confession" and reach
144ibid.
“̂̂^Ibid., p. 590. 
^46ibid., p. 591. 
'̂̂ ‘̂ Ibid.
^^®Ibid., p. 592. 
l̂ ^̂ Ibid.
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a distinct, if limited agreement. The debate should be productive; 
it should yield definite proposals and/or articles of agreement. 
Such documents "can never be more than a partial agreement, an 
agreement at definite points. . . ."^50 Despite this provisional 
and temporary character, such agreements testify that genuine 
progress has been made, that honest hearing, proclamation, and 
discussion has occurred, and that decisions have been made.^^^
Such decisions document the positive results of interaction and 
generate community. Barth believes that "it is in these common 
decisions in which a word is spoken here and there . . .  as a word 
to be respected, it is in the existence of these agreements that 
we live out" the community's "history. Community, then, is a 
product of decision and intergroup relationships which emerge, in 
significant measure, from common debate and discussion.
Comprehensive basis for agreement
A second intergroup factor in moving toward unity concerns 
the importance of establishing a comprehensive basis for agreement. 
Two aspects of this issue include: (1) the importance of estab­
lishing -a "preliminary history" through comprehensive position
ISOibid,
^^^Ibid., p. 594. 
^^^Ibid., p. 595.
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statements; and (2) the importance of addressing compelling and 
contemporary concerns.
First, moving toward unity means recognizing the importance 
of establishing a "preliminary history" through comprehensive 
position statements. Community and the elements which contribute 
to community do not spring up suddenly; they are products of a 
particular history in which "insights" have been won by a group 
and "battles" have been fought for their advancement and preserva­
tion. Consequently, if communities are to blend and share their 
insights in mutual agreements and interaction, comprehensive dis­
cussions, including position statements representing the groups 
involved, are necessary. Barth underscores the importance of 
accounting for the preliminary histories of groups as follows:
A creed without such a preliminary history. . . . might serve 
as a testimony to man's benevolent love of unity; as an expres­
sion of a common wish or ideal; as a compromise formula for 
groups whose differing statements are no longer the expression 
of living . . . thinking and who can now make a common state­
ment only because they no longer know what once divided 
them. . . .154
Such an agreement, proclaimed for its own sake, would be like "a 
beautiful flag which is left in the barracks when the regiment is 
on the march."1^^ Sometimes the purpose of a position statement




based upon a "preliminary history" may be "defined simply as the 
gain of a better understanding of why and how far, under present 
circumstances . . .  we cannot understand each o t h e r . S u c h  a 
statement at least prepares for serious discussion. Such a state­
ment may help avert the problem of groups "looking past each other" 
and "talking past each other all along the line" in their discus­
sions. It may also help bridge the problem of detachment in such 
discussions and encourage groups to confront important issues.
A position statement based upon a "preliminary history," i.e., one 
which squarely faces root issues between groups as grounded in 
their past and present, may also permit "division to manifest 
itself." This can stimulate thoughtfulness on all sides. Barth 
considered achieving understanding of a central, divisive issue, 
as a "success" in ecumenical e f f o r t . A  position statement 
based on a "preliminary history" enables groups to recognize con­
ceptual similarities and to explore differences. The clarification 
of these differences may provide a basis for immediate and ongoing 
discussion.
Second, a corollary of the foregoing is recognizing that
156ibid., p. 272. 




moving toward unity means addressing compelling and contemporary 
concerns. Genuine unity is not achieved on the basis of super­
ficial, merely verbal affirmations. Articles of agreement, if 
valid, must arise from some present "concrete situation" which 
"forces" the community to reach specific intergroup agreement. 
Such agreements involve "a communicating of something to know and 
something to undertake. . . They should contain definite
content and directions. They should include a declaration of 
insights and truths which a community "feels itself constrained 
to bear witness to . . . before the world in a formal docu­
ment. . . Accordingly, a community which desires to pro­
claim its insights must have the courage to address itself to 
"problems of life which today beset its members. It cannot wait 
until its statement comes thirty years too late. . . .  It must 
act while the problem is still 'hot,' . . .  at the outset of the 
problem.
"Principle of the common center"
A third intergroup factor in moving toward unity concerns





Barth's "principle of the common center," which orders community 
around a common object of interest. Two aspects of this pivotal 
issue include: (1) the role of the common center and object; and
(2) how it functions in building community.
First, the common center and object plays an important role 
in unifying communities. A community, like the disciplines which 
serve it, must be fundamentally "self-nourished at its own 
s o u r c e . I f  a community or a discipline loses sight of its 
special object of interest and inquiry, it loses its integrity 
and cohesiveness.Communities or disciplines which lose their 
special focus and reason for being face self-destruction. 
Accordingly, Barth refused to ground or justify theology in any 
other philosophy or science. He insisted that the Church as a 
community, and theology as a discipline, must stand upon their own 
feet.^®^ A community, like a discipline, must have its own, dis­
tinct "central binding e l e m e n t . ^ h e  Christian community, for
^^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God, 1/1:x. For example, 
theology as a discipline serves the Christian community. Cf. 
p. xii, ibid.
l®^For a definition and discussion of "object," cf. pp. 27- 
39, supra.
l^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. l/l:x.
1^’̂Ibid.
l^^Cf. John W. Keltner, Interpersonal Speech-Communication 
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 26-41.
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example, has its "own source and object."^®® This is usually inter­
preted by Barth to mean God, Christ, or the Scriptures, although 
man and his language are considered subsidiary objects of inquiry. 
The special object may vary from community to community as it does 
from discipline to discipline. The community’s experience is 
oriented around the object. As an objective reality, which may 
also be a subject or a personal model for the community, it provides 
a focus or center for the being and action of the community.
The history, work, and future of a community relates to its special 
object of interest. Thus, in some communities the special object 
becomes an object or center of total or at least comprehensive 
"concern" and "commitment.
Second, the common center and object functions in building 
community. This "principle of the common center," which orders 
community around a common object of interest, is the axial concept 
in Barth's theory of community. This principle, which is similar 
to Barth's concept of fidelity to the object, extends this concept, 
previously seen as determining the nature of scientific activity, 
reason, and language, into the area of intercommunity relations.
^^^Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 1/1:2.
^^®Cf., for example, Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God. 
1/2:442; Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/3:681, 711, 831.
^^^Barth, Evangelical Theoloqv, pp. 74-95.
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Whereas a discipline orders its inquiry around a special object,
operating at the level of analysis and investigation, a community
orders its experience and practical activities around a special
object. The speech of the community "points" to, "summons" to,
"witnesses" to, and creates "fellowship" around a special 
172object. The special object is a reference point for the commu­
nity. Where the same common reference is viewed by different 
groups, a commonality and hence basis for communication and commu­
nity exists. Despite differences, groups with the same special 
object may unite around this object. Barth believed that community 
may be promoted by challenging each group to orient itself to its 
claimed center, its special object of concern. If each group does 
this, he believed, the interests of different groups will ultimately 
meet as they extend their own presuppositions and follow their own 
approaches in reaching out to this common object. Thus, each 
community should "move forward" from its own place toward its 
special object of c o n c e r n . A  desideratum is that "from their 
own place all would orientate themselves to the centre which in 
loyalty to their own cause they regard as their own peculiar 
c e n t r e . S t r o n g  impetus for unity would proceed from each
l^^Barth, Doctrine of God. 2/2:196.
l^Bsarth, Doctrine of Reconciliation. 4/1:680.
174ibia., p. 682.
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community as it addresses its own object and center of interest.
While the results of such an orientation would vary from group 
to group, Barth contends that, collectively, individual communities 
would be drawn closer together in the quest for a common object 
of interest. If differing communities reach toward their shared 
object of concern, then the possibilities of agreement are enhanced. 
If agreement is achieved or at least a common interest is expressed 
for the central concern, then peripheral interests can later be 
brought into agreement. Speaking of theology's ability to accom­
modate a wide variety of viewpoints, Barth says:
All these exist together: the one not without the many
and the center not without its infinite circumference, although 
no One point of the circumference is identical or interchange­
able with any other. None is insignificant, unimportant, or 
dispensable; none is without its special truth and worth.
There is none that does not represent and reflect the whole; 
and there is none concerning which, proper or improper knowl­
edge might not have crucial consequences. . . . Oriented to 
him who is its starting point and its goal, theological knowl­
edge becomes a knowledge that articulates the unity of the
manifold.175
Barth's "principle of the common center" thus correlates concepts 
and groups by seeing the interdependence and importance of many 
ideas and communities, by giving each its place in a broadly- 
conceived galaxy or frame of reference. Instead of focusing on 
peripheral interests or piecemeal efforts to obtain unity, Barth 
concentrates attention upon a central object of concern, recognizing
175Barth, Evangelical Theoloqv. pp. 87-88. Italics are mine.
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that a broad array of interests may be addressed to this object. 
The center organizes the circumference. Each community's special 
object and that shared by many communities, provides a unifying 
center. Barth capsulizes this function as follows: "While it
gives every point of the circumference its special due, it brings 
together all parts from their own individual centers to their com­
mon center." The "principle of the common center" unites con­
verging lines of interest of many communities as they point toward 
a common object. It does this inductively and scientifically, 
requiring each local group to extend its own presuppositions, 
develop and manifest its own claims, and, by so doing, inductively 
discover the degree of its shared interest with other communities.
Summary
This chapter considered how community or intergroup unity 
may be achieved. The central question was: What principles of
communication did Barth believe were conducive to ecumenicity, or 
cooperation and unity among groups? The chapter considered a 
theory of community's significance for contemporary rhetoric and 
examined some presuppositions in Barth's theory of community. 
Barth's "principle of the common center," which orders community 
around a common object of interest, emerged as the axial concept
^^^Ibid., p. 88. Italics are mine.
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in his theory.
A theory of community contributes to rhetoric: (1) as part
of its task; (2) as part of modern inventional theory; and (3) as 
part of a conception of how the "universal audience" or audiences 
are produced. A theory of community contributes to rhetoric's 
task as a discipline serving "the great aspirations of the human 
community." It investigates "ways in which communication can help 
develop world community" and concerns generating agreements among 
people.
A theory of community contributes to modern inventional 
theory: (1) as part of its basis, since rhetoric studies how
cooperation is achieved ; (2) as part of its evaluative function, 
which judges among competing world views ; and (3) as part of its 
goal, which involves generating frameworks for group relations. 
Invention discovers grounds for agreement and cooperative action. 
It concerns not only the origination and management of discourse—  
the cohesion of ideas— but also the origination and cohesion of 
groups. A revitalized concept of invention contains a logic of 
intergroup relations. Invention criticizes world views because 
persuasive strategies relate to such positions. A "generative 
theory of rhetoric" attempts to bridge differing structures of 
experience. Invention generates relationships between ideas and 
people.
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A theory of community contributes to a conception of how 
the "universal audience" or audiences are produced. It recognizes 
that audiences are generated, not given, and that the "concept of 
a universal audience" involves "the search for rapport or at least 
operational agreement among diverse groups."
Three areas of Barth's theory of community were analyzed:
(1) his concept of community with related terms; (2) intragroup 
factors; and (3) intergroup factors. The terms "catholic," 
"ecumenical," and "community" structure Barth's theory. His uni­
versal framework includes elements of "comprehensiveness," "iden­
tity," and "continuity." Barth envisioned a universal audience 
of all humanity which he addressed through the church, a "provis­
ional" audience pointing to the even larger world-wide audience. 
Because of Barth’s universal framework, he was able to reconcile, 
not divide. Barth's "principle of identity" presupposes solidar­
ity, commitment, and participation with one's fellow-humanity.
The "principle of continuity" sees communities as "existing only 
in change," as part of a dynamic historical evolution. The term 
ecumenical refers to efforts to develop intercommunity relation­
ships. Barth's theory of ecumenics views "a people" or community 
as a "fluid concept," a "historical construct," and a matter of 
"attitude" which recognizes the relativity of all communities and 
is hence open to changes in them. The term community focuses
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Barth's ecumenical thought and entails these notions: (1) the
upbuilding of community proceeds from a particular human fellow­
ship to a universal fellowship; (2) the community exists in its 
task; and (3) the community exists as event. Barth's theory of 
community is scientific and inductive. The universal is dis­
closed in the particular and therein becomes an empirical and 
rational phenomenon. The building of community proceeds induc­
tively— from definite groups with specific histories, character­
istics, and situations— to more inclusive, intercommunity relation­
ships. The community is sustained, defined, and measured by its 
task. The community's norms, roles, and functions relate to its 
task. Its task has an inner and outer movement; it must be 
addressed first within the community and then without. The com­
munity exists as event. Community occurs; it "is when it takes 
place" in interaction.
Three intragroup factors in Barth's theory of community 
include: the importance of each group (1) taking its separate
existence seriously; (2) facing questions, including the question 
of its individual existence; and (3) agreeing to listen. Taking 
the separate existence of a group seriously involves taking the 
local situation seriously; seeing unity in disunity; pursuing the 
intentions and claims of a community. Communities must take their 
particular histories and character seriously if they are to be
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integrated meaningfully into larger unions. Seeing unity in dis­
unity involves dialectical correlation. Opposing communities 
represent complementary elements in a total process. The unity 
of the whole may be seen in the various parts in which it can or 
does consist. Questioning individual existence involves: (1)
facing the causes of disunity and questioning their necessity;
(2) facing the question of tradition; and (3) facing the question 
of a community's being. Agreeing to listen involves: (1) recog­
nizing that community is based upon "common hearing and receiving";
(2) deciding to hear; and (3) recognizing that listening is prepar­
atory to common debate and discussion. If we speak with a group, 
we must hear with it. Listening precedes proclamation. Proclama­
tion is an accounting of what has been received by listening to a 
community. Listening may constitute a movement in the history of 
a group. In deciding to hear, a community abandons any claim to 
exclusiveness. Agreeing to listen is a decisive step toward unity.
Three intergroup factors in Barth's theory of community 
include: (1) the value of common debate and discussion leading
to unification; (2) the importance of a comprehensive basis for 
agreement; and (3) the "principle of the common center." Corporate 
debate and discussion can lead to unity. Debate and discussion 
bridges listening and proclamation, criticizing, shaping, and inter­
preting both. Proclamation invites dialogue. Debate and
CHAPTER VI
BARTH’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PHILOSOPHY
OF COMMUNICATION
This chapter examines some comprehensive implications for 
a philosophy of communication inherent in the work of Karl Barth.
To accomplish this objective, the chapter takes a brief retro­
spective and prospective view of Barth's communicology. The 
following aspects are considered: (1) the purpose and thesis of
the study; (2) some specific contributions to a philosophy of 
communication ; and (3) some limitations of Barth's philosophy of 
communication and areas in which further research is needed.
The purpose of this study was to clarify and structure the 
implicit philosophy of communication in Barth's writings and devel­
opment. The thesis of the study was that a philosophy of communi­
cation can be derived from his writings. Following the premise 
that Barth's work contains sufficient data to constitute such a 
philosophy, a number of areas of interrelated concepts relevant to 
communication were located. These concepts were discovered through 
a primarily inductive investigation of Barth's writings,
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particularly his extensive systematic work, the Church Dogmatics. 
The thesis of the study was tested through a comprehensive analy­
sis, interpretation, synthesis, and critical evaluation of commu- 
nicological topics and concepts in Barth's work. Evidence 
presented in the discussion of a number of areas of Barth’s rhe­
torical thought indicates a positive confirmation of the thesis.
Barth's thought contributes to a philosophy of communication 
in a number of specific ways. No attempt will be made here to 
re-suramarize all of the particular findings of each chapter, since 
these are provided in detail in the chapter summaries. Instead, 
a number of comprehensive implications of Barth's philosophy for 
the study of communication are itemized. The following implica­
tions are observed; a study of Barth contributes (1) to an inter- 
cultural rhetoric; (2) to the architectonic and inventional func­
tions of rhetoric; (3) to a scientific concept of reason; (4) to 
the philosophical basis of communication ; (5) to the concept of 
speech as emerging meaning ; (6) to a concept of dialectic; (7) to 
a conceptualization of the functions of speech; and (8) to a theory 
of community.
(1) Barth contributes to an intercultural rhetoric. At a 
time when cross-cultural studies are increasing and recognition 
is growing that rhetoric needs to expand its international scope, 
Barth contributes to intercultural dialogue in the field of
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communication. Barth's work, which was produced in over one hun­
dred major translations, has transcultural interest. Barth con­
tributes the communicological thought of a thinker of international 
impact. He contributes the thought of a critical-humanistic 
scientist from a European tradition. Barth contributes a philo­
sophical communicology which emerged within the context of his 
Swiss-German academic environment. Historically, rhetoric profited 
from studies of great European thinkers. Recently, continental 
philosophers such as Perelman, Heidegger, and Tillich have con­
tributed to rhetoric. Barth contributes to an international dia­
logue concerning the role of communication which needs continuing 
development. Barth's contributions to intercultural rhetoric 
include, beside factors in his development leading to international 
dialogue, at least the following elements: his view of one of the
primary functions of speech as the opportunity to compare and criti­
cize differing world views; his concept of a people as a fluid, his­
torical construct, susceptible to change as part of a dynamic evo­
lution; his concept of a world community and universal audience of 
all humanity, along with specific intragroup and intergroup factors 
which may lead to international unity.
(2) Barth contributes to the architectonic and inventional 
functions of rhetoric. The National Developmental Project on Rhet­
oric addressed the need for rhetorical concepts which enable persons
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to evaluate ideas, positions, and to engage in dialogue and action. 
Barth contributes to such concepts. The central theme evolving 
in this study was that the primary architectonic principle govern­
ing Barth's development and thought is a movement toward complete 
fidelity to the object of inquiry as determining the nature of 
scientific activity, rationality, and discourse. This architec­
tonic principle oriented Barth's philosophy of communication.
This concept, for example, was the basis for his experimental 
view of language, i.e., his notion that language must be faithful 
to the objects it represents and flexible in following their move­
ments. Language must be tested for its fidelity to the objects 
it represents. It must be in process, fluid, mobile, tentative, 
and always subject to revision; it must reflect movement, change, 
energy, and life if it represents the ontological dynamic of 
objects. Rhetorical productions must evolve with the changing 
realities they seek to represent. Barth's concept was further 
manifested in his "principle of the common center," in which the 
axial concept of intergroup unity is viewed as the sharing of a 
common object of interest. Fidelity to the object, then, is an 
architectonic, unifying principle of human motivation and language 
in Barth's thought. This architectonic concept may broaden and 
enrich communication theory by its ability to synthesize scientific 
activity, reason, language, the functions of speech, and efforts
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toward intergroup unity. This principle contributes a powerful 
inventional concept which governed the production of Barth's dis­
course. This concept also contributes to the concept of a disci­
pline, with its emphasis upon the investigation of a special object 
within a specific field of inquiry. Thought, action, and discourse, 
is oriented toward this object and receives its impetus from its 
particular domain. Barth believed that if disciplines, communi­
ties, and speakers adhered more carefully and scientifically to 
the special objects they seek to investigate and represent, thought 
and communication would be enriched.
(3) Barth contributes to a scientific concept of reason.
For Barth, logic is bound to its object. Reason is adherence and 
appropriate response to the object of inquiry. The proper use of 
reason is determined primarily by its object. Ontology precedes 
epistemology. Rationality is participation in "meaningful order," 
and this involves correlating objectivity and subjectivity. Reason 
is an event, an act of such correlation. Rationality is ordered 
activity according to the law of an object's being. Barth thus 
contributes to a scientific concept of reason by emphasizing its 
conformity to ontology and by correlating human experience with it.
(4) Barth contributes philosophical bases for communication. 
Barth's ideas about communication derive from his theory of exist­
ence. He integrated a balanced conception of existential and
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dialectical notions. By grounding communication in the object- 
subject relation, Barth maintained an equilibrium between objec­
tivity and subjectivity. He believed that essence communicates 
through existence, i.e., the nature of universal being communi­
cates through the nature of individual being. Consequently, the 
humanistic and naturalistic unite. Speech can never lie at the 
surface of reality; it participates, even in its defective forms, 
in the order of reality. Speech manifests the laws, continuities, 
constants, and models of the phenomenal universe. Existential, 
essential, and empirical realities unite in genuine communication. 
Barth establishes speech in a dynamic ontology which preserves 
subjectivity in the framework of objectivity. He contributes to 
a philosophical basis for communication by his concepts of knowl­
edge and experience. Knowledge is the acknowledgment of reality, 
and hence must move with ontological reality. Knowledge requires 
active personal participation. As the subject is determined by an 
object of knowledge, he provides proof of his acquaintance with 
it, he coexists with it, and becomes a witness to its content. 
Communication is thus grounded in the nature of knowledge and 
experience, which involves subjective appropriation from the thing 
known. Barth speaks of a "knowledge-relation," of knowledge as an 
existential relation between a knower and a thing known. Content 
emerges from the active relation between knower and thing known.
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Knowledge and experience are thus processive, and inventional 
theory must consequently be revised to keep pace with evolving 
reality. Knowledge and discourse must retain the character of an 
investigation ; they must remain provisional; they require supple­
mentation. Human thought and discourse are part of a history; 
knowledge and speech are in a process of becoming.
(5) Barth contributes to the concept of speech as emerging 
meaning. Because of Barth's view of existence, knowledge, and 
experience, he regarded speech as a process of emerging meaning.
A message must develop from the many words spoken. Meaning must 
evolve. Discourse must give birth to meaning— physical stimuli 
must become ethical and intellectual phenomena achieving existence 
in the subjective experience of receivers. Critical science con­
cerns the "total series of expressions" of a community. In its 
total configuration and history, meaning varies according to the 
connotations it has acquired in different contexts or which have 
been attached to it through criticism. Criticism must focus upon 
centers of meaning within a total configuration of discourse, con­
centrating upon a few major elements within these. Barth thus 
provides a meaning-centered view of the history and criticism of 
discourse.
(6) Barth contributes to a concept of dialectic. Barth saw 
dialectic as conceptual evolution, as the critical correlation of
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opposites, and as implying an elasticity, portability, and adapta­
bility of concepts. Dialectic is the movement of reason within 
existence. Concepts possess full ontological status as much as 
any occurrence in the physical world. Ideas are an organic part 
of history. Consequently, speech may be regarded as an organic 
part of history. Dialectic incorporates diverse lines of thought. 
The dialectical thinker and speaker experiences the pressures and 
tendencies of a subject matter, interacts with it, and then 
releases this experience in a dynamic, flexible manner.
(7) Barth contributes to a conceptualization of the functions 
of speech. Barth's functions for speech include making reference, 
participating in a coTEaon event of perception, establishing our 
humanity through being in encounter, acting, and experiencing 
human fellowship in reality. Barth's development of these func­
tions contributes to a better conceptualization of interpersonal 
communication, to the value theory of communication, and to a goal 
conceptualization of communication. Rationality depends upon 
objective reference. Communication thus also involves participa­
tion in a common event of perception. Humanity is actualized in 
encounter. Speech and action are an organic unity. The final 
function of speech is to experience human fellowship in reality.
(8) Barth contributes a theory of community in keeping with 
the ecumenical task of rhetoric. He provides an inductive and
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pragmatic approach to the building of community which makes spe­
cific applications and extensions of his philosophy of communica­
tion in the service of intergroup unity. This theory contributes 
to a generative rhetoric which provides specific guidelines for 
developing intercommunity relationships. Barth's theory includes 
fresh perspectives on listening, proclamation, corporate debate, 
discussion, and other topics which underscore the value of and 
reinterpret rhetorical concepts in the service of community.
Finally, some limitations of Barth's philosophy of communi­
cation and areas in which further research is needed may be 
observed. A basic limitation in dealing with Barth is coping with 
the vastness of his writing. Although the Dogmatics. which con­
tains more than eight thousand pages, was comprehensively examined 
for this study, this represents only about half of Barth's writing. 
Considerable further research might be conducted by focusing upon 
his other articles, books, and pamphlets, or upon specified periods 
of his life and work. Another limitation and incentive for further 
research stems from Barth's productiveness and style. Because 
Barth wrote prolifically over such a long period of time, the 
researcher must synthesize concepts over a broad span of time and 
literature. Further, Barth's style, at least in the Dogmatics, is 
often complex. Dialectical qualifications of his ideas occur in 
various parts of his work. One must be careful to interpret Barth
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from the perspective of his overall thought and development. This 
productiveness and style is a stimulus to all kinds of topical 
investigations, however, as Barth develops as many interesting 
subthemes as he does major ones. No doubt this variety of Barth's 
topics has contributed to the development of more than eighty-five 
dissertations in this country which have dealt with aspects of his 
work. In view of Barth's outstanding significance as a theologian 
and in view of growing recognition of his philosophical acumen, 
this trend may well continue.
As a stimulus to further research, several questions and 
areas of investigation may be suggested: How do Barth's ideas 
about communication compare with those of other contemporary 
philosophers and theologians? To what extent can the views of 
these philosophers be correlated as a contemporary philosophy of 
communication? How does Barth contribute to the philosophy of 
the social sciences? What contributions does Barth make to seman­
tics? to a theory of criticism? to the psychology of communica­
tion? to a theory of religious-ethical communication? To what 
extent does Barth present a personal and conceptual model for 
intercultural communication? These and other questions seem to 
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